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What works for whom in public employment policy? 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Employment Insurance 1996 Reforms 
 
 The Canadian Employment Insurance (EI) Act, passed in June 1996, established two 
parts to the EI program.  Part I, Employment Insurance Benefits (EIB), is cash unemployment 
compensation.  It provides temporary income support to Canadians between jobs.2  Part II 
provides for Employment Benefits and Support Measures (EBSM), which are active labour 
market programs to help the unemployed return to work.3  The overriding policy objective is to 
provide “eligible Canadians with better opportunities to obtain and keep employment and be 
productive participants in the labour force.”  The EBSM should also advance other policy 
objectives, including reduced EIB expenditures.  
 
 A major goal of the EI Act was harmonization of federal and provincial employment 
programs while maintaining local flexibility in design and delivery of services.  The act provided 
for bilateral agreements between the provinces and the federal government, as well as for 
contracts between provinces and third parties for the design and delivery of services.  The 
bilateral agreements are known as Labour Market Development Agreements (LMDA). 
 
1.2 Labour Market Development Agreements 
 
 By the fall of 1999, LMDA had been concluded between the federal government and 
each province and territory except Ontario, where the agreement did not go into effect until 
January 1,  2007. The delivery of EBSM in this province was handled by the federal government 
until that date.  The federal government is represented by Human Resources and Skills 
Development Canada (HRSDC) in these agreements.  The initial agreements were either 
comanaged or devolved.  In the comanaged situation, the province or territory and the HRSDC 
shared responsibility for labour market activities.4  In the devolved situation, the province or 
territory had sole responsibility for the design and delivery of interventions.  Since February 
2010, all LMDA have been devolved. The interventions are designed and delivered within the 
principles and guidelines established by the legislation and the LMDA. 
 
 In keeping with the new approach to results-based management in the federal 
government, known as “Modern Comptrollership,” HRSDC has developed and continues to 
explore new results-based indicators to reflect outcomes rather than only throughputs or inputs.  
Modern Comptrollership places emphasis on the department and its minister to account to 
Parliament and the Canadian public for the use of resources.  As a consequence, with the 
                                                 
2Benefits may also be paid, for example, to persons on maternity leave or on sick leave. 
3An overview of Employment Insurance (EI) Part I, income benefits for the unemployed in Canada, is 
available at http://www.hrdc-drhc.gc.ca/dept/guide98/ei2.shtml.  EI Part II is the subject of this report.   
4See <http://www.hrdc-drhc.gc.ca/dept/guide98/hri2.shtml>.  
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implementation of the EBSM came the introduction of a new results-based accountability 
framework—a systematic approach to managing departmental performance by results.  
 
 EI Part I is delivered by HRSDC through Service Canada centers, but delivery of EBSM 
have been devolved to the provinces and territories.  The LMDA required formative and 
summative evaluations of EBSM in each province and territory. The formative evaluations were 
completed, and the first summative evaluations have been done in all jurisdictions except for one 
province, where the completion is expected in Summer 2011.  Those evaluations answered some 
questions but raised others about program effectiveness and evaluation design.  This paper 
recapitulates results from the summative evaluations and contrasts these results with findings in 
the international literature with an eye toward informing the next round of EBSM evaluations 
under the LMDA. 
 
1.3 Canadian Active Labour Market Programs 
 
 The EBSM comprise four main Employment Benefits (EBs): Skills Development (SD), 
Targeted Wage Subsidies (TWSs), Self-Employment (SE), and Job Creation Partnerships (JCPs).  
The main support measure under Employment Services interventions is Employment Assistance 
Services (EAS).  Eligibility for EBs is limited to current EI recipients (referred to as “active 
claimants”), and unemployed persons who have had an EI claim in the past three years or 
received maternity or parental benefits in the past five years before applying for EBSM 
assistance.  The latter group is referred to as “EI former claimants,” or “reachbacks.”  
Employment Assistance Services (EAS) are available to all unemployed Canadians and legal 
residents regardless of their involvement with EI Part I.  Following are brief overviews 
describing how each program works and recent levels of participation and program 
expenditures.5   
 
 Skills Development (SD) is the primary job skills training program available through the 
EBSM. Typically, SD training is funded through client vouchers to third party providers, with 
clients paying a negotiated portion of the total cost.  Individuals needing training to upgrade their 
skills for employment may be eligible for financial assistance through SD to help with training, 
related costs, and living expenses.  A portion of SD assistance may be repayable on a conditional 
basis.   
 
 Skills Development, which includes SD-Regular and SD-Apprentices, helps participants 
obtain employment by providing direct financial assistance that enables them to select, arrange 
and pay for training in skills ranging from basic to advanced. SD-Regular participants receive 
financial assistance to defray basic living costs and training costs, including tuition. Participants 
in SD-Apprentices interventions are supported during the classroom portion of apprenticeship 
training, primarily through EI Part I. These individuals may also receive Part II support for 
additional classroom-related expenses. 
 
                                                 
5This overview draws freely on a technical document prepared by Nicholson (2010) under contract with 
HRSDC and continuously updated by HRSDC (2009). 
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 As is consistent with the high priority placed on addressing skills shortages across 
Canada, SD traditionally accounts for the largest proportion of Employment Benefits 
interventions and expenditures, and these trends intensified in 2008/09. SD interventions rose 
11.4 percent, to 159,011. This total accounted for 83.7 percent of all Employment Benefits 
interventions delivered in budget year 2008/09, up from 82.1 percent the previous year. 
 
 Targeted Wage Subsidies (TWSs) help participants obtain employment through the 
acquisition of work experience and on-the-job training. TWSs encourage employers to hire 
individuals whom they would not normally hire in the absence of a subsidy. Financial assistance 
is provided to the employer to cover a portion of the participants’ wages, as well as other 
employment-related costs. These subsidies are typically targeted at hard-to-employ workers and 
may account for up to 60 percent of total wages.  The subsidies last for up to 52 weeks and can 
be extended to 78 weeks for workers with disabilities. Earnings from subsidized jobs are 
insurable under EI and therefore enable workers to renew their EI eligibility.   
 
 In 2008/09, 15,412 TWS interventions were delivered across the country, a decrease of 
2.9 percent from the previous budget year. This type of intervention has declined in each of the 
last eight years. The TWS share of all Employment Benefits interventions fell from 9.1 percent 
the previous year to 8.1 percent in 2008/09. Total TWS expenditures fell to $87.4 million in 
2008/09. 
 
 Self-Employment (SE): Eligible individuals who have a good idea for their own 
business may qualify for financial support, planning assistance, and ongoing support while they 
get their business up and running.  Applicants must attend an orientation, provide a viable long-
term business plan, start a new business, and agree to work full-time on this business while 
receiving financial assistance.  Workers are provided with technical assistance in setting up their 
own businesses. They are able to collect their remaining EI entitlements during this process and 
may in some cases collect additional EI Part II benefits.  Earnings under SE are not insurable 
under EI and therefore do not provide for renewed EI eligibility. 
 
 Self-Employment enables participants to obtain employment by helping them to start 
their own business or become self-employed. It provides financial assistance for basic living 
expenses and other personal needs while the participants are developing and implementing their 
business plan. SE also funds coordinators who ensure participants have access to business 
planning advice and expertise. 
 
 The number of SE participants rose for the first time in five years, climbing 2.2 percent to 
10,380 in 2008/09. Even with this increase, SE interventions have declined 13.6 percent since 
2004/05. SE represented 5.5 percent of all Employment Benefits interventions in 2008/09, down 
from 5.8 percent the previous year. Expenditures for SE declined year-over-year, falling 3.0 
percent to $135.6 million. 
 
 Job Creation Partnerships (JCPs): Eligible individuals may have an opportunity to 
work on special projects developed in partnership with the provinces/territories, the private 
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sector, labour, and community groups.  These projects create incremental and meaningful work 
opportunities and help develop the community and local economy.  These are jobs in the public 
and nonprofit sectors that are intended to benefit the community. JCPs give participants the 
opportunity to gain work experience to improve their prospects for obtaining and maintaining 
employment. Financial assistance is provided to short-term projects that offer work experience to 
participants.  Employees on these jobs continue to receive their EI benefits in lieu of wages and 
may have these benefits “topped up” to prevailing wage rates for the specific occupations. 
Wages earned under JCP activities are not insurable under EI. 
 
 In 2008/09, there were 5,275 participants in JCPs, an increase of 3.0 percent year-over-
year. This was the first increase in JCPs since 2002/03. Even with this small gain, the number of 
JCP participants has declined by 49.9 percent since 2002/03. JCP interventions made up 2.8 
percent of total Employment Benefits interventions, down from 2.9 percent last year. 
Expenditures were relatively stable at $49.3 million compared with $49.5 million in 2007/08. 
 
 Employment Assistance Services (EAS): These are job search assistance services 
provided to help unemployed workers find employment.  Services include job interview 
referrals, job skills inventory, aptitude testing, job search assistance, access to information and 
resource centers, job finding clubs, individualized and group counseling, and group information 
sessions.  The services are often provided through third-party service delivery agreements.   
 
 Employment Services are available to any unemployed person in Canada who requires 
assistance to enter or return to the labour force. There are three types of Employment Services 
interventions: 1) Employment Assistance Services (EAS), 2) Group Services, and 3) Individual 
Counseling.  Total expenditures for Employment Services rose 2.2 percent to $566.3 million in 
2008/09. The number of interventions delivered rose at a significantly higher rate of 14.4 percent 
to 878,254. As the economy worsened during the latter half of the year, an increasing number of 
individuals sought Employment Services to facilitate a quick return to the labour market, or, 
conversely, needed multiple interventions as they developed a return-to-work action plan. 
 
 EAS interventions comprise a variety of services that support participants as they prepare 
to enter or re-enter the labour force. These services range from job search assistance, provided to 
job-ready clients, to the development of in-depth return-to-work action plans for clients facing 
multiple employment barriers. EAS interventions may be combined with other EBSM 
programming for which the client is eligible.  A total of 512,198 EAS interventions were 
delivered in 2008/09, which was a year-over-year increase of 15.1 percent. EAS interventions 
accounted for 58.3 percent of all Employment Services interventions delivered during the year. 
 
1.4 Overview 
 
 The next section reviews results from the Canadian evaluations as summarized by 
Nicholson in a technical document contracted by HRSDC (2010), and lists the knowledge gaps 
left from these studies concerning the effectiveness of programs for participant subgroups, in 
differing labour market conditions, for various program features, and in differing combinations 
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and sequences with each other.  The third section is the body of this paper, where we attempt to 
present the findings on the effectiveness of active labour market programs in other developed 
countries, relying on high-quality evaluation studies.  In Section Four, the knowledge gaps in the 
evaluation literature from both Canada and other countries are presented.  Finally, in Section 
Five, based on knowledge of the LMDA evaluations in Canada and the evidence from other 
countries, we will suggest evaluation strategies that could be tried in the next round of Canadian 
EBSM evaluations under LMDA.     
 
2 EFFECTIVENESS OF ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET PROGRAMS IN CANADA 
 
2.1 Evidence from LMDA Summative Evaluations 
 
 This section reviews the evidence from the LMDA evaluations as summarized by 
HRSDC (2009) and Nicholson (2010).  Results were available for evaluations in the following 
provinces and territories: Alberta, British Columbia, Newfoundland and Labrador, New 
Brunswick, Northwest Territories, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Quebec, Prince Edward Island, 
Saskatchewan, and Yukon.  The regions spanned by these 11 evaluations cover 97 percent of the 
total Canadian labour force.  The reference period used in the summative evaluations to assess 
program net impacts falls between 1998 and 2004.   
 
 The summaries of evaluations focused on three outcome measures (annual hours of 
employment, annual earnings, and number of weeks per year in receipt of EI benefits), by type of 
EBSM, for active and former EI claimants. The summaries focused on evidence from 
comparison group–designed quasi-experimental evaluations.  The most common estimation 
methodology used in the LMDA summative evaluations is called difference-in-differences.  The 
outcomes of participants are contrasted to those of similar individuals who did not participate in 
the program, with a second contrast computed before and after the program participation time 
frame.  
 
 The EBs examined were Skills Development, Targeted Wage Subsidies, Self-
Employment, and Job Creation Partnerships.  The SM evaluated was Employment Assistance 
Services.  Following are the main findings for each program. 
 
 Skills Development (SD). Active claimants who participated in SD increased their 
earnings in seven jurisdictions, representing 33 percent of the national labour force covered by 
the evaluations. The typical estimated gain in annual earnings was in the $2,000 to $5,000 range. 
In proportional terms, the earnings gains were about 10 to 20 percentage points. The impact on 
employment was positive (an increase of 211 hours per year, or about five weeks) for active 
claimants in one jurisdiction, representing 15 percent of the national labour force covered by 
these evaluations. Smaller increases were reported in the remaining jurisdictions reporting on 
this measure, representing 85 percent of the labour force covered. However, the smaller 
estimates were not statistically significant at standard levels.  Both positive and negative net 
impacts were found for EI use among active claimants. Predominantly positive findings were 
found for EI use in six jurisdictions encompassing 57 percent of the nation’s workforce, with 
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estimated decreases ranging between 1.2 and 3.2 weeks in EI use per year.  Average increases of 
1.8 weeks in EI use per year were estimated for two jurisdictions, representing 17 percent of the 
national labour force covered by the evaluations.  
 
 For former claimants, SD had mixed effects on employment, earnings, and EI use. Point 
estimates ranged from a decrease of 235 hours to an increase of 342 hours, estimated earnings 
impacts ranged from a decrease of $3,900 per year to an increase of $5,300 per year, and 
estimated EI impacts ranged from a decrease of 2.5 weeks per year to an increase of 4.3 weeks 
per year.  
 
 These relatively positive results may in part be explained by the focus of many SD 
interventions on obtaining credentials. A majority of SD participants report that their program 
provided some sort of credential for completion, and there is empirical evidence that such 
credentials may serve as a signal about productivity to prospective employers (Martin and Grubb 
2001).  Another reason for the preponderance of positive results may be the relatively weak 
labour markets that the comparison groups faced in many of the evaluations.   
 
 Targeted Wage Subsidies (TWSs). Significant employment and earnings gains were 
reported for former claimants who participated in TWSs.  Four jurisdictions, representing 87 
percent of the national labour force, reported increases in employment between 194 and 419 
hours per year. Similarly, former claimants who participated in TWSs recorded increases in 
annual earnings ranging from $2,600 to $4,400 in four jurisdictions, representing 85 percent of 
the national labour force covered by the evaluations.  Significant postprogram earnings gains 
were found for active claimants who participated in TWSs in two jurisdictions, representing 15 
percent of the national labour force covered by the evaluations. The typical estimated gain in 
annual earnings was in the $4,200 to $4,800 range. The impact on EI use was mixed for active 
claimants, ranging between a decrease of 1.8 weeks per year and an increase of 2.7 weeks per 
year.  
 
 For former claimants, the impact was negative, with increases in EI use of between 0.2 
and 8.5 weeks per year in four jurisdictions, representing 84 percent of the labour force covered. 
The negative impact on EI use may, in part, reflect eligibility effects. Employment under a TWS 
program is insurable under EI, so eligibility is more or less automatic for most participants. Even 
if there are employment gains after the intervention, it is still possible that some of those who 
lose their subsidized jobs will collect EI. Significant employment and earnings gains for former 
claimants were found in the majority of the evaluations that studied this intervention. 
Specifically, significant increases in employment were found in four out of five evaluations that 
assessed this outcome, and increases in earnings were found in four out of six evaluations. The 
estimated gains in earning were in the range of $2,600–$4,400. The results for active claimants 
were more modest, as only one out six evaluations found a positive impact on earnings, and only 
one out of seven evaluations reported an increase in earnings.  
 
 Self-Employment (SE). SE showed positive net impacts on employment for both active 
and former claimants. The jurisdictions with positive employment outcomes represented 98 
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percent of the national labour force covered by the evaluations for active claimants and 87 
percent of the national labour force covered for former claimants. Increases of 20 to 30 percent 
in annualized hours worked were reported, with much larger gains being reported in some 
provinces. These strong gains suggest that many SE participants remain self-employed after the 
formal intervention ends and that they generally report working full-time on such jobs. Increases 
in the annual number of hours SE participants worked were often not accompanied by increases 
in earnings. In some cases, the evaluations reported significant declines in earnings (up to $2,600 
per year). In contrast, however, some increases in earnings (up to $4,700 per year) were found 
for former claimants in one jurisdiction, representing 26 percent of the national labour force 
covered. Both active and reachback claimants experienced significant decreases in EI use in the 
postprogram period. Specifically, reductions in EI use of up to 16 weeks per year for active 
claimants were found in seven jurisdictions, representing 86 percent of the national labour force. 
Similarly, reductions in EI use of up to four weeks per year for former claimants were found in 
three jurisdictions, representing 87 percent of the national labour force covered by the 
evaluations.  
 
 The principal finding is that outcomes from participation in SE are extremely 
heterogeneous. In some cases, the ventures can be wildly successful, creating employment not 
only for the individual involved but for many others as well. In other cases, SE can have serious 
negative consequences for the individuals involved—their businesses may be unsuccessful, and 
they may incur a wage penalty when they seek to re-enter paid employment.  Negative results 
were found for women, but these were often not statistically significant because of small sample 
sizes for women entering self-employment.  However, the negative impacts from spells of self-
employment are considerably smaller than those from unemployment itself.  
 
 Job Creation Partnerships (JCPs). The net impact estimates for JCPs were generally 
quite varied. For active claimants, a positive net impact was found on hours worked in one 
jurisdiction (an increase of 285 hours, or about seven weeks per year), representing 20 percent of 
the national labour force of the jurisdictions in which this outcome was assessed. Mixed results 
were found for impacts on earnings. Increases of $3,600 per year were found in one jurisdiction, 
representing 17 percent of the national labour force, while in another jurisdiction, representing 
58 percent of the national labour force, decreases of $2,500 per year were reported. No 
significant results were reported for EI weeks for these claimants. Employment results for former 
claimants who participated in JCPs were mixed (ranging from a decrease of 259 hours, or about 
six weeks worked per year, to an increase of 85 hours, or about two weeks worked per year). 
JCPs had negative impacts on earnings for former claimants (decreases ranging from $2,100 to 
$3,800 per year) in three jurisdictions, representing 40 percent of the national labour force. A 
negative impact was found for EI weeks in one jurisdiction (an average increase of 1.5 weeks), 
representing 60 percent of the national labour force covered by the evaluations.  
 
 The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from the JCP evaluation results is that the 
estimates were generally quite varied and often not statistically significant. For active claimants, 
only two of the earnings estimates were significantly different from zero, and one of them was 
negative.  For former claimants, three significant declines in earnings following JCP 
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participation were reported.  Estimates of impacts on EI receipt were rarely statistically 
significant. 
 
 Employment Assistance Services (EAS). These programs are generally short and 
relatively low-cost.  Often EAS are combined in action plans with other interventions.  Because 
of this complexity, evaluations of EAS have tended to focus on the group of “EAS-only” 
claimants.  According to the British Columbia data, these represent perhaps 65 percent of 
individuals who received any EAS-related services, but a much smaller fraction of total EAS 
services provided (because those with an Employment Benefits intervention tend to have more 
EAS interventions than do members of the EAS-only group).  The extent to which the EAS-only 
group is representative of all EAS participants has not been explicitly addressed in the 
evaluations, but on a priori grounds it seems plausible that this group might have more successful 
employment experiences than the other EAS participants. 
 
 Results for active claimants were generally not statistically significant for employment 
and earnings, with the exception of one jurisdiction where an earnings increase was estimated. In 
part, this may have resulted from the difficulty of detecting such impacts given the small sample 
sizes available in the evaluations.  For EI weeks, five out of eight evaluations generated 
statistically significant impacts; these included both positive and negative results.  Given the 
mixed results, no overall conclusions can be drawn about the impact of EAS-only in the EBSM 
context.   EAS participants did report strong levels of program satisfaction, job readiness, and 
interest in further training.  
 
2.2 Lessons Learned and Knowledge Gaps 
 
 We list the lessons learned and the remaining gaps in knowledge about effects of EBSM 
operated under LMDA in the provinces and territories.  Likely gaps concern effects by 
participant characteristics, program features, labour market conditions, and bundling or 
sequencing of services.  
 
 Skills Development.  Sample size restrictions generally prevented the evaluations from 
estimating effects of SD separately for subgroups of participants.  A few of the evaluations did 
report that women had somewhat more favorable overall impacts on employment and earnings 
than men, though these results were generally not reported separately for SD participants only. In 
the evaluations that were able to estimate gender-specific impacts for SD participants only, gains 
for men often exceeded those for women.  Hence, the EBSM results may not precisely mirror the 
international finding that women are more likely to benefit from training than men. 
 
 Estimated impacts of SD on former claimants were more variable than were SD impact 
estimates for active claimants. This larger variance in results may in part be explained by the 
difficulties that some of the evaluations had in identifying a proper comparison group for former 
claimants, some of whom had been out of the labour force for some time. 
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 Targeted Wage Subsidies. A general wage subsidy should increase both wages and 
employment. Katz (1996) provides a “guesstimate” that each 10 percent of subsidy should 
increase wages by about 6 percent and employment by about 2 percent. However, when a 
subsidy is targeted at only one class of workers, the situation becomes more complicated, 
because the displacement of unsubsidized workers by subsidized ones becomes relevant. By 
some estimates such displacement effects may be as large as 80–90 percent. 
 
 The more consistent positive impacts on employment and earnings among former 
claimants are not surprising. Many former claimants have been out of the labour force for 
substantial periods of time, and a temporary subsidy reduces employers’ costs of getting them 
“up to speed” in their jobs. On the other hand, active claimants have recent employment 
experiences, so their potential gains from TWSs are not as great.  Given these caveats, the actual 
results reported for TWSs in the evaluations were modestly promising.   
 
 The temporary nature of many wage subsidy programs adds further complications. In 
most economic models, the effect of a temporary subsidy should be smaller than that of a 
permanent one because firms would not make the kinds of labour-using investments they might 
if the subsidy were permanent. But more complex models suggest that such differences will be 
smaller when learning on the job is important.  In these cases, the subsidy may help to 
compensate for an initial period of low productivity for new workers and help to overcome 
firms’ reluctance to make such hires. 
 
 These conceptual issues about the concurrent effects of wage subsidies have not played 
an important role in the EBSM evaluations, however, because the evaluations focused 
exclusively on outcomes after the subsidies end.  That is, the subsidy period was viewed as being 
the TWS “treatment,” and this program was evaluated in ways similar to any other active labour 
market program. TWSs should have positive employment effects since skills and attitudes 
developed during the subsidy period may make employees more attractive. 
 
 Many evaluations of short-term subsidy programs have found beneficial outcomes. For 
example, the random-assignment Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) evaluation in the United 
States found that female subsidy recipients experienced earnings gains of about 15 percent 
relative to the control group, and males experienced gains of about 10 percent (Bloom et al. 
1993). In many cases, these gains persisted into the second postprogram year. Similar positive 
results were found in the National Supported Work evaluation and in some of the analysis of 
some states’ welfare reform initiatives (Gueron and Pauly 1991).  Although evidence from 
formal evaluations is less readily available outside of the United States, a survey of OECD 
experiences offers the assessment that subsidy programs have a greater impact per dollar spent 
than either training programs or direct government job creation (Martin and Grubb 2001). In the 
same way, a meta-analysis of 95 studies of European active lLabour market policy reports that 
evaluations of private sector incentive programs such as wage subsidies are more likely to report 
a positive impact from participation in these programs than from participation in training (Kluve 
2006). 
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 One complication in conceptualizing the wage subsidy component of the EBSM program 
is in understanding precisely how it is targeted. Although most of the evaluations report that 
TWSs are more appropriate for younger and harder-to-employ workers, few details are provided 
about how such targeting is achieved. The fact that the EBSM recipients studied in the 
evaluations must have been EI claimants further complicates the targeting issue. In some 
respects, EI claimants have characteristics more similar to dislocated workers than to the 
disadvantaged workers typically served by temporary wage subsidies. Precisely how the theory 
of wage subsidies applies to such workers is an open question.  Similarly, the evidence on the 
effectiveness of such subsidies in achieving labour market gains among dislocated workers is 
much less well-developed. 
 
 Self-Employment.  Unfortunately, the employment gains from participating in SE were 
often not accompanied by increases in earnings.  Once all sources of self-employment income 
were taken into account, one evaluation reported significant increases in earnings, and another 
evaluation reported decreases in earnings for former claimants. For active claimants, the only 
significant impact found in the evaluations with respect to earnings was negative. Whether the 
differences between these positive and negative findings can be explained by differences in the 
ways in which the earnings data were collected is an open question.  Clarifying whether SE 
provides a good income source for participants or, instead, raises difficulties in returning to paid 
employment should be an important goal of future evaluations.  
 
 SE participants generally experienced significant decreases in EI receipt in the 
postprogram period. Because weeks in self-employment are not insurable under EI, it is likely 
that these outcomes largely reflect eligibility effects rather than a decline in EI collection among 
eligible workers. If this decline was accompanied by declining earnings, the incomes of workers 
pursuing self-employment may experience serious declines, especially in the short run.  
Although this sort of impact was not found in all of the evaluations, the possibility that those in 
self-employment may experience large short-run declines in income suggests caution in 
expanding self-employment interventions beyond carefully targeted subgroups of claimants.  
 
 Job Creation Partnerships.  Some studies have reported that participation in public 
sector employment can help to improve training outcomes for low-skilled workers.  That is, the 
effects of training are more likely to stick for this group if they can experience a period of 
relatively undemanding work prior to joining the formal labour market (Heckman, LaLonde, and 
Smith 1999). However, interactions between SD and JCPs were not explicitly studied in the 
EBSM evaluations. 
 
 Employment Assistance Services.  A complication in evaluating EAS in the EBSM 
context is that often these services are combined in action plans with other interventions.  
Evaluations have tended to focus on EAS-only claimants, and evidence suggests that these 
claimants may be more successful than those who received EAS in combination with other 
services.  The evaluation findings for EAS were generally not strong.  As noted, the employment 
and earnings impacts, with the exception of one jurisdiction, were not statistically significant, 
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and although the impacts on EI weeks were significant in five out of eight cases, the signs of the 
impacts were both positive and negative.   
 
 A natural question to ask is why these results seem to differ so much from the small 
though relatively stable findings reported in many job search evaluations.  Three possibilities 
might be mentioned.  First, it may be that it is especially difficult to evaluate EAS using 
nonexperimental methods (many of the best job search studies used random assignment).  
Measuring the impact of this low-cost intervention may require a very precise matching of 
participant and comparison cases in the preprogram period, and it may not be possible to achieve 
that precision with the propensity score methods used here.  A second possibility is that the 
actual services delivered under EAS are more heterogeneous than the package of job search 
services usually studied.  The fact that many claimants received numerous specific EAS services 
supports this view.  Finally, many previous job search studies have been done in the United 
States, where the provision of such services also plays a monitoring and enforcement role with 
respect to continuing eligibility for unemployment benefits.  That role may be less significant in 
Canada, and this may account for a reduced impact. 
 
 
3 EFFECTIVENESS OF ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET PROGRAMS IN OTHER 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES  
 
3.1 Overview of Employment Programs in Developed Economies 
 
 In this chapter of the report, we review evidence on the effectiveness of the generic 
categories of Active Labour Market Programs (ALMP) as they are delivered by public agencies 
in other developed economies.  This review will serve as a context for comparative evidence on 
EBSM effectiveness. 
 
3.2 Subgroups, Program Features, Sequencing of Services, and Labour Market Context 
 
 The specific aspects of program evaluation we will focus on in the cross-country survey 
are these: participant subgroups, program features, bundling or sequencing of services, and 
labour market context.  Participant characteristics are the most commonly reported subgroup 
effects.  We report estimates of program features, sequencing, and labour market context when 
available.    
 
3.3 Methodological Standards 
 
 We limit our review of results to evidence from comparison group–designed evaluations 
of programs.  We consider evidence from both experimental and non-experimental evaluations. 
At the back of this report we attempt to provide an exhaustive bibliography of relevant prior 
studies.  In this report we reference only a subset of the studies listed.  For each evaluation study 
referenced we will briefly summarize the identification strategy for producing reliable estimates 
of program effects.  For example, we clearly distinguish evidence from studies where 
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experimental designs with randomization were used to identify exogenous program treatments.  
Similarly, for nonexperimental evaluations we briefly summarize the conditioning variables for 
dealing with nonrandom selection into program assignment.  Our review of evidence focuses on 
statistically significant program-effect estimates on employment, earnings, and conservation of 
cash EI assistance.  Where available, our discussion of results includes program effect estimates 
by the following areas: demographic subgroup, program features, services bundles and 
sequences, and the labour market context.  Summary tables of the key research evidence for each 
program are presented in the paper.  The factors summarized in the tables are as follows: author 
(year), country, sample and time frame, identification strategy, estimates by subgroup, program 
feature, labour market context, and service bundle or sequence. 
 
3.4 Findings by Intervention Type 
 
3.4.1 Skills Development  
 
 Studies of the effectiveness of publicly funded Skills Development (SD) have been 
conducted in a number of countries, although only a limited number of these studies present 
results for subgroups of the population.  While there is considerable variation across the studies, 
in the main, SD has been found to have positive impacts on employment or earnings, although 
there is considerable uncertainty about whether the positive impacts offset the social and private 
costs.   
 
The purpose of SD is to enhance individuals’ human capital, which may be defined as the 
set of skills and knowledge that an individual possesses that may be applied in a job in order to 
be productive.  The skills may be general or specific, meaning that they may be applicable in 
many jobs, or they may be applicable only to a specific occupation or job.  Skills are sometimes 
referred to as “soft” or “hard.”  Soft skills are personal attributes or characteristics that tend to 
affect job performance through interpersonal interactions in the workplace.  They include 
characteristics such as personality traits, communication skills, motivation, friendliness, and 
optimism.  Hard skills are the abilities to perform a certain type of task or activity.    
 
Public funding of SD may be warranted for unemployed individuals and may be 
warranted for incumbent workers as well.  Unemployed individuals may be emerging workers, 
meaning that they have very limited labour market experience, if any at all, or they may be 
dislocated workers, meaning that they have become involuntarily unemployed after many years 
of tenure.  In either case, workers’ skills do not match the skill requirements of jobs because 
useful skills have not been acquired or because existing skills have become obsolete.  Public 
funding of SD is appropriate on the basis of 1) the efficiency gains and positive externalities that 
are associated with employment, 2) imperfect capital markets that do not generally support 
investments in human capital, and 3) potential informational diseconomies to the extent that 
individuals may not be aware of or learn about the payoffs to training or educational 
opportunities.  Public funding of SD for incumbent workers may be warranted to prevent such 
workers from becoming unemployed. 
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In any case, skills development is an investment that is made in order to gain future 
benefits in the form of employment and earnings, as well as productivity.  Table 1 provides 
information about two thorough and rigorous meta-analytical studies that summarize results from 
several dozen studies of training.   
 
 
 
Table 1  Characteristics of Meta-Analyses of Skill Development Impacts 
Study 
Number of 
underlying 
studies 
Geographical 
coverage 
Dates of 
coverage
Dependent 
variable Main covariates Main results 
Greenberg, 
Michalopoulos, 
and Robins 
(2003) 
37 U.S. 1975– 
2000 
Annual earnings Training type, 
gender, age, race, 
unemployment rate, 
program cost, 
experimental 
dummy 
Men:  inconclusive; on-
the-job training (OJT) 
significant in most 
specifications; 
experimental dummy 
strongly  positive; 
nonwhite positive 
 
Women:  all training 
types except basic ed 
strongly positive; no 
other covariates 
significant 
 
Youth:  classroom skills 
training strongly positive; 
nonwhite positive; 
unemployment rate 
negative 
Card, Kluve, and 
Weber (2009) 
97 26 countries; 
primarily 
European 
1995–
2007 
Sign/significance 
of short-term 
impacts; 
sign/significance 
of medium-term 
impacts 
ALMP type; age; 
gender; country 
group; experimental 
dummy; duration in 
program 
Short-term impact:  
training not effective 
 
Medium-term impact:  
training (classroom or 
OJT) effective 
 
Outcome for men and 
women similar 
SOURCE:  Studies comprising rows of the table.
 
In the United States, a summary article by Friedlander, Greenberg, and Robins (FGR) 
(1997, p. 1810) notes,  
 
The broadest generalization about the current knowledge of government training 
programs for the disadvantaged is that they have produced modest positive effects 
on employment and earnings for adult men and women that are roughly 
commensurate with the modest amounts of resources expended on them. . . . 
Moreover, they have failed to produce positive effects for youth. 
 
Barnow and Smith (2009, p. 173) conclude, 
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Most employment and training programs have either no impact or modest positive 
impacts.  Many do not pass careful social cost-benefit tests, though some that fail 
may be worth doing on equity grounds.   
 
In perhaps the most exhaustive, recent review of the evidence, Card, Kluve, and Weber 
(2009, p. 20) found, in their meta-analysis of active labour market policy evaluations 
representing 26 countries, 
 
In the short run [< 12 months], job search assistance programs appear to 
have a relatively positive impact, while training programs seem to have a 
bigger advantage in the medium run [12–24 months]. . . . Programs for 
youth appear to be relatively unsuccessful in the short or medium run.   
(bracketed phrases added for explanation)  
 
An interesting methodological finding in this meta-analysis is the suggestion that 
nonexperimental research designs are likely unbiased—a conclusion drawn by the authors after 
finding that experimental and nonexperimental studies have very similar outcomes (positive and 
negative) controlling for outcome measure, type of program, and type of participants. 
 
In his summary of EBSM under the LMDA in Canada, Nicholson (2010, p. 11) reports as 
follows: 
 
The results in Table 3 for active claimants are encouraging. . . . The typical 
estimated gain in annual earnings was about $2,000–$4,800. . . . In proportional 
terms, the earnings gains are quite large by international standards—about 10–20 
percentage points. . . . Estimated impacts of SD on former claimants are also 
shown in Table 3.  In general, these estimates were more variable than were the 
ones for active claimants. 
 
Oftentimes, studies treat SD—i.e., training—as if it were a “black box” and do not 
attempt to disentangle what characteristics of the training might be responsible for its impacts.  
SD interventions are quite heterogeneous; among other things, they differ in terms of content, 
modality of delivery, pedagogy, and length.  Some studies have attempted to examine some of 
these aspects.  In the National JTPA Study (NJS), a rigorous random-assignment evaluation of 
training, Orr et al. (1994) were able to estimate impacts on the earnings of three service 
strategies:  classroom training (either occupational skill training or basic education), on-the-job-
training in combination with job search assistance (OJT/JSA), and all other service 
combinations.  Their results were as follows: 
 
Both women and men in the classroom training subgroup experience earnings 
losses during the in-program period with earnings gains in the post-program 
period.  None of these estimated impacts are statistically significant when adult 
women and adult men are analyzed separately, but when the two target groups are 
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combined statistically significant impacts on earnings are found in both post-
program years. . . . Women in the OJT/JSA strategy had immediate, statistically 
significant earnings gains that persisted throughout the follow-up period; men had 
estimated impacts that were quite similar in magnitude, but were only statistically 
significant in the second post-program year.  (pp. 132–133, emphasis in original)   
 
Interestingly, despite using the phrase “modest” in their summary of results, FGR (1997) 
report rather hefty rates of return to training.  They use the NJS data to show real rates of return, 
assuming that the mean effect lasts 3 years or lasts 10 years.  These rates are over 80 percent for 
OJT and, in the case of men, they are over 70 percent for classroom training.  For women, 
classroom training has rates of return of < 0 percent and 15 percent, depending on whether the 
mean effect is assumed to last 3 or 10 years, respectively.   
 
 Greenberg, Michalopoulos, and Robins (2003) report that, in the U.S. experience, 
classroom skills training has apparently been effective in increasing earnings, but basic education 
has not.  This meta-analysis also finds that OJT significantly increases earnings for adults.  
Ostensibly, this study intended to test the hypotheses that 1) publicly-funded training would 
become more effective over time as administrators learned what worked and what didn’t work 
and that 2) training outcomes should be correlated with the cost of training.  The authors 
conclude that both of these hypotheses are false—over the 25-year time frame of studies, there 
was no positive trend in effectiveness, and the most expensive training modalities were not 
superior for adults. 
 
 Biewen et al. (2007) investigate the issue of the length of training using German data.  
For programmatic purposes, Germany categorizes training programs into short-term training 
(lasting 2–12 weeks), further training (several months to 1 year), and retraining (2–3 years or 
more).  Further training could be purely classroom or practical (involving OJT, internships, or 
other stints at a firm).  This study uses propensity score matching to estimate the net impacts of 
the various training modalities.  The authors argue that a rich set of preprogram variables as well 
as a case worker assessment of participant motivation and regional unemployment rates satisfy 
the conditional independence assumption (CIA) necessary to identify findings.  The study finds 
that all training modalities increase employment likelihoods, but surprisingly, short-term training 
and classroom further training had the most beneficial outcomes.   
 
 Osikominu (2009) also investigates the issue of training length and notes that long-term 
training has a tradition in Germany even though many studies have noted the lock-in effect of 
such training.  This analysis examines spells of unemployment and employment using a 
competing risks hazard model.  The author maintains that variation in the timing of treatment is 
adequate to identify treatment effects.  The study finds that short-term training reduces 
unemployment spells, especially if it is introduced early in the spell.  Long-term training, on the 
other hand, increases unemployment spells, especially if it is used early in the spell; however, 
long-term training pays off with longer employment spells. 
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3.4.1.1 Subgroups  
 
 Obviously, an important characteristic of any analysis of the impacts of training on 
employment or earnings is the distribution of those impacts across subgroups of the population.  
Subgroup analyses may identify subpopulations for whom training seems to be systematically 
effective or ineffective.  To the extent that disparate outcomes across subgroups are caused by 
unintentional aspects of the program, then it may be possible for administrators to alter policies 
or practices to alleviate any inequities.  On the other hand, if there is a structural or 
programmatic reason for the disparate outcomes, then alternative programs or policies may need 
to be developed, if possible and if desired, by policymakers.  The subgroup effects that have 
been analyzed in studies include the following:  age (youth versus adults), sex, disability status, 
geographic region, educational background, and circumstance of training participation 
(dislocation or not).  Table 2 summarizes the studies that examine impacts for subgroups. 
 
Age.  A number of studies have found consistently only modest, if any, positive impacts 
from training youth (usually defined as less than 21) through the public workforce development 
system.  Kluve et al. (2007) discuss evaluation findings for youth programs in Europe.  They 
report that one study (Brodaty et al. 2002) that looked at workplace training programs for two 
cohorts of youth in France (1986–1988 and 1995–1998) found positive results in the earlier 
cohort, but the results for the second cohort turned negative.  This nonexperimental study, which 
uses a matching technique that relies on a competing-risk duration model to identify the 
propensity score, indicates that private subsidies yield better results for the short-term 
unemployed, whereas training works better for long-term unemployed youth.  Kluve et al. (2007) 
further cite a Finnish study that found positive employment and earnings outcomes from “labour 
market training” but slightly negative outcomes from “youth practical training,” which is the 
largest but least expensive program for unemployed youth in Finland.   
 
The Kluve et al. (2007) literature review goes on to cite no or negative effects of youth 
training programs in Sweden, Portugal, Norway, and Italy. 
 
In the United States, the NJS essentially found no earnings impact of classroom training 
or OJT/JSA for youth.  Orr et al. (1994) state, 
 
The only significant impacts occurred during the first six months of the follow-up 
period—a significant earnings loss for female youths in the classroom training 
subgroup and a significant earnings gain for those in the OJT/JSA service 
strategy.  It is likely, however, that . . . this many estimates would be statistically 
significant by chance.  On the basis of these results, then, there is no evidence that 
any of the JTPA service strategies improved the earnings of either female youth 
or male youth non-arrestees. (p. 150, emphasis in original) 
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Table 2  Summary of Studies That Provide Skill Development Impacts by Subgroup 
Study/subgroup Country(ies) Impact 
Youth   
Brodaty et al. (2002) France Positive in 1986–88; negative in 1995–98 
Kluve et al. (2007) Finland Positive for “labour market training” 
Negative for “youth practical training” 
Kluve et al. (2007) Sweden, Portugal, Norway, Italy Negative or insignificant 
Orr et al. (1994) United States Negative for female youth; insignificant for 
all others 
Hollenbeck and Huang (2003) United States Insignificant earnings; negative short-term 
employment; positive long-term 
employment 
Hollenbeck and Huang (2006) United States Negative short-term earnings; insignificant 
short-term employment; positive long-term 
earnings and employment 
Gender   
Nicholson (2010) Canada Impacts for men often exceeded those of 
women 
Card, Kluve, and Weber (2009) 26 countries Program outcomes similar for women and 
men 
Orr et al. (1994) United States Impacts for adult women substantially larger 
than for adult men 
Greenberg, Michalopoulos, and Robins 
(2003) 
United States Earnings effect largest for women and quite 
modest for men 
Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske (2008) United States Women’s employment and earnings impacts 
larger than men’s 
Race/ethnicity   
Orr et al. (1994) United States Earnings impacts for Hispanic women less 
than for whites or blacks; no racial/ethnic 
differences for men 
Greenberg, Michalopoulos, and Robins 
(2003) 
United States Nonwhite men and youth have higher 
earnings impacts than whites; no racial 
difference for women 
Disability   
Aakvik (2003) Norway Positive, but not significant, employment 
impacts 
Hoglund and Holm (2002) Denmark No impact 
Hollenbeck and Huang (2006) United States Positive employment and earnings impacts, 
but uncertain because of potential selection 
bias 
Geographic region   
Biewen et al. (2007) Germany Positive impacts in western Germany; no 
impact in eastern Germany 
Nicholson (2010) Canada Earnings and employment variation across 
provinces and territories 
Educational background   
Orr et al. (1994) United States No difference in impact between high school 
graduate and GED equivalence 
SOURCE:  Various. 
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For readers unfamiliar with the NJS, it should be pointed out that Orr et al. disaggregated 
the results that they found for youth into individuals with and without an arrest record.  The 
overall impacts for youth were estimated to be negative and significant, but the impacts for 
nonarrestees were insignificant. 
 
Hollenbeck and Huang (2003, 2006) estimated the short-term (three full quarters after 
program exit) and longer-term (9–12 full quarters after exit) net impacts of the JTPA Title II-C 
Youth program and the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) Title I-B Youth program, respectively, 
using data from the state of Washington.  Unfortunately, no analyses were done looking strictly 
at those youth who received training.  In the earlier study examining the JTPA program, these 
authors find no significant earnings gain and a (significant) short-term employment loss and 
longer-term employment gain.  In the later study examining the WIA program, the short-term 
earnings and employment impacts were negative, although the employment impact was not 
significant.  Notably, the longer-term earnings and employment impacts of the WIA Youth 
program turned positive.  Again, it is not known the extent to which these impacts can be 
attributed to skill development.  Both of these studies used a propensity score matching 
technique with a rich specification of preprogram education and labour market experience 
measures. 
 
 Sex.  Many studies examine the differential impacts from training for women and men.  
In Canada, Nicholson (2010) reports that even though his review of the literature suggests that 
SD-type programs appear to help adult women but are not especially beneficial for adult men,  
the evaluations of the EBSM delivered under the LMDA that were able to estimate gender-
specific impacts for SD participants found gains for men often exceeding those for women.   
 
If the conventional wisdom is that training helps adult women but not men, then Card, 
Kluve, and Weber (2009) also seem to contradict that convention.  They note, 
 
This feature allows us to perform a simple but powerful “within-study” 
comparison of program effectiveness by gender:  we simply compare the 
sign/significance of the program estimates for women and men.  For the 28 
studies from which we can extract both a short term estimate for women and a 
short term estimate for men, we found that the estimates were the same . . . in 14 
cases (50%); the women had a more positive outcome in 8 cases (29%); and the 
women had a less positive outcome in 6 cases (21%).  This comparison provides 
further evidence that the program outcomes tend to be similar for women and 
men.  (pp. 20–21) 
 
 This citation is mainly summarizing European evidence.  In the United States, as noted in 
the citation above, the NJS found that classroom training was ineffective at raising earnings for 
either men or women; however, on-the-job training contracts significantly increased earnings for 
women in both the first and second follow-up periods, and increased earnings for men in the 
second follow-up period.  The effects for women were substantially larger than for men.  (See 
Orr et al. 1994.) 
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 In a meta-analysis of the findings from 31 evaluations of 15 voluntary U.S. government-
funded training programs that operated between 1964 and 1998, Greenberg, Michalopoulos, and 
Robins (2003) report, 
 
On average, the earnings effects of the evaluated programs seem to have been 
largest for women, quite modest for men, and negligible for youths.  For men and 
women, the earnings effects of training appear to have persisted for at least 
several years after the training was complete. (p. 31) 
 
It has been suggested that since the United States provides custodial single parents (mostly 
women) with income maintenance support through the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
(TANF) program (formerly Aid to Families with Dependent Children, or AFDC), women may 
benefit more from training because of the regular financial support.  
 
 Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske (2008) report significant earnings and employment impacts 
of training for the WIA adult program.  In this nonexperimental evaluation, the results for 
women are larger than for men, as in the NJS.  In the third year after program entrance, the 
impact of training on women’s quarterly earningswas approximately $850 per quarter, compared 
to about $420 for men.  The employment rate net impact estimates for the same time period were 
7.5 percent for women and 2.0 percent for men.  This study, in general, found insignificant 
employment or earnings impacts for training for dislocated workers in the WIA program; 
however, it might be noted that the point estimates for women are more positive (or less 
negative) than for men. 
 
 Race/ethnicity.  U.S. studies have examined the effect of training on earnings or 
employment by race/ethnicity.  Exhibit 5.8 of Orr et al. (1994, p. 135) displays impacts of the 
JTPA, as estimated in the NJS, on women by ethnicity subgroups.  White and black non-
Hispanic adult women have significant 30-month earnings impacts, whereas the impact for 
Hispanic women is insignificant.  However, the authors of the study warn that the F-test of 
whether the impacts are different across the three groups is not significant.  Exhibit 5.9 (p. 137) 
shows that there are no significant differences for men by ethnicity. 
 
 Greenberg, Michalopoulos, and Robins (2003) find contrary results.  The meta-analyses 
presented in this report show that nonwhite men and youth receive higher payoffs from training, 
whereas there is no difference by race/ethnicity for women.  They conjecture, 
 
Perhaps, surprisingly, government-funded training seems to have been less 
effective for white men and white youths than for nonwhite and racially mixed 
groups of men and youth.  One possible explanation for this finding, which did 
not occur for women, is that white workers faced fewer employment barriers than 
nonwhite workers did and could more readily find jobs on their own without the 
aid of training. (pp. 50–51) 
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 Disability status.  Estimating the returns to skill development for individuals with 
disabilities is difficult because most programs are targeted solely to such individuals, and so it is 
difficult to isolate the impact of the training.  Nevertheless, an extensive literature on vocational 
rehabilitation programs has arisen.  Annex IV in HRSDC (2011) has an extensive bibliography 
for this literature.   
 
 In programs that serve individuals with and without disabilities, the problem of 
unobserved heterogeneity arises.  Aakvik’s study of the employment effects of education on 
disabled workers in Norway (2003) uses econometric selection models and finds that the 
employment impacts of education are substantial (8 percentage points); however, they are not 
statistically significant. 
 
 Kluve et al. (2007) summarize a study by Hoglund and Holm (2002) that found that 
education had no significance in explaining whether Danish workers participating in vocational 
rehabilitation programs for long-term sick-listed workers returned to employment at either their 
former or a new firm.   
 
 Hollenbeck and Huang (2006) found quite large and significant employment and earnings 
impacts for vocational rehabilitation programs provided to disabled individuals in the state of 
Washington in a nonexperimental study that compared participants to individuals who applied 
for services but did not participate.  However, without detail on the makeup of the comparison 
group, these results should be considered tentative. 
 
 Geographic region.  Within a country, or within a political jurisdiction such as a 
province or state, skill development interventions may vary in their effectiveness if there are 
substantial differences in access to the interventions or in resources used to provide the 
interventions.  For example, Biewen et al. (2007) used German administrative data in their study 
of training program effectiveness and found positive employment impacts of short-term and 
medium-term programs in West Germany, but no positive treatment effects in East Germany.   
 Not surprisingly, Nicholson (2010) found earnings and employment variation across 
provinces and territories in his summary of the SD impacts of EBSM under the LMDA.  
However, that summary report did not attempt to find a systematic explanation for the substantial 
provincial variation. 
 
 Educational background.  Presumably, a trainee’s preprogram educational experiences 
will interact with the training that is provided, so it is difficult to identify the training effect 
because of its endogeneity.  In our review of the literature, the only study that seemed to provide 
direct evidence was the NJS, and its findings suggest that whether or not a participant had their 
high school diploma or GED equivalence did not make a statistically significant difference in 
earnings or employment impacts (Orr et al. 1994). 
 
 Dislocated workers.  Cavaco et al. (2005) analyzed the impact of retraining for displaced 
workers in France using a competing risks duration model.  They found an increased likelihood 
of reemployment of 8 percentage points for participants in the program.  However, they also 
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found that the program was not well targeted.  Impacts would have been much larger—perhaps 
as great as 28 percentage points—if the program had been taken up by those who would have 
benefited the most, which according to their analyses would have been younger, more highly 
educated displaced workers. 
 
 In a careful nonexperimental analysis using administrative data from 12 states in the 
United States, Heinrich et al. (2008) estimate that retraining dislocated workers through the WIA 
program has no impact on earnings or employment.  Sixteen quarters after entering WIA as 
dislocated workers, the difference in earnings and employment rates between individuals who 
went through training and those who did not is essentially zero for both men and women. 
 
 In a study using Washington data, Hollenbeck and Huang (2006) find results that are 
somewhat more sanguine.  Dislocated workers who received training had a 4-percentage-point 
employment advantage and an approximately $300 quarterly earnings advantage over a 
comparison group that did not receive training.  Hollenbeck (2009a) posits four hypotheses as to 
why the results from both Hollenbeck and Huang (2006) and Heinrich et al. (2008) differ for 
dislocated workers, whereas they are broadly consistent for training disadvantaged adults.  These 
hypotheses include 1) treatment point, 2) source of comparison group data, 3) matching 
technique, and 4) estimator differences. 
 
3.4.1.2 Conclusions  
 
Many studies have been undertaken that provide estimates of the impacts of publicly 
provided skills development (i.e., training) programs.  The studies use data from many different 
countries and pertain to many different types of programs offered under differing labour market 
contexts.  Abstracting from the heterogeneity, the studies generally suggest that skills 
development delivers positive labour market impacts for adults.  Training or education tends to 
improve the likelihood of employment and to increase earnings, if employed.  However, in 
general, very little support exists in studies for similar positive impacts of skills development for 
youth.   
 
While impacts on the labour market are positive (for adults), authors who have attempted 
to calculate the social and private costs of training question whether the benefits of skills 
development activities exceed their costs.  The general consensus here is that positive net 
impacts on employment and earnings must last several years in order for the benefits to exceed 
the costs. 
 
Skills development activities vary widely in their characteristics—content, instructional 
modality, duration, use of technology, and so forth.  Very few studies have rigorously analyzed 
these characteristics, although some evidence exists about content and modality.  This evidence 
suggests that classroom skills training and on-the-job training activities have better labour market 
impacts for participants than short-run classroom training, basic skills training, or longer-run 
(greater than two-year) educational programs.   
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 The broad conclusion that skills development is found to have generally favorable 
impacts for adults begs the question of how those impacts might vary across subgroups of the 
population.  Results for training youth through the workforce development system tend to be 
discouragingly low, although there are a few studies that find positive outcomes.  All but three of 
the studies reviewed here that examined programs in European countries and the United States 
find no positive or negative impacts for youth.  The three studies that report positive impacts for 
youth have important qualifications to them to discount those findings.   
 
 The general convention, particularly based on studies conducted before the year 2000, is 
that SD has its strongest impacts on adult women, and that it has weaker but usually positive 
impacts on adult men.  However, this convention seems to be somewhat challenged by more 
recent studies.  The meta-analysis by Card, Kluve, and Weber (2009) suggests that outcomes are 
quite similar for men and women.  Nicholson (2010) notes that the evaluation results for EBSM 
delivered in Canada under the LMDA in which gender-specific results were reported found gains 
for men that often exceeded those for women.   
 
 A couple of studies relying on U.S. data examine the impacts of skills development by 
race/ethnicity.  Orr et al. (1994) report very weak evidence that Hispanic women may not have 
benefited as greatly from the JTPA program as other women, but there was no difference by 
race/ethnicity among men.  Greenberg, Michalopoulos, and Robins (2003) report somewhat 
more solid evidence that nonwhite men and youth receive higher payoffs from training than 
white males, whereas there is no difference by race/ethnic group for women.  In short, there is no 
recent evidence about differences across these subgroups, and the evidence that does exist is 
somewhat conflicting. 
 
 In terms of other subgroups, the evidence presented here suggests at best weak support 
for positive labour market impacts for individuals with disabilities, no impacts by educational 
background, and no systematic variation by geographic area.   
 
 Even though there have been many empirical studies of the impacts of training, there are 
still areas where little seems to be known.  Most of the studies treat training as a “black box”; 
observations either participated or not.  Little is known about the impacts of characteristics such 
as seriousness of purpose, engagement, attendance, or even completion of the training 
intervention.  Furthermore, inadequate sample sizes seem to have precluded much analyses of 
personal characteristics, such as age, race, educational background, disability status, or place of 
residence (urban versus rural). 
 
3.4.2 Targeted Wage Subsidies  
 
Wage subsidy and wage supplement programs offer tax credits or other financial 
incentives to businesses or individuals to improve earnings and employment prospects.  These 
programs are seen as more flexible and less expensive alternatives to direct income support or 
direct government employment.  The private sector bears a share of the cost by paying that 
portion of the wage bill that businesses consider equals the value of the marginal product of the 
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subsidized workers they hire.  In theory a subsidy to a business or to an individual yields 
identical employment and earnings results; in practice that has proven not to be the case.  The 
equivalence of employer- and employee-based programs requires that the existing labour supply 
(those already employed when the subsidy is implemented) and the new labour supply (those 
who were not previously employed) be the same, in that they respond in the same way to market 
incentives and are otherwise interchangeable (Dickert-Conlin and Holtz-Eakin 2000).  However, 
programmatic and behavioral issues arise with respect to participation rates, program costs, 
efficiency, deadweight loss, and unintended stigma effects on targeted populations.   
 
Most programs that incentivize employment focus on wage subsidies to employers.  
Subsidies in this case affect the demand for labour, expanding an employer’s demand for labour 
by reducing the cost of employing a worker.  Many wage subsidy programs target 
subpopulations that have difficulty obtaining employment.   If the subsidy is large enough to 
compensate employers for hiring someone they would not otherwise have employed, the subsidy 
increases employment for that specific subgroup.  It may also be the case that wage subsidies 
could benefit a subgroup by providing incentives that move individuals in the targeted group 
from part-time to full-time status.  Furthermore, employment and/or earnings gains for a targeted 
subgroup of workers may be achieved at the expense of another subgroup of workers.  
Consequently, evaluations of targeted wage subsidies should consider the displacement effects.    
 
Wage subsidies can be in the form of cash paid directly to the firm or through a voucher 
to the worker.  Other subsidy schemes involve a tax credit to firms or a reduction in payroll 
taxes.  Many programs provide a wage subsidy only, but others provide the subsidy in 
conjunction with training, such as on-the-job training (OJT), apprenticeship programs, or 
internships.  In rare cases, wage subsidies are used to encourage qualified workers to enter an 
occupation in short supply, such as Illinois’s Great START (Strategy to Attract and Retain 
Teachers) program for early childhood providers and educators.  Other examples are Nova 
Scotia’s Film Industry Tax Credit, which subsidizes wages paid to Nova Scotia residents 
working on film or TV productions, and New York City’s subsidy of green jobs.   
 
In contrast to wage subsidy programs, wage supplement programs provide financial 
incentives directly to employees.  They typically are targeted at economically disadvantaged 
populations, who because of a low level of skills or lack of work experience have difficulty 
finding jobs that pay above a worker’s reservation wage.  The wage supplement fills the gap 
between the wage rate an employer would be willing to pay to hire that person and the wage the 
worker believes he or she must receive to make working worthwhile.  When the take-home wage 
of the employee increases, the labour supply increases, in theory.  Wage supplements are 
typically paid to individuals through the income tax system, as a credit or reduction in their 
taxes.  Although the number of wage supplement programs offered is small compared with wage 
subsidy programs, in some countries wage supplements reach more participants and distribute 
more money than wage subsidies.  In the United States, for example, the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC) distributes more than $35 billion annually to low- and moderate-income workers.  
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3.4.2.1 Subpopulations targeted by wage subsidies  
 
Wage subsidy programs target a wide variety of subpopulation groups.  In Canada, for 
example, Canada Business’s Web site lists 72 separate wage subsidy programs.  While many 
programs focus on economically disadvantaged and marginalized populations, there are some, 
albeit far fewer, programs that seek to encourage the expansion of employment in targeted 
occupations and industries, such as green jobs or in high-tech sectors.  We, however, will 
concentrate primarily on programs that help to improve employment prospects for the harder-to-
employ populations.   
 
Table 3 provides examples of the various target groups included in the more prevalent 
past and present wage subsidy programs.  Some of the programs listed offer wage subsidies to a 
long list of eligible groups.  For example, the Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC), a wage 
subsidy program currently operating in the United States, subsidizes employers for wages paid to 
12 groups of job seekers.  The groups include long-term TANF recipients, other TANF 
recipients, veterans, 18- to 39-year-old SNAP (food stamp) recipients, 18- to 39-year-old 
designated community residents living in disadvantaged areas, 16- to 17-year-old summer youth, 
vocational rehabilitation referrals, ex-felons, SSI recipients, Hurricane Katrina employees, 
unemployed veterans, and disconnected youths.   
 
Additional programs target other subgroups.  For example, Australia’s Indigenous Wage 
Subsidy program targets unemployed Aboriginals or Torres Strait Islanders.  The subsidy is 
worth up to AUS$6,600 over 26 weeks for a full-time ongoing job of at least 25 hours per week, 
or up to AUS$3,300 over 26 weeks for a part-time job of at least 15 hours per week.  For 
employers that provide career development assistance, an additional reimbursement of up to 
AUS$550 is available.   
 
Some wage subsidy programs combine subsidies with additional services.  On-the-job 
training programs, which are offered in several countries, provide wage subsidies for the explicit 
purpose of reimbursing firms for providing on-the-job training.  The wage subsidy compensates 
employers not only for direct training costs but also for the lower productivity of workers while 
they receive training.  The U.S. On-the-Job training program (the portion funded through 
Recovery Act dollars) uses a sliding scale for determining the wage subsidy, depending upon the 
size of the firm, with the consideration that training is a relatively larger burden for smaller firms 
than for larger firms.  Another example is the United Kingdom’s New Deal for Lone Parents, 
which combines an earnings subsidy provided by the Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) with 
case management, information, referrals, and other limited financial support. 
 
Although several of these programs have been evaluated, these evaluations rarely 
estimate the effect of subsidies on each of the subgroups served.  In several cases, the number of 
participants in a particular group is simply too small for an accurate assessment.  Evaluations of 
the WOTC and of other wage subsidy programs typically differentiate participants only by 
gender and race.   
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Table 3  Selected Wage Subsidy Programs that Target Specific Subgroups 
Subgroups Programs Country Description Evaluation 
Disadvantaged youth TJTC, WOTC U. S. TJTC: employers claim a tax credit for up 
to 2 years (50% subsidy first year, 25% 
second year) on the first $6,000 earned 
annually by newly hired employees 
Katz (1996) 
Summer youth  
16–17-year-olds 
WOTC U.S. WOTC: firm receives a tax credit up to a 
maximum subsidy of 40%, depending 
upon hours worked, up to $6,000 in 
earnings for a max. subsidy of $2,400 
Evaluated in 
Hollenbeck (1986) 
Public assistance TJTC, WOTC, WtW  U.S. WtW: firm receives tax credit (35% first 
year, 50% second year) up to the first 
$10,000 in wages each year, w/ max. 
subsidy of $8,500 over two years 
Hamersma (2008) 
SNAP recipients,  
18–39-year-olds 
WOTC U.S. See above  
Ex-felons WOTC U.S. See above  
Disabled WOTC, TJTC U.S. See above Evaluated in 
Hollenbeck (1986) 
Disabled Flexjob Denmark Subsidy based on severity of disability Gupta & Larsen (2010)
Disabled Ticket-to-Work U.S. SSDI recipients receive voucher to 
exchange for job or support services 
 
Disabled Austrian Employment 
Act for Disabled 
Austria Subsidizes employment of severely 
disabled and grants employment 
protection 
Humer et al. (2007) 
Disabled FAS Wage Subsidy 
Scheme 
Ireland General subsidy for a perceived 
productivity shortfall in excess of 20%, 
maximum of €10,000/yr. 
 
Indigenous Indigenous Wage 
Subsidy 
Australia  Hunter et al. (2003) 
Older workers Reemployment Trade 
Adjustment Assistance
U.S.  None 
Single mother welfare 
Recipients 
TJTC  U.S.  Katz (1996) 
Long-term unemployed  JobStart Australia  None 
Dislocated workers OJT U.S.  New Jersey 
Experiment 
Long-term unemployed Danish Wage Subsidy 
Scheme 
Denmark Subsidizes 50% of minimum wage for a 
max. of one year, with restrictions to 
minimize displacement  
Rotger & Arendt 
(2008) 
Low-income working 
families 
Working Families Tax 
Credit 
UK Low-income working families receive 
reduction in welfare payments the more 
they work 
Brewer et al. (2005) 
Hard-to-place persons German Wage Subsidy 
Program 
Germany As much as 50% of the monthly salary 
for at most 12 months 
Stephan (2009) 
General population  
under age 65 
Swedish Regional 
Payroll Tax Reduction 
Sweden Firms in northern part of Sweden are 
allowed to cut payroll taxes by 10 ppts. 
Bohm & Lind (1993); 
Bennmarker, 
Mellander, & Ockert 
(2008) 
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3.4.2.2 Factors in evaluating wage subsidy and supplement programs 
 
 The efficacy of wage subsidy programs depends upon several factors.  One is the ability 
to target only those populations that are considered in need of a subsidy.  Providing a general 
subsidy to all workers greatly inflates the cost of the program and reduces its efficiency.  
Another related issue pertaining to employer subsidies is whether the subsidy should cover the 
entire workforce or merely new hires.  Marginal employment subsidies are provided only for a 
firm’s additional employment over some baseline level of employment.  Included within 
marginal employment subsidies are subsidies to new hires.  They are less costly per job created, 
but they may provide some incentive for firms to increase turnover.  Some firms, however, may 
not find such subsidies attractive unless the subsidy is more than enough to cover training costs.  
Also, hiring subsidies do not completely eliminate deadweight loss, since it is still difficult to 
disentangle those people whom the firm would have hired only with a subsidy from those whom 
the firm would have hired anyway.  And among all these concerns, one cannot forget the issue of 
stigma, which increases the more narrowly a population group is defined.   
 
Evaluations need to take into account these behavioral and programmatic differences.  
Five criteria are typically used to assess the effectiveness of these programs:   
 
1)  Job creation: Did more people from the targeted group get jobs? 
2)  Earnings:  Were earnings the same or higher compared with similar unsubsidized 
jobs? 
3)  Displacement: Did the new hires crowd out or displace others from getting a job?  
4)  Deadweight loss:  Would firms have hired these individuals without the subsidy? 
5)  Participation:  Do firms find the subsidy adequate to compensate them for the 
additional costs of hiring a subsidized worker?  
 
Most evaluations of wage subsidies and supplements are based on nonexperimental 
design.  We highlight below several evaluations that use various matching techniques to 
construct comparison groups.  We include the Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project as an example 
of an evaluation based on random assignment design.6   
Table 4 summarizes the results from evaluations of the programs listed in Table 3.  These 
evaluations are selected because they, more so than most evaluations, consider the net impact of 
the programs on subgroups of the population and because they use rigorous methodologies to  
 
                                                 
6 A few evaluations of the UK’s Working Families Tax Credit have used structural labour demand and 
supply models which, when calibrated, simulate the effects of the program (e.g., Brewer et al. 2005).   
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Table 4  Examples of Evaluations of Wage Subsidy and Wage Supplement Programs 
Program/evaluator 
Targeted 
group 
Evaluation 
type 
Employment 
effect 
Deadweight 
loss 
Displacement 
effect 
Participa-
tion rate  
TJTC (U.S.) 
 
Katz (1996)  
Disadvantaged 
youth 
Comparison 
group 
constructed 
from change in 
program 
7% in the short run 40–52% of 
TJTC 
certifications 
created jobs for 
group targeted. 
- 8% of TJTC 
certificates 
hired because 
of their TJTC 
status 
TJTC (U.S.) 
 
Hollenbeck et al. 
(1986) 
Disadvantaged 
youth; welfare; 
veterans; 
handicapped 
Comparison 
group of 
eligible but 
noncertified 
workers 
Youth and handi-
capped generally 
gained, with real 
earnings gain of 
$462 (1998$) and 
$1,940 for handi-
capped.  Most 
earnings gains came 
from an increase in 
employment.  White 
females gained 
most . 
- Displacement 
greatest among 
black male 
youth, black 
males, black 
females, and 
white females 
on welfare.  
Also black 
veterans. 
- 
JTPA OJT (U.S.) 
 
Orr et al. (1996) 
Displaced 
workers 
Random 
assignment 
- - 60% - 
WOTC (U.S.) 
 
Hamersma (2008) 
Welfare 
recipients 
Comparison 
group 
constructed 
from change in 
program 
5.9% higher 
probability of 
employment in 2nd 
quarter; no 
difference in 
probability in 4th 
quarter and into 
second year. 
38% of tax 
credit is passed 
through to 
workers in 
higher wages. 
- < 10% 
Flexjob (Denmark) 
 
Gupta and Larsen 
(2010) 
Disabled  Comparison 
group of 
closely 
matched 
ineligibles 
Probability with 
subsidy is raised 
33ppts from base of 
44%; does not 
reduce exit to 
disability pension. 
- - - 
Austrian 
Employment Act for 
the Disabled 
(Austria) 
 
Humer et al. (2007) 
Disabled Fixed-effect 
regression 
Employment 
protection has 
greater impact on 
employment than 
subsidy. 
- - - 
Indigenous Wage 
Subsidy (Australia) 
 
Hunter et al. (2003) 
Aboriginals and 
Torres Straits 
Islanders 
Comparison 
group of those 
who did not 
complete 
program 
Longer duration of 
employment; 
shorter duration of 
unemployment 
- - - 
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Program/evaluator 
Targeted 
group 
Evaluation 
type 
Employment 
effect 
Deadweight 
loss 
Displacement 
effect 
Participa-
tion rate  
Danish Wage 
Subsidy Scheme 
(Denmark) 
 
Rotger aand Arendt 
(2008) 
Long-term 
unemployed 
Firm-based 
evaluation;  
comparison 
group includes 
eligible but not 
participating 
firms; firms 
with < 10 
employees 
Subsidy contributed 
0.71 jobs per 
subsidized firm; net 
creation is 0.26 jobs 
per subsidized firm 
after taking into 
account separation 
rate 
- Separation rate 
of 0.45 per 
subsidized firm 
< 7% 
Finland Wage 
Subsidy Scheme 
(Finland) 
 
Venetoklis (2004); 
Kangasharju (2005) 
Difficult-to-
employ workers 
Comparison 
group of 
eligible firms 
that do not 
participate 
6–9% increase in 
payroll 
No evidence of 
displacement 
- - 
Swedish Regional 
Payroll Tax 
Reduction (Sweden) 
 
Bohm and Lind 
(1993) 
Disadvantaged 
region 
Compared 
employment 
changes in 
disadvantaged 
region and 
nearby counties
No evidence of 
statistically 
significant 
employment effects 
- - - 
Finnish Regional 
Payroll Tax 
Exemption 
Experiment (Finland) 
 
Korkeamaki and 
Uusitalo (2008) 
Disadvantaged 
region in 
northern Finland 
Matched 
comparison 
group by 
similar region 
and similar 
firms within 
region 
No evidence of 
statistically 
significant 
employment effects 
- - - 
German Wage 
Subsidy Program 
(Germany) 
 
Stephan (2009) 
Hard-to-employ 
persons 
Matched 
comparison of 
subsidized and 
unsubsidized 
workers 
Initially subsidized 
workers have higher 
employment rates, 
but wage rates were 
not statistically 
different from 
comparison group 
- - - 
Self-Sufficiency 
Program Experiment 
(Canada) 
 
SDRC 
Long-term 
welfare 
recipients 
Random 
assignment 
experiment 
Those receiving 
supplement were 
twice as likely as 
control group to 
work full-time; 
increased earnings 
by > 20%; no diff. 
when supplement 
ran out. 
- - 33% 
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Program/evaluator 
Targeted 
group 
Evaluation 
type 
Employment 
effect 
Deadweight 
loss 
Displacement 
effect 
Participa-
tion rate  
EITC (U.S.) 
 
Eissa and Liebman 
(1996) 
 
Long-term 
welfare 
recipients; 
women with and 
without children 
Constructed 
comparison 
group from 
change in 
program  
LFP rate increase 
between 2.4 ppts 
and 6.1 ppts for 
least-educated 
women with 
children; no 
evidence that it 
increases hours of 
those already 
working. 
- - - 
Working Families 
Tax Credit (UK) 
 
Brewer and others 
(2005) 
Low-income 
working 
families 
Microdata used 
to estimate 
structural 
labour supply 
model 
Compared with 
previous program: 
increased labour 
supply of lone 
mothers by 5 ppts.; 
slightly reduced 
labour supply of 
mothers in couples; 
slightly increased 
labour supply of 
fathers in couples. 
- - - 
 
construct counterfactuals.  Most use propensity score matching techniques to construct 
comparison groups, but a few utilize random assignment and structural modeling techniques.   
 
The evaluations reviewed above found generally modest gains in employment and labour force 
participation of participants in wage subsidy programs.  The net effects range from 3 to 9 
percentage point increases in employment compared with their counterfactuals.  For those 
evaluations that consider earnings effects, none found a decline in earnings associated with the 
employment gains, which suggests that participants are not sacrificing earnings for an increase in 
the prospect of finding employment.  Only a few studies reported deadweight loss estimates and 
participation rates.  Those that did found deadweight loss to be greater than 50 percent, 
suggesting that at least half—and probably more than half—of the money spent on subsidies 
goes to workers that would have been hired without the program.  Participation rates are low, 
with evaluations showing less than 10 percent of eligible hires typically claimed by employers.  
 
Wage supplement programs, on the other hand, appear to have higher take-up rates than 
wage subsidy programs.  Evaluations also show that their employment effects are comparable to, 
if not greater than, many of the wage subsidy programs.  The Canadian and U.S. programs show 
positive effects on labour force participation rates.  Evaluation results of Canada’s Self-
Sufficiency Project experiment found that those receiving the supplement were twice as likely as 
the control group to work full-time, and their earnings increased by 20 percent.7  The U.S. results 
were not as large but were still positive:  researchers found a 2.4 percentage point increase 
overall and a 6.1 percentage point increase for less-educated women with children.   
                                                 
7 Because the earnings supplement applied only to full-time jobs, part of the increase in full-time 
employment came from workers changing from part-time to full-time jobs in order to obtain the subsidy. 
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3.4.2.3 Summary of wage subsidy and wage supplement evaluation results 
 
Subgroup Effects.  These positive employment effects are shared by various subgroups 
of participants: disadvantaged youth, particularly white females; disadvantaged adults, 
particularly lone mothers and hard-to-place individuals; the disabled; dislocated workers; and 
indigenous populations.  However, it is difficult from the evaluations to surmise whether wage 
subsidy and wage supplement programs are more effective for one group than for another.  The 
estimated net impacts of these programs on employment are similar across evaluations for 
different subgroups.  For example, Katz (1996) finds a 7 percentage point increase for 
disadvantaged youth for the Targeted Job Tax Credit (TJTC) program.  Hamersma (2008) finds a 
5.9 percentage point increase for welfare recipients in the U.S. WOTC program.  Venetoklis 
(2004) also finds around a 6 percentage point increase in employing hard-to-employ workers in 
Finland.  However, Hollenbeck et al. (1986) find no statistically significant effects of the TJTC 
program for female youths or for black and Hispanic veterans.  They also find greater 
displacement effects for black male youth, black adult males and females, black veterans, and 
white female welfare recipients.   
 
The ability to compare the relative effects of wage subsidy and wage supplement 
programs on population subgroups is complicated by the fact that specific programs target 
different population subgroups and that these programs differ in design and external context.  By 
external context, we mean that the programs are administered across different countries and their 
impacts are influenced by different cultures and various types of other social and workforce 
programs and different economic environments.8   
 
To offer a richer perspective on the types of programs provided and the design and 
findings of evaluations conducted on these programs, we offer in the next several sections brief 
descriptions of evaluations of programs in Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, and the United 
States.  We selected these programs and evaluations because they offer examples of programs 
that target different population subgroups.  The evaluation of the U.S. Targeted Job Tax Credit is 
particularly noteworthy because the program targeted several different subgroups and the 
evaluation was designed to estimate the relative effects of the program on these groups.    
 
3.4.2.4  Examples of wage subsidy programs in Finland, Denmark and the Unitred States 
 
Finland.  Venetoklis (2004) evaluates Finland’s wage subsidy program by using 
propensity score matching to construct the comparison group of firms and by using difference-
in-differences to estimate the net impact of the wage subsidy program, drawing from a data set of 
18,000 firms.  The Finnish legislation provides subsidies to profitable firms that take on 
unemployed workers who find it difficult to find unsubsidized jobs.  Typical subsidized jobs are 
                                                 
8 The use of comparison groups helps to mitigate possible external contextual effects, since both the 
treatment and comparison groups are supposedly subject to the same “environment.”  However, even when 
programs are evaluated using random assignment experiments, it is unclear how generalizable the results of those 
evaluations might be when placed in different contexts.   
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for janitorial workers, clerks, secretaries, and unskilled manufacturing workers.  The purpose of 
wage subsidies is to improve the human resources development of the unemployed and to 
encourage firms to increase employment.  Wage subsidies are based on an amount of up to 
approximately 770 Euros per month for up to 10 months (in 2002).  Workers in subsidized jobs 
are usually paid according to the prevailing wage rate.  The subsidy fills the gap between the 
prevailing wage rate and what the firm would be willing to pay to hire that person.   
 
Venetoklis analyzes the financial statements of business firms that submitted tax returns 
to the Finnish tax authority from 1995 to 2001.  These data were linked to information on the 
annual amount of wage subsidies participating firms received during the same seven-year period.  
The data set covered nearly all firms in Finland.  A comparison group was constructed using 
propensity score matching, with five financial variables and the industrial classification of the 
firm as the identifying variables.  The results, derived under three matching techniques and 
regression adjustment and for various lengths of time, show that wage subsidies are associated 
with a 6 percent increase in payroll.   In another study of the Finnish wage subsidy program, 
which used the same data set and similar methodology, Kangasharju (2005) estimated a 9 
percent increase in payroll as a result of the wage subsidy program.  He also finds no evidence of 
a displacement effect.  
 
Denmark.  Rotger and Arendt (2008) used a similar approach to evaluate the Danish 
wage subsidy program.  The Danish program targets long-term unemployed and subsidizes 50 
percent of the minimum wage for a maximum of one year, with restrictions to minimize 
displacement.  Rotger and Arendt considered only small firms (1–10 employees) in their 
analysis.  Using matching techniques to form a comparison group of similar firms, their analysis 
finds that after the completion of the subsidized period, the subsidy contributed 0.71 jobs per 
subsidized firm.  Taking into account a separation of 0.45 per subsidized firm, the net job 
creation attributed to the subsidy is 0.26 jobs per subsidized firm.   Obviously, with respect to 
total employment creation, the take-up rate is important.  They find that less than 7 percent of the 
eligible firms in this size range have a subsidized employee.     
 
United States.  Hamersma (2008) examines the effects of WOTC/WtW wage subsidies 
on employment, wages, and job tenure.  She uses unique administrative data from Wisconsin to 
identify subsidy-eligible and subsidy-certified workers.  Her evaluation focuses on one of the 
targeted populations under WOTC—short-term welfare recipients.  Hamersma finds a positive 
effect of WOTC on employment near the time eligibility occurs (a 5.9 percent higher probability 
of employment over the comparison group in the second quarter after eligibility), but this effects 
does not extend to the fourth quarter after eligibility.  Hamersma attributes the negligible long-
run effects to low rates of participation in the WOTC/WtW programs.  Fewer than 10 percent of 
eligible individuals were claimed by their firms in order to collect the subsidy.  Hamersma does 
find a positive earnings effect, with subsidized workers earning $105 (or 9 percent of the average 
quarterly earnings for a relevant job).  However, she does not find any evidence that subsidy-
certified workers have longer job tenure than comparable uncertified workers.  Therefore, it 
appears that the primary earnings gains due to WOTC came through the subsidized job itself and 
not through changes in the worker’s broader future employment following the subsidized jobs.   
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3.4.2.5 Evaluating subgroups served by U.S. wage subsidy programs 
 
The U.S. federal government has implemented two major wage subsidy programs.  The 
Targeted Job Tax Credit was authorized in 1978 and was in effect until 1996, when it was 
replaced by the Work Opportunity Tax Credit, which was augmented in 1998 by the Welfare-to-
Work Tax Credit.  Several evaluations of these programs were conducted; none, however, used 
random assignment.  The Hollenbeck et al. (1986) study, conducted for the U.S. Department of 
Labor, is worth highlighting because it provides separate analyses of four subgroups.  The 
evaluation uses administrative data, including UI wage records and program data, to construct 
the treatment and comparison groups.  The treatment group in this case is TJTC-certified 
workers, and the comparison group is other noncertified workers.  Instead of using matching 
techniques, Hollenbeck et al. used regression analysis and selectivity-corrected regression to 
control for demographic factors. They used two methods to correct for selectivity bias:  The first 
was to exclude all post-hiring vouchers from the sample, since those who were admitted to the 
program after receiving a positive outcome—that of being hired—obviously had a smaller 
likelihood of having been randomly selected into the program.  The second method was to use 
the Barnow, Cain, Goldberger (1980) approach of including in the outcome equation a predicted 
variable of program participation based on a subset of explanatory variables not included in the 
outcome equation.9  The general findings of this evaluation are that subsidies increased the 
length of employment but reduced the mean wages relative to comparison groups.   
 
Table 5 summarizes the results for various subgroups.  Following Hollenbeck et al.’s 
(1986)  notation, “+” denotes positive and statistically significant, “0” denotes an effect of nearly 
zero, and “−” denotes negative and statistically significant.  A second entry of “0” indicates that 
the coefficient was not statistically significant.  According to the table, welfare recipients benefit 
from subsidies by being employed more quarters than their comparison group, and the greater 
number of quarters results in higher average wages throughout the period studied.  These 
benefits accrue without a significant decline in average wages during employment or 
displacement.  The results are similar for males and females and for white and nonwhites, with 
white females (and to some extent white males) exhibiting slightly stronger results with respect 
to average wages during employment.  Gender differences were noticeable for youth and the 
handicapped.  For youth, females fared better than males; for the handicapped, males did better 
than females.  The most typical impact of TJTC is to increase quarters of employment but to 
have negative effects on mean wages, conditioned on employment relative to comparison groups, 
which suggests that wages are relatively lower than in the comparison group.  Furthermore, 
while the results are not shown in the table, the authors find displacement effects in many of the 
subgroups, with the magnitude being no more than a one-to-one substitution effect.   
 
                                                 
9 Including the selection-correction equation in the outcome equation suggested nonrandom selection.  The 
authors conclude that in general these results suggest that white males who are vouchered tend to be the least 
employable, while “creaming” is exhibited for white females and nonwhites (p. V-1).  The authors comment that 
several of the estimates are implausibly large.    
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3.4.2.6 Comparing the effect of wage subsidy programs on indigenous people with the effect 
of other programs 
 
A report commissioned by Australia’s Department of Employment and Workplace Relations 
(now called the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations)  evaluated the 
effectiveness of wage subsidies on Australian indigenous job seekers relative to other programs.  
This report, Hunter et al. (2003), used a longitudinal survey to follow the employment outcomes 
of job seekers who participated in five different programs:  1) employment support, 2) training, 
3) job creation, 4) wage subsidy (including apprenticeship and traineeships), and 5) job search 
training.  To control to some extent for selection bias, Hunter et al. compared the outcomes of 
those who completed the program with those who did not complete the program.  Using this 
methodology for each of the five program types, they found that wage subsidies stood out as the 
most effective ALMP treatment.  Wage subsidies were associated with a longer duration of 
employment, a shorter duration of unemployment, and a greater number of spells of employment 
than the other programs.  The authors, however, point out that comparing program completers 
with those who did not complete the program can introduce bias into the estimates because of 
differences between the two groups, and it is unclear whether the bias overstates or understates 
the effect of the program.  For example, if noncompleters are less motivated than completers, 
then the comparison may overstate the effects of the program.  On the other hand, as the authors 
point out, if the noncompleters who did not indicate a reason are more likely to leave a program 
because they secured employment or reentered education, then the difference between 
completers and noncompleters may understate the effect of a program (p. 66). The evaluators 
were not able to account for displacement or substitution effects (Hunter, Gray, and Chapman 
2000).   
 
3.4.2.7 Evaluation of two wage supplement programs:  Canada’s SSP and the U.S.’s EITC 
 
Wage supplement programs have a similar purpose as wage subsidy programs:  to 
encourage low-income workers to find jobs and expand their hours of work.  The difference is 
that wage supplement programs provide tax credits (or other income assistance) directly to 
employees, whereas wage subsidy programs provide tax credits directly to employers.  
Theoretically, the difference should not matter in encouraging employment, but evaluations have 
shown that differences do exist, particularly the possible stigma effect when workers are 
identified as low-income and possibly low-productivity workers.  Canada conducted and 
evaluated an experiment, the Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP), which provided wage supplements 
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Table 5  Estimated Effects of TJTC Subsidies on Selected Subgroups 
Race/Sex 
Outcome 
Avg. wages during 
employment 
Avg. quarters of 
employment Avg. wages 
Avg. quarters per 
employer Displacement 
Youth      
     White males +/0 + + - - 
     Nonwhite males -/0 + + - -/0 
     White females + +/0 + - -/0 
     Nonwhite females + 0 + -/0 -/0 
Welfare      
     White males +/0 + + -/0 0 
     Nonwhite males -/0 + + +/0 - 
     White females + + + +/0 -/0 
     Nonwhite females -/0 + + +/0 -/0 
Veterans      
     Whites -/0 + +/0 - - 
     Blacks/Hispanics +/0 +/0 0 -/0 - 
Handicapped      
     Males + + + -/0 - 
     Females -/0 + +/0 -/0 -/0 
Source:  Hollenbeck and others (1986).    
 
to long-term welfare recipients.  It was evaluated using a random assignment research design.  
The United States enacted a major wage supplement program, the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC), which was evaluated using a quasi-experimental research design.  Whereas the SSP was 
never implemented into a large scale program; the EITC has evolved into the United States’ 
largest welfare assistance program.   
 
The results from the SSP evaluation show a relatively large take-up rate, increasing 
employment and earnings and reducing welfare use and poverty.  One-third of the long-term 
welfare recipients who were offered the SSP earnings supplement took up the supplement and 
worked full-time.  Results also showed that those receiving the supplement were twice as likely 
as control group members to be working full-time.  As a result, SSP increased earnings by 
$3,400 per person, more than 20 percent over the earnings of the control group.  However, the 
effects of SSP were not long-lasting.  After the supplement ran out, there was no difference in 
employment outcomes between the control and treatment groups.   
 
Since no provision was made to evaluate the United States’ EITC program using random 
assignment, researchers have had to construct comparison groups using various methods.  Most 
have looked at the effect of changes in program design at various times in its history by 
comparing the effects on those individuals affected by the change with those not affected.  
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Examples of this approach include the evaluation by Eissa and Liebman (1996).  To construct a 
comparison group, they used the increase in subsidy rate in 1986 from 11 percent to 14 percent 
and an increase in the maximum income to which the subsidy rate was applied.  The change 
affected single women with children only.  Therefore, the study compares the change in the 
labour supply of single women with children (the treatment group) to the change in the labour 
supply of single women without children (the comparison group).   
 
Results from difference-in-differences estimation shows that the labour force 
participation rate of the treatment group increased from 0.729 to 0.753, a statistically significant 
increase of 2.4 percentage points.  In contrast, there was no change in the participation rate of the 
control group.  For the least educated women with children, the participation rate increased 6.1 
percentage points.  However, there is no evidence that EITC induces those already in the labour 
market to work more hours.  Moreover, there is no strong evidence that the EITC depressed 
wage rates significantly.  Eissa and Liebman’s results are consistent with those of other 
researchers who have examined the various effects of EITC. 
 
3.4.2.8 Summary of evaluation effects on population subgroups  
 
The evaluations reviewed above found modest gains in the employment and labour force 
participation of participants in wage subsidy programs.  The net employment effects range from 
around 3 to 9 percent increases.  Wage supplement programs appear to have larger take-up rates 
and induce significant increases in participation rates.  Many wage subsidy programs target 
specific populations.  The programs for which we selected evaluations targeted upwards of 15 
population subgroups.  The net employment effects across these population subgroups are mostly 
positive, and for those that obtained statistically significant estimates, the magnitudes of the net 
impact estimates are quite similar.  This assessment of wage subsidy and wage supplement 
evaluations is similar to that provided by Kluve (2010) in his meta-analysis study of European 
programs.  Of the 22 European wage subsidy programs in the study, 17 found positive and 
statistically significant employment effects.10  Nine of these studies evaluated programs that 
targeted youth, and of these nine evaluations, six found positive and statistically significant 
results.  Kluve concludes from his meta-analysis that wage subsidy programs can be “effective in 
increasing participants’ employment probabilities.”  Betcherman, Olivas, and Dar (2004) are less 
favorable in their critique of 17 evaluations of wage subsidy programs in developed countries.   
Their conclusion is that the results are mixed, with only six showing significant long-run 
employment effects.  This is consistent with our assessment with respect to long-term effects, but 
we find that several more estimate short-term employment effects.  Our list includes more recent 
programs or more recent evaluations.   
 
Bartik (2001) offers a favorable assessment of wage subsidies in the United States.  His 
critique of two dozen or so evaluations of U.S. programs leads to the conclusion that properly 
designed programs can be effective in increasing the employment and earnings of the 
disadvantaged.  This applies to both wage subsidy and wage supplement programs.   
                                                 
10Not all of the 22 programs are wage subsidy programs, since Kluve combines wage subsidy programs 
with self-employment programs in his analysis.    
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Evaluations also found significant inefficiencies in the programs, although not all 
evaluations included estimates of deadweight loss.  Bartik (2001) concludes from his critique of 
the various studies that the windfall wastage is somewhere within the range of 50 to 92 percent, 
with a midpoint of around 70 percent.  This means that seven out of every ten dollars spent on 
subsidies goes to subsidize hires that would have occurred anyway.  The wastage inflates the per-
participant cost beyond the amount of the wage subsidy.  Also, it appears that programs that 
target a narrow population subgroup are less inefficient.  One study found significant 
displacement effects for specific subgroups such as black male youth and black adult males and 
females.   
 
Another issue with wage subsidies paid directly to employers is the low take-up rates.  
According to Bartik, this may be the biggest limitation.  Evaluations show that less than 10 
percent of eligible hires are typically claimed on employers’ tax returns.  Employers complained 
of high compliance costs, even when much of the paperwork was handled by consultants.  Some 
evaluations surmised that employers did not want to be encumbered by government regulation 
and oversight and that the benefits of the subsidies did not exceed the perceived costs of such 
intrusion.  However, even when the required paperwork associated with the programs is handled 
by other organizations, firms are still reluctant to participate.  It is not clear whether larger 
subsidies to cover the fixed cost of compliance would make a difference.   
 
Yet another unintended effect of wages subsidies that concerns some evaluators is their 
negative effect on skill formation.  They argue that wage subsidies (to both employers and 
employees) targeted at the economically disadvantaged discourage the acquisition of skills, 
because higher skills lead to higher wages, which in turn reduces the likelihood that such 
employees will be entitled to wage subsidies.  One study shows that wage subsidies actually 
reduce the accumulation of skills (Heckman, Lochner, and Cossa 2003).     
 
Subsidies paid directly to employees have proven more effective.  Dickert-Conlin and 
Holtz-Eakin (2000) concur that employer-based programs have been characterized by low 
participation rates and relatively little success.  An employee-based approach, such as the EITC, 
appears relatively more successful in targeting the desired population, inducing additional labour 
force participation, and raising earnings (p. 263).  
 
3.4.3 Self-Employment (SE) 
 
 Self-employment assistance is an active labour market program (ALMP) to promote 
reemployment for a small proportion of UI recipients.  Unlike most other ALMP, which operate 
through the supply side of the labour market by increasing the quantity or value of job seeker 
skills, self-employment assistance is designed to boost labour demand through direct job creation 
for unemployed workers.  Before discussing the effectiveness of SEA as a reemployment 
program option, we start by reviewing related literature on the effects of self-employment spells 
on future labour market experiences.   
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3.4.3.1 Background on self-employment 
 
 In 2009 there were 32.5 million self-employed in the 27-nation European Union.  These 
workers accounted for nearly 15 percent of total employment, or more than one job in seven 
(European Commission 2010a).  In the United States in 2009 about 15.3 million people were 
self-employed, constituting nearly one out of every nine jobs (Hipple 2010).  The self-employed 
are a heterogenous group including building trades workers, home-based craft and piece workers, 
proprietors of small farms, cosmetologists, and professional services providers like physicians, 
attorneys, and accountants.  A summary of self-employment studies is given in Table 6.  
Information on self-employment patterns for subgroups is given in Table 7. 
 
 Branchflower (2000) presented a survey of self-employment in OECD countries at a 
Burlington, Ontario, conference sponsored in 1999 by the Canadian Employment Research 
Forum.  He presented evidence that since 1966 the trend in self-employment has been down in 
most OECD countries (except Portugal, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom).11 In most of 
the countries he studied, Branchflower (2000) finds that the rate of self-employment declines as 
the unemployment rate rises; that the self-employed are more likely to be male and older; that 
both the least-educated and the most-educated have higher probabilities of being self-employed; 
and that the self-employed are less willing to move from their neighborhoods, towns, and regions 
than are wage and salary employees.12  Branchflower (2000) attributes this last result to the pull 
on the self-employed of their customers. 
 
 There is a wide range of estimates concerning the effect of self-employment on 
subsequent income and employment stability.  Some transitions to self-employment are 
permanent and result in secondary job creation through hiring within microenterprises.  For 
many others, self-employment is transitory and is followed by lower future employment rates 
and earnings in wage and salary jobs.   
 
Bruce and Shuetze (2004) examine the effect of self-employment experiences in the 
United States using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics dating back to 1979.  They 
estimate regression models on earnings controlling for observable characteristics.13  They find 
that, relative to continued wage employment, brief spells in self-employment do not increase—
and probably actually reduce—average hourly earnings upon return to wage employment.   
                                                 
11 While net self-employment has been down, Branchflower (2000, p. 488) estimates a U-shaped time trend 
with a minimum toward the end of the 1980s and a gradual recovery in self-employment rates since that time. 
12 Branchflower’s (2000, p. 489) analysis of determinants in Canada suggested higher self-employment 
rates for those who are less educated (but not higher educated), older, males, and have dependent children.  He also 
found a slight upward time trend in Canadian self-employment from 1975-1996.   
13 Control variables include months of job tenure, union membership, local area (county) unemployment rate, 
educational attainment, race, age, marital status, number of children under age 18, household asset income, 
residence in a metropolitan statistical area, and geographic region of residence (Northeast, South, and West, where 
North-Central is the reference category). To control for the potential endogeneity associated with self-employment 
and unemployment experience, they add the log of hourly wage sector earnings recorded at the start of the five-year 
period as an independent variable. 
 41 
Table 6  Summary of Studies of Self-Employment Experience on Subsequent Earnings 
Authors (year) Countries Method Sample Intervention Earnings 
Bruce and 
Schuetze (2004) 
U.S.; SE rates: 
males 6%, 
females 3%  
Control for 
differences in 
individual, 
household, and 
occupational 
characteristics in 
OLS models of 
outcomes. 
Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics: 
7 cohorts each with 
800 men, 300 
women.  Inflow: 
1979 to 1985; 
Outflow: 1984 to 
1990 
Observational study of 
labour force transitions.  
Any SE or 
unemployment in 5-year 
period vs. steady 
employment 
Neither SE nor WS earn > 
SE earn > unemployed 
earnings 
Moore and 
Mueller (2002) 
Canada Control for 
observable 
characteristics in 
probit models of 
transition from 
WS to SE. 
Canadian Labour 
Market Activity 
Survey, 1988 to 
1990.  Transitions 
within a year from 
WS to either WS 
or SE.   SE: 650; 
WS: 9182 
Observational study of 
labour force transitions 
IF UI receipt less earnings 
from SE 
Zissimopoulos 
and Karoly 
(2007) 
U.S. Control for 
observable 
characteristics in 
multinomial logit 
models of 
transition from 
WS to SE or 
other labour 
market states. 
Health and 
Retirement Study: 
Five survey waves 
of persons over 51 
years of age in 
years 1992 to 2000
Observational study of 
labour force transitions 
from WS to SE, retire, 
or out of LF 
- 
NOTE: SE = self-employment, WS = wage and salary employment, LF = labour force 
 
 
Table 7  Summary of Studies of the Effect of Self-Employment Experience on Earnings: Subgroups 
Authors (year) Subgroups Subgroups Features Other Net benefits 
Bruce and Schuetze 
(2004) 
More males in SE, 
similar effects 
Males higher avg. 
wages, similar 
percentage effects 
SE also increased 
prob. of PT vs. 
FT at terminal 
1984 to 1990 
expansion 
- 
Moore and Mueller 
(2002) 
Longer-run 
increases SE 
Involuntary sep. more 
likely SE 
Pers. rea. sep. 
most likely SE 
Vol. sep. less 
likely SE 
- 
Zissimopoulos and 
Karoly (2007) 
Pension coverage 
reduces movement 
in SE 
Wealthier older 
workers moved into 
self-employment 
Flexible earnings 
arrangements 
lead to SE 
No diff. M or F - 
 
Furthermore, those who experience self-employment have difficulty returning to the wage sector.  
However, these consequences are small compared to similar experiences in unemployment.  
Bruce and Schuetze (2004) examined seven cohorts over five-year periods with inflows between 
1979 and 1985 and outflows between 1984 and 1990.  In Bruce and Shuetze’s samples, about 6 
percent of men and 3 percent of women experienced self-employment.  They found that on 
average those who experienced a spell of self-employment had subsequent income that was 
above those who experienced unemployment during the five years, but below those who were 
neither unemployed nor self-employed.  Additionally, self-employment increased the likelihood 
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that future work would involve part-time jobs.  Overall men fared better following a spell of self-
employment than did women. 
 
 Moore and Mueller (2002) studied transitions from wage and salary employment into 
self-employment in Canada. They hypothesize that some workers may be pushed into self-
employment because of inadequate demand for wage and salary workers.  Examining transitions 
from paid work to self-employment using data from the Labour Market Activity Survey for the 
years 1988 to 1990, Moore and Mueller find evidence of their self-employment push hypothesis.  
They estimate probit models of the change from wage and salary employment to self-
employment, controlling for observable characteristics.14  They find that the likelihood of self-
employment is typically influenced by five factors.  It is 1) increased by longer spells of 
joblessness(and this effect is stronger for women), 2) reduced by the receipt of cash 
unemployment benefits between jobs, 3) higher for workers involuntarily laid off because of lack 
of work than for workers who undergo voluntary separations, 4) lower for job separations due to 
personal reasons, and 5) unaffected by labour market conditions.  Overall, Moore and Mueller 
(2002, p. 800) conclude that “few of the individuals in the sample, however, appear to be pushed 
into self-employment.”   
 
 Zissimopoulos and Karoly (2007) studied self-employment among older workers in the 
United States.  They use five waves of data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) 
panel—every other year from 1992 to 2000—and estimate multinomial logit models of transition 
from wage and salary employment to self-employment, retirement, or not working, while 
controlling for observable characteristics. This HRS survey sample of older Americans has 
higher average rates of self-employment than a sample of younger Americans surveyed in the 
Current Population Survey.  Indeed, Zissimopoulos and Karoly (2007, p. 275) compute that on 
the HRS survey date, 39 percent of male respondents aged 66 who reported working full-time 
were in self-employment.   In estimating models of transition to self-employment, Zissimopoulos 
and Karoly (2007) control for four categories of observable factors: 1) demographic 
characteristics; 2) wealth, pensions, and inheritance; 3) health status; and 4) job characteristics. 
They find that among older workers, movement into self-employment is more likely to occur 
among those with the following characteristics: pension coverage, higher levels of personal 
assets, and more flexible employment arrangements.  Their evidence also suggests that poor 
health—as measured by the presence of a work-limiting health condition—appears to push older 
workers into self-employment. Since health-limiting factors do not increase movement into self-
employment for younger workers, they argue that older workers with a work-limiting health 
condition are better able to accommodate their condition and continue working if they are self-
employed, as compared to having wage or salary employment. 
 
                                                 
14 Control variables include the regional unemployment rate, weeks between jobs, UI benefit receipt, involuntary 
job separation, voluntary job separation, separation for personal reasons, gender, region (Atlantic, Quebec, Prairies, 
British Columbia), number of family members in labour force, marital status, number of children, age, visible 
minority, immigrant, educational attainment, union membership, pension coverage, months of job tenure. 
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3.4.3.2 Background on self-employment assistance (SEA) 
 
 Through the self-employment assistance (SEA) program, unemployed Canadian workers 
are provided assistance in setting up their own businesses. Those eligible for EI cash payments 
through Part I, if granted SEA assistance, are not required to search for a new job.  Instead they 
are able to collect their remaining cash EI entitlements though Part I, and may receive additional 
Part II benefits.  Earnings while in SE are not insurable under EI and therefore do not renew EI 
eligibility (Nicholson 2010, p. 4).  Total spending on SEA in Canada amounted to about $145 
million in 2005/2006, with approximately 12,000 individuals starting this intervention during the 
year.  Hence, on a per-participant basis, this is an expensive intervention—averaging over 
$12,000 per client (Nicholson 2010, p. 14). 
 
 France provided the first self-employment assistance to the unemployed in 1979.  By the 
early 1990s there were SE programs in 17 member countries of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD).  The French and UK programs are examples of the two 
main alternative SE assistance designs.  The French program provides clients with a lump sum 
payment for business start-up, whereas in the UK, clients receive weekly “Jobseeker’s 
Allowance” payments but are granted a work-search waiver while self-employment is pursued.  
In addition to France, the lump sum approach is used in Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
and Sweden.  The periodic payments approach is used in Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.  Self-
employment programs are used by a small fraction of the unemployed, but they can account for a 
large share of new business formation.  In France, SE constituted nearly 25 percent of new 
businesses in the early 1980s, and in the UK, it constituted about 20 percent in 1987 (Messenger 
and Wandner 1994).   
 
 Various forms of SEA programs operate in most OECD countries, although many of 
these are relatively small. Overall, OECD countries devoted only about 2 percent of total active 
labour market spending to self employment, so, by this standard the Canadian program is quite 
large (Nicholson 2010).  Among the 27 European Union (EU) countries, 19 have SEA programs.  
The numbers include 10 of the 15 countries that were EU members before 1996 and 9 of 12 who 
joined after 1996.  SEA spending constitutes on average 2.5 percent of ALMP spending for the 
older EU members and 2.0 percent for the newer members (European Commission 2010b).   
 
 In the United States, an SEA program was established in 1993 on a temporary basis as 
part of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and was made a permanent part of 
federal UI legislation in 1998.  Federal legislation followed directly from the design of a 
successful Massachusetts demonstration project. To participate, UI claimants must be determined 
to be likely to exhaust their UI benefits, based on the worker profiling mechanism that is used for 
the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services system.  The SEA program has remained very 
small, with only seven states choosing to have active programs.  Only five states typically have 
more than 100 participants per year, and no state has had as many as 1,000 participants in any 
year.  Participation has been mainly in the states of New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania, 
with fewer participants in Maine and Oregon.  The small size of SEA can be seen in various 
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types of measures.  The number of workers entering SEA has only risen as high as 7,300 per 
year, and annual payments have amounted to no more than 50,000 weeks compensated and $17 
million in benefits paid.  These are very small numbers compared to the regular UI program, 
which paid $32.7 billion to 7.5 million beneficiaries in 2007 (Wandner 2010).  Participation in 
SEA rose sharply during the recent severe recession:  for example, Oregon SEA cases rose from 
319 in 2008 to 716 in 2009.  Still, no states even come close to approaching the federal cap, set 
at 5 percent of a state’s pool of regular UI beneficiaries (Haislip 2011).   
 
3.4.3.3 Effectiveness of self-employment assistance 
 
 The LMDA evaluations in Canada suggest that SEA increased hours worked after 
participation, but there was no evidence about whether the added hours were in self-employment 
or wage and salary employment.  The Canadian SEA was also found to decrease EI receipt, but 
estimates of impacts on earnings were mostly negative. The negative impacts on earnings and the 
decreased use of EI may have reduced total annual income; however, this was not assessed in the 
evaluations.  Nicholson (2010) suggests the deadweight loss for the Canadian SEA program may 
be high, because offers are typically made to older people with more work experience and to 
those with above-average educational attainment.  That is, people with a high propensity to 
become self-employed anyway are more likely to receive SEA.  He also notes that the take-up 
rate is low, and most employment is in low-skill, low-wage sectors.   
 
Our review of self-employment assistance and microenterprise evaluations includes 
studies of programs in Canada, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Sweden, and the United States.  A 
summary of these SEA evaluations is given in Table 8.  Evaluation results for SEA subgroups, 
program features, and labour market conditions are given in Table 9. 
 
Canada.  Other evaluations of SEA in Canada were done by Graves and Gauthier 
(1995); Wong, Henson, and Riddell (1998); and Finseth (1999).  The latter was not a formal 
comparison group design evaluation, but rather a survey of self-employment activity, prior 
evaluations of SEA, and the adequacy of financing systems to support microenterprise 
establishment and development in Canada.  
 
 Graves and Gauthier (1995) performed a nonexperimental evaluation of SEA in Canada 
with a sample of 1,479 participants and 2,700 comparison-group subjects contacted in telephone 
surveys.  The participant sample resulted from a 62 percent response rate when attempting to 
interview the census of SEA participants in program year 1992/93.  The comparison group 
resulted from strategic selection on observable variables from the register of UI beneficiaries and 
their 28 percent response rate to the survey.  The comparison group was selected to match the 
SEA participant survey respondent sample on the dates of beginning UI benefit receipt and 
province.  When contacted as part of the survey, the comparison group was asked to rate their 
interest in self-employment, in the same way that SEA participants are asked during program 
screening.  The final comparison group was culled to yield a pattern of interest in self-
employment similar to the SEA participant sample.  With these participant and comparison 
samples, program effects were estimated using regression adjustment on observables. The 
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evaluation noted that because of the similar dates of beginning UI receipt and the time spent in 
SEA by participants, there was a longer mean post-program period for the comparison group (65 
weeks) than for the participant group (40 weeks). The net result of matching and response rates 
yielded a comparison group that was younger, less likely to be married, less likely to own a 
home, and less likely to have educational attainment beyond secondary school.  Compared to the 
general population of UI recipients, SEA participants tend to be older, with more labour market 
experience, more education, and higher levels of personal financial assets.   
 
Graves and Gauthier (1995) attempted to overcome sample selection issues by computing 
program effects in regression models, controlling for observable characteristics.  They estimated 
logit models on binary outcomes and OLS models on continuous outcomes, controlling for 
observable variables such as age, sex, education, geographic region, marital status, and attitudes 
toward risk-taking.  They assert that efforts to correct for selection bias by using Heckman two-
step procedures suggested that selection bias was not an issue.  The report would have benefited 
from a fuller exposition of these results, since some of the results suggest that selection was a 
key problem in the evaluation.  In particular, the SEA program effect estimates were much larger 
when contrasted to the full comparison group than when compared to those who actually started 
self-employment.  About 83 per cent of SEA clients were still operating their SEA venture at the 
time of their evaluation interview, an advantage of 7 percentage points over the average of those 
in the comparison group who started their own businesses.  SEA participants experienced an 
increase in earnings between the pre- and post-program periods, but in contrast to the 
comparison group had lower earnings in the first year after SEA and significantly higher 
earnings in years two and three after SEA.  SEA participants were 4 percentage points less likely 
to receive cash social assistance than those in the comparison group, and, measured on average 
eight months after completing the program, they also had drawn $2,632 less from the UI account.   
 
 Graves and Gauthier (1995) estimated that, from a governmental perspective, UI benefit 
savings do not outweigh the substantial $13,000 of additional UI resources which were invested 
in workers’ SEA participation.  The savings from SEA were estimated to pay back the 
government costs within an average of three years and nine months.  Considering all values and 
costs in a full social accounting framework, the average break-even point could be reached 
within 18 months.  However, it was estimated that about half of program participants would have 
entered self-employment even without government SEA.  This deadweight estimate doubles the 
average payback costs to around 7 years for the government and 3 years for society.   Participant 
versus nonparticipant contrasts among subgroups, controlling for characteristics, revealed that 
SEA impacts for social assistance recipients (SARs) were positive but smaller.  SAR participants 
had smaller investments in SE and used public instead of private financing.  However, the 
business survival rate for SAR participants was about 85 percent on the survey data, which is on 
par with the full participant group.  Compared to other SEA participants, SAR participants had 
higher reported earnings, business profits at the same level, were less likely to have paid 
employees, and made less use of EI after SEA.  There were no statistically significant differences 
in outcomes across age groups.  Canadian equity groups, including visible minorities, disabled, 
and aboriginals, did not show significant differences in self-employment survival, earnings, 
income, EI use, or hiring.  There were no differences across regions in survival rates, but self-
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employment start-ups in Quebec and Atlantic Canada had more favorable outcomes compared to 
SEA start-ups in Ontario and Western Canada.  These included higher values of business 
revenues and profits and more hiring of paid employees.  Participant versus nonparticipant 
contrasts among subgroups, controlling for characteristics, revealed that SEA impacts for social 
assistance recipients (SARs) were positive but smaller.  SAR participants had smaller 
investments in SE and used public instead of private financing.  The business survival rate for 
SAR participants was about 85 percent.  Compared to other SEA participants, SAR participants 
had higher reported earnings, business profits at the same level, were less likely to have wage or 
salaried employees, and received less EI after SEA.  There were no statistically significant 
differences in outcomes across age groups.  Canadian equity groups, including visible minorities, 
the disabled, and aboriginals, did not show significant differences in self-employment survival, 
earnings, income, EI use, or hiring.  There were no differences across regions in survival rates, 
but self-employment start-ups in Quebec and Atlantic Canada had more favorable outcomes 
compared to SEA in Ontario and Western Canada.  These included higher values of business 
revenues and profits and more hiring of paid employees.  
 
 Wong, Henson, and Riddell (1998) examined whether self-employment assistance in 
Canada increased the earnings of program participants during the years 1987 to 1996.  The self-
employment incentive (SEI) program operated under the Community Futures program from 
1987 to 1991 in about 200 nonmetropolitan areas experiencing labour market adjustment 
difficulties. The SEI was funded from general revenues and provided a weekly taxable allowance 
of $180 (rising to $230 in 1991) for up to 52 weeks to successful applicants in lieu of UI or 
social assistance while they attempted to start self-employment.  The SEI also provided access to 
free business counseling.  From 1992 to 1995 the self-employment assistance (SEA) program 
operated as part of the UI program.  Entrepreneurship training remained free but became 
mandatory under SEA.  The SEA start-up allowance was equivalent to the weekly UI benefit 
amount and was paid from the UI fund.  Additionally, the SEA required a personal investment of 
at least 25 percent of start-up costs, up to a maximum of $4,000.   
 
 The evaluation relied on program administrative records maintained by Human 
Resources Development Canada and earnings records maintained by Revenue Canada.  From the 
Status Vector of the social insurance benefits master file, detailed information was drawn on 
work history, insurable earnings, and UI claim history. The Canadian Jobs Strategy (CJS) file 
provided records of program interventions financed from general revenues. The T1 tax filer 
administrative data gives annual individual income by source.   
 
 More than 66,000 persons participated in self-employment between 1987 and 1998, 
amounting to about 2 percent of regular UI claimants.  An initial comparison group of 160,205 
individuals was randomly selected from the UI inflow, evenly distributed across years and 
amounting to one-half of one percent of regular UI claimants. About one-quarter of the initial 
comparison sample was randomly selected for analysis.  Relative to the SEI period, the SEA 
program enrolled a significantly higher share of UI beneficiaries, topping out at around 11,000 
annual participants at the end of its period, or three times the level of SEI.  
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Table 8  Summary of Self-Employment Assistance Program Evaluation Mean Effects Estimates 
Authors (year) Method Country/sample Intervention Self-empl. Any empl. EI/UI Receipt 
Benus et al. (2008) RA: participants got 13 
hours more SE training 
than comparison group 
USA/Inflow at one-stop 
centers: 2003 to 2005; 7 
sites: Pennsylvania (2),  
Minnesota (2), Maine (3) 
Assessment, classroom 
training, 1-on-1 business 
counseling, help with loan 
applications 
At 3 quarters +6%; 
at 6 quarters +3% 
No significant effect, but 
more in SE than in WS 
+1 week, +2 weeks if 
on UI first 
Benus et al. (1995) RA: among profiled 
high-exhaustion-
probability UI 
beneficiaries 
USA/Massachusetts Inflow 
1990–93, treatments: 614, 
controls: 608 
British style SEA: weekly 
UI pay with work search 
waiver 
at 19, 31 mos. 
+11%, +5% 
at 19, 31 mos. +1%, −4% −1.8 weeks 
Benus et al. (1995) RA: among profiled 
high-exhaustion-
probability UI 
beneficiaries 
USA/Washington State 
Inflow 1989–90, 
treatments: 755 controls: 
752 
French-style SEA: Lump 
sum balance of UI 
entitlement 
at 21, 33 mos. 
+16%, +12% 
at 21, 33 mos. –9%, −8% −7.6 weeks 
Carling and 
Gustafson (1999) 
NE : controlling for 
observable 
characteristics in 
hazard models 
Sweden/Inflow census 
6/95–12/96 follow-up at 27 
months, se: 9,043, 
ws:14,142 
Policy to target se to 
women and foreign-born 
reduces unempl. 
after SE vs. 
subsidized job 
SE double WS for male 
and female natives of 
Sweden 
— 
Graves and Gauthier 
(1995)   
NE: matching on 
observables plus 
regression adjustment 
Canada/Telephone survey, 
se participants: 1,479, 
comparison: 2,700 
UI-type payments continued 
an extra 52 weeks once 
SEA starts, and participant 
finances 25% of project 
8%  higher rate vs. 
those in comparison 
group who started 
SE 
18.3% vs. those in 
comparison group who 
started SE (regression-
adjusted) 
−8.6% v full comp 
group (reg adj) 
−7.3 weeks v comp gp 
started SE (reg adj) 
O’Leary (1999) NE: matching on 
observables plus 
regression adjustment 
Hungary/Inflow in 1996, 
participants: 1067, 
comparison: 3,338 
British style: monthly UI-
type payments for 18 mos. 
— WS employment 0.16 
percentage point increase 
9 months after SE 
−1.6 months 
O’Leary (1999) NE: matching on 
observables plus 
regression adjustment 
Poland/Inflow in 1993–94, 
participants: 709, 
comparison: 10,000 
French style: lump sum, but 
must repay 
— WS employment 0.27 
percentage point increase 
about 36 months after SE
+3.65 months 
Pfeiffer and Reize 
(1998)  
NE: instruments for 
SEA in probit model 
Germany, Oct. 1993 to 
August 1995 census 
UK-type after 4 weeks ui; 6 
to 24 months 
Survival gain, East 
0.0197 West 0.0080
— — 
Wong, Henson, and 
Riddell (1998) 
NE: regression 
adjustment for 
observable differences, 
diff-in-diff models  
Canada, 1987 to 1995 
census SEI and SEA; 
comparison random 
sample UI inflow 
SEI 1987–91: $180/wk. to 
$230 not UI 52 wks.; SEA 
92–95 = UI from UI 
account 52 to 156 weeks 
Increased SE+WS 
earnings 
— — 
NOTE: RA= random assignment experiment, NE= nonexperimental, SE = self-employment, WS = wage and salary employment, FE = fixed-effects estimator. 
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Table 9  Summary of Self-Employment Assistance Program Evaluation Subgroup Effects Estimates 
Authors (year) Earnings Subgroups Subgroups Features Labour markets Net benefits 
Benus et al. 
(2008) 
−$200 WS in 
the year after 
SEA 
No impact on public 
assistance receipt 
— — Economic recovery 
period 
No rise in SE earnings, fall 
in WS earnings, bigger 
effects on UI recipients  
Benus et al. 
(1995) 
SE $1,219,  
WS $3,053 
Males less likely in WS 
employment 
Males less likely in SE 
Males gain in total earnings 
(SE+WS) 
Add jobs at 19, 31 mos. 
minus 0.4, 0.9 
UN89–93: 4.1, 6.0, 
8.2, 7.6, 6.2 
$13,843 to individuals,  
$2,089 to government 
Benus et al. 
(1995) 
SE $2,157,  
WS –$1,744 
Males less likely in SE  Whites, males, expect 
recall: SE+WS earnings up 
Add jobs at 21, 33 mos. 
plus 0.1, 0.3 
UN89–93: 5.5, 4.4, 
6.0, 7.3, 6.9 
$696 to individuals,    
−$1,246 to government 
Carling and 
Gustafson 
(1999) 
— No diff. in effects by sex for 
Swedish-born 
Not effective for foreign-
born unemployed 
Increase in supply of 
skilled unemployed 
Rising unemployment 
rate 1990–2000 
— 
Graves and 
Gauthier (1995)   
−1,139 1 yr. + 
3,911 2 yr. 3 
yr. 
Social assistance recipients’ 
effects on par or stronger than 
average participant 
No diff. by age; equity 
groups 5% lower survival 
& $300 less earnings 
Added jobs higher by 6.5 
percent vs. comp. group 
Quebec and Atlantic 
more likely to hire 
others 
6 years to recover SEA  
costs per participant 
O’Leary (1999) −$26/mo. +Older +Vocational education  
+School graduate 
— +High unemployment 
areas 
— 
O’Leary (1999) $69/mo. +Females +work experience 
less than 3 yrs. 
+Blue-collar occupation 
+Not long-term unempl. 
Effect increases with size 
of own investment 
— — 
Pfeiffer and 
Reize (1998)  
— Employment growth  
east Ger 0.02, west Ger 0.03 
— — — — 
Wong, Henson, 
and Riddell 
(1998) 
SEI 19K to 
27K per yr. 
SE+WS 
Prime age males SE higher 
earn. than comp. 
Women had higher SE 
income; older and Quebec 
worse (lower) 
SE superior to UI alone; 
SE earnings effect 
declines yr. 2 and yr. 3 
Recession 1991–92 — 
NOTE: SE = self-employment, WS = wage and salary employment. 
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 The Wong, Henson, Riddell (1998) research design boils down to regression correction 
for differences in observable characteristics. The first step is to compute differences in earnings 
before and after the program period separately for program participants and the comparison 
group.  These computations are intended to remove effects on earnings due to characteristics that 
do not change over time, including unobservable factors such as innate ability and motivation.  
These first difference earnings data are then used as dependent variables in regression models 
with indicators for program participation and other variables to correct for differences across the 
two groups in observable characteristics.  In addition to a dummy variable for participation, the 
explanatory variables include gender, age, experience (and experience squared), and regional 
labour market controls.   
 
 The empirical evidence provides support for the hypothesis that combined earnings from 
market work and self-employment are increased by adding a self-employment experience 
through either SEI or SEA.  The basic fixed effect estimates of the SEI effect on gross earnings 
from self-employment are large and positive, ranging from $19,000 to $27,000 per year, 
depending upon the cohort. These mean estimates increase somewhat when other controls are 
included.  Control variables suggested that women had higher self-employment income, while 
older persons and those in Quebec had lower income.  The impacts are much stronger in the first 
year after the program, with self-employment earnings estimates tapering off in the second and 
third postprogram years. These estimates of earnings effects range from $1,000 to $2,000 per 
month and are large compared to results found in other countries.  This study would have 
benefited from matching participants with nonparticipants in the very large random comparison 
group before impact estimates were computed by difference in differences, with controls for 
observable characteristics.    
 
Finseth (1999), with support from the International Labour Office, conducted a survey of 
SEA and microenterprise/microfinance programs in Canada.  For evaluation results he relied on 
Canadian performance measurement and prior evaluation studies.  He documented sources of 
business start-up assistance and asserted that the Community Futures model is the best channel.  
He stated that at the end of the 1990s about 1,200 borrowers were served by microenterprise loan 
funds, but that these constituted only 3.8 percent of such loans.  The vast majority borrow from 
private financial institutions while relying on government loan guarantees.  Finseth (1999) 
asserts that the SEA program has a number of positive impacts on the target clientele and on 
government, including a greater level of business success, reduced reliance on unemployment 
benefits, increased savings for social assistance, increased income for SEA participants, greater 
job satisfaction, increased levels of induced employment, and increased tax revenue 
contributions.  From the point of view of cost-effectiveness, the SEA Program is not appealing.  
Finseth argues that the institutional framework for self-employment assistance delivery is 
inefficient. Nonetheless, he asserts that Canada’s SEA program is a good thing. It is achieving its 
purpose and making a difference to a significant group of people, turning them into net producers 
and thereby reducing the number of people who act as a continuous draw on the resources of 
Canadian society. 
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Germany.  Pffeifer and Reize (1999) compare firm survival and employment growth in 
subsidized start-ups by unemployed persons with firm survival and employment growth in 
subsidized start-ups by nonunemployed persons.  The study was done using data from four 
länder in eastern Germany and eleven länder in western Germany soon after reunification.  The 
start-up subsidy for the unemployed was provided by the Work Support Act. The empirical 
analysis is based on a sample of new start-ups established between 1993 and 1995.  Data on 
German start-ups was compiled from administrative records by the research institute of the 
German public employment service (IAB/BA) and included 9,613 start-ups, of which 618 
received a start-up allowance for the unemployed; of these, 4,311 and 395, respectively, were in 
the eastern länder. The model for empirical estimation is a survival equation including an 
endogenous indicator variable for receipt of a start-up subsidy.  The auxiliary equation predicting 
receipt of a start-up subsidy includes the following as instruments: legal form of ownership; 
industry type; and sex, age, and age squared of the business leader.  In eastern Germany, firm 
survival is longer among subsidized start-ups, and receipt of the subsidy is correlated with a 
slightly higher mean hiring rate.  In the western part of Germany, subsidized start-ups survive at 
a rate similar to unsubsidized start-ups but have a slightly higher mean employment growth rate. 
 
Hungary.  O’Leary (1998) evaluated the effectiveness of self-employment assistance to 
the unemployed in Hungary based on a census of more than 1,000 SEA recipients during the first 
three calendar quarters of 1996 in half of the twenty counties in Hungary.  Opposite this 
population was a comparison group created as matched pairs from a larger random sample of 
more than 3,000 unemployed persons registered as job seekers with the public employment 
service at the same time.15  Matching was done without replacement by the minimum sum of 
squared distance on characteristics. The variables used for matching were age, sex, educational 
attainment, job separation reason, occupation, and county of residence. The SEA in Hungary was 
provided as a series of up to 18 monthly payments in amount and procedure similar to 
unemployment compensation, like in the British model for SEA.  Follow-up surveys were 
conducted about 24 months after inflow to UI and about 12 months after completion of SEA.  
Impact estimates computed in regression models adjusting for observed characteristics suggest 
that SEA raised the probability of being employed on the survey date by 21 percentage points 
and shortened UI receipt by 1.6 months, but lowered earnings by an equivalent of $26 per month 
relative to the comparison group mean of $142.  In Hungary, SEA was more effective for those 
who were older, were vocational or high school graduates, or were working in high 
unemployment areas.   
 
Poland.  O’Leary (1998) evaluated the effectiveness of self-employment assistance to the 
unemployed in Poland based on a census of 709 SEA recipients in 8 of the 49 voivodships in the 
country.  These eight included four of the most populous voivodships and one-quarter of the 
nation’s population.  SEA participation occurred during 1993 and 1994.  Interviews were 
conducted with participant and comparison samples between February and April 1997, so the 
results reflect a longer term follow-up than observed in other evaluations.  The comparison group 
was created as matched pairs from the inflow to the public register of unemployed at the same 
                                                 
15 The nation of Hungary includes a total of 20 counties (megye) as political administrative districts.  
Samples were drawn from 10 counties chosen to span the range of economic conditions in the country. 
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time. Additional variables used for matching were age, sex, educational attainment, job 
separation reason, occupation, and county of residence.16  The SEA in Poland was provided as a 
lump sum as in the French SEA model, except the sum is a loan that must be repaid to the 
national labour office.  Impact estimates computed in regression models adjusting for observed 
characteristics suggest that SEA raised the probability of being employed on the survey date by 
29 percentage points and lengthened UI receipt by 3.65 months, but raised monthly earnings by 
an equivalent of $69 per month relative to the comparison group mean of $193.  In Poland SEA 
was more effective for females, those with less than three years of work experience, blue collar 
workers, and those who were unemployed fewer than six months.  In addition to having to repay 
the loan, the personal contribution to start-up funds was tracked, and outcomes were found to be 
improved for those contributing more to the self-employment project. 
 
Sweden.  Carling and Gustafson (1999) estimated the effects of SEA relative to 
subsidized jobs in Sweden.  They used a census of data from administrative records on all 
participants in SEA and subsidized work for an 18-month period starting in June 1995.  
Controlling for participant characteristics, they estimated that SEA participants had a 
significantly lower risk of reunemployment compared to those who got subsidized jobs.  The 
1990s rise in unemployment in Sweden induced the government to increase enrollment in SEA 
relative to subsidized work, on the premise that the newly unemployed included a large share of 
skilled workers.  Furthermore, SEA was targeted at women and immigrants, in hopes of helping 
those particular groups.  Carling and Gustafson (1999) studied the census of 18-month program 
inflows for SEA and subsidized jobs starting in June 1995.  To identify the effect parameter, 
Carling and Gustafson (1999, p. 21) first estimated a simple model with the endogenous program 
indicator for self-employment relative to subsidized work.  They estimated a huge effect for self-
employment to reduce the hazard of unemployment (–0.927),; the effect estimate gets smaller in 
magnitude as the effect is incrementally identified by sequentially adding covariates to reach a 
final estimate at (–0.752).  The control variables included individual demographic characteristics, 
geographic region of Sweden, labour market conditions, and local employment office indicators. 
They tracked outcomes through March 1999 and found the beneficial effects of SEA to be 
similar for men and women who were native Swedes, but they found no reliable evidence of 
beneficial effects of SE for unemployed immigrants in Sweden. 
 
United States.  A recent microenterprise evaluation study, Growing America through 
Entrepreneurship (GATE), studied the value of helping new entrepreneurs in rural and urban 
communities start and expand their own small businesses (Benus et al. 2008).  Evidence from the 
GATE evaluation added to information about providing self-employment assistance through the 
UI program that was tested through field experiments in Massachusetts and Washington State 
during the late 1980s (Benus et al. 1995).    
 
GATE enrollment was done between fall 2003 and summer 2005 in seven urban and rural 
sites in the states of Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Maine.  GATE was available to any person 
                                                 
16 Matching was done without replacement by the minimum sum of the squared distance measure.  The 
characteristics used for matching were age, educational attainment level, gender, months of work experience, date of 
registration with the employment office as unemployed, and local labour office where registered as unemployed.   
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over age 18 who was lawfully able to work in the United States, whether employed or 
unemployed, and who was interested in starting or expanding a small business.  GATE 
participation required three things: 1) registration either at a GATE kiosk at a One-Stop Career 
Center, at the GATE Web site, by mailing a postcard, or by calling a toll-free number; 2) 
attendance at an orientation session at a One-Stop Career Center; and 3) completion of an 
application package mailed to the evaluation contractor.  GATE offered three services: 1) an  
individual assessment session; 2) training in a variety of relevant topics, including general 
business, legal and personnel issues, and business accounting computer software; and 3) 
individual meetings with business counselors about business plans and loan applications.  Each 
participant could decide to receive any or all of the three services. 
 
 A total of 4,198 GATE applicants were randomly assigned to either the treatment or the 
control group. Control group members were not prevented from receiving other self-employment 
services available in the community. Therefore, this evaluation addresses the policy-relevant 
question: What is the effect of adding GATE to the array of self-employment services already 
offered in the community?  Outcomes were measured through telephone follow-up surveys 
conducted at 6 and 18 months after random assignment.  A total of 3,450 interviews were 
completed after 6 months (with an 82 percent response rate); of these, 3,039 were interviewed 18 
months after enrollment.  For the evaluation, the follow-up survey data were merged with 
administrative records on UI payments and quarterly wage records covering the 12 months 
before and after random assignment.  
 
 Project GATE generated a small but significant impact on business ownership in the 18-
month follow-up.  By the third quarter after random assignment, 43 percent of the program group 
reported owning a business, a statistically significant 6 percentage points more than the 
comparison group.  The advantage for participants dwindled to 3 percentage points (statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level) at the 18-month follow-up.  There were no significant effects 
on total employment (self-employment plus wage and salary employment), with rates at about 70 
percent in the first quarter after random assignment and 85 percent 18 months after random 
assignment. However, compared to the control group, GATE participants were more likely to be 
self-employed and less likely to be employed in wage and salary jobs.  
 
 Control group members earned slightly more than participants from wage and salary jobs 
and about the same through self-employment, so that GATE participants earned somewhat less 
during the 18-month follow-up.  The wage and salary difference was $1,800 based on the survey, 
but only $200 less based on UI quarterly wage records (not statistically significant).  Both groups 
earned about $6,000 over the 18-month follow-up period.  GATE increased receipt of UI benefits 
by about one week, or about $340 per person for all participants and $605 for those already 
receiving UI benefits when they applied to GATE.  There were no program impacts on the 
receipt of public assistance or other income. 
 
 The GATE design in Minnesota was similar in many respects to Self-Employment 
Assistance (SEA) provided in some states through the UI program.  While the Minnesota sample 
size was quite small (n = 459), GATE dramatically increased the probability of owning a 
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business during the 18-month period after random assignment.  There was also a strong positive 
effect on total employment.  During the second half of the follow-up period (Q4–Q6), recent UI 
claimants in Minnesota experienced strong and statistically significant employment gains relative 
to the control group (7 to 9 percentage points).  Control group members earned more than 
participants from wage and salary jobs, with an average quarterly difference of $350 in the first 
three quarters but no difference in the next three quarters.  There was no impact on self-
employment earnings, but there was increased receipt of UI benefits. 
 
 In Minnesota, GATE increased UI receipt by three weeks over the follow-up period and 
increased the amount of UI benefits received by about $1,240 per person. GATE had no impacts 
on the receipt of public assistance or other income.  Furthermore, GATE had no impacts on the 
likelihood of receiving public assistance, the amount of public assistance benefits received, 
household income, or the earnings of the entrepreneur’s spouse.  In total, the results for recent UI 
claimants in Minnesota indicate positive impacts on business formation and employment but 
negative effects on earnings and UI receipt.  
 
 Overall, the GATE study suggests the following: self-employment services can be 
effectively offered at One-Stop Career Centers; self-employment services are readily available 
even in the absence of GATE; increased business ownership might not lead to increased self-
employment earnings in the short run; self-employment can lead to a loss of earnings from wage 
and salary jobs in the short run; self-employment programs have larger impacts on UI recipients; 
and 18 months is too short for a follow-up to determine the long-term effectiveness of GATE.   
 
 The Massachusetts UI Self-Employment Demonstration evaluated the effectiveness of 
SEA for unemployed workers who are likely to exhaust their UI benefits (Benus et al. 1995).  
The evaluation involved random assignment, with half the eligible UI claimants receiving self-
employment services (the treatment group) and the other half receiving regular UI services (the 
control group). Enrollment in the experiment started in May 1990 and ended in May 1993.  Only 
about 2 percent of targeted UI claimants met the initial demonstration requirements of attending 
an orientation and submitting an application.  A total of 614 UI claimants were assigned 
treatment, and 608 assigned to the control group.  Following the British model, the 
Massachusetts experiment provided weekly cash payments at the level of regular UI for the 
remainder of the entitled duration if self-employment efforts were continued.  Follow-up 
telephone surveys were conducted at an average of 19 and 31 months after random assignment.  
Compared to the control group, the treatment group was more likely to have the following 
results: at least one self-employment experience during the observation period; about 1.5 months 
more in self-employment; no significant difference in earnings from self-employment; no 
significant difference in the likelihood of having a wage and salary job during the observation 
period; approximately one month more of having worked than controls in wage and salary 
employment; significantly more earnings than controls from wage and salary employment; 
positive impacts on the likelihood of employment (in either wage and salary or self-employment) 
during the follow-up period; positive impacts on the likelihood of employment (in either wage 
and salary or self-employment) at the time of the follow-up survey; positive impacts on total 
time employed (in either wage and salary or self-employment) during the observation period; 
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positive impacts on combined wage and salary and self-employment earnings; positive impacts 
on employment; reduced length of the first unemployment spell; reduced UI benefit receipt 
during the benefit year; increased likelihood of self-employment and accelerated entry into 
employment; and positive effects on total earnings, largely driven by large, positive impacts on 
wage and salary earnings, rather than by impacts on self-employment earnings. 
 
 Self-employment assistance in the Massachusetts experiment increased business start-ups 
among project participants, reduced the length of their unemployment, and increased their total 
time in employment—which includes self-employment plus wage and salary jobs.  The 
experiment also had a substantial positive impact on participants’ earnings.  When placed into a 
benefit-cost framework, the self-employment assistance program model proved to be cost-
effective for project participants and society as a whole.  It proved cost-effective to the 
government sector as well.  Overall, the self-employment assistance provided in the 
demonstration significantly increased participants' total time in employment (i.e., the 
combination of self-employment and wage and salary employment) after having been randomly 
assigned to the project.  Including time spent both on self-employment and wage and salary 
employment, participants were employed 1.9 months longer than the control group.  Total 
earnings from all sources for the comparison since random assignment averaged $10,056. 
Controlling for differences in observable characteristics, the self-employment treatment 
increased average earnings for participants by $5,940 over the thirty-one month follow-up 
period.17  
 
 The Washington UI Self-Employment Demonstration (SEED) involved random-
assignment enrollment to treatment and control groups in Washington State between September 
1989 and September 1990, with business services available to participants through March 1991 
(Benus et al. 1995). A total of 755 new claimants were enrolled in SEED at the six sites and were 
offered demonstration services; 752 new claimants who applied to SEED were assigned to the 
control group. The SEED treatment followed the French-style lump sum, with the offer being the 
remainder of a UI beneficiary’s entitlement at the start of self-employment efforts along with 
business start-up and development efforts.  The first Washington telephone survey was 
conducted, on average, 21 months after random assignment. 
 
 Only about 4 percent of targeted Washington UI claimants met the initial eligibility 
requirements of attending an orientation and submitting an application. Compared to the control 
group, treatment subjects had the following results: they spent about 4.0 months more in self-
employment; earned more than controls from self-employment during the follow-up period; had 
reduced likelihood of wage and salary employment; spent about one month less in wage and 
salary employment.; earned significantly less from wage and salary employment; had similar 
earnings from wage and salary and self-employment during the observation period; had higher 
rates of employment; reduced the length of the first unemployment spell; excluding the lump-
                                                 
17 Impacts were estimated in regression models controlling for observable characteristics: age, race, sex, 
educational attainment, on employer stand-by awaiting job recall, prior earnings quartile, prof/tech/mgr occupation, 
service industry, site location, quarter of UI benefit year begin (BYB) date, local unemployment rate at BYB (Benus 
1995, p. B-214).   
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sum payment, had reduced UI benefit receipt during the first benefit year; and including the 
lump-sum payment, had higher total UI payments during the first benefit year.  
 
3.4.3.4   Summary of Self-Employment Assistance 
 
 Self-employment accounts for about 15 percent of total employment in Europe and 10 
percent in the United States.  Some transitions to self-employment are permanent and result in 
secondary job creation through hiring within microenterprises.  For others, self-employment is 
transitory and is followed by lower future employment rates and earnings in wage and salary 
jobs.  In the United States, relative to continued wage employment, brief spells in self-
employment do not increase average hourly earnings, reduce the chances of returning to 
employment in the wage sector, and increase the likelihood of future part-time work.   However, 
these consequences are small compared to similar experiences in unemployment.  Overall, men 
fared better following a spell of self-employment than did women.  
 
 Self-Employment Assistance (SEA) programs operate in most OECD countries. 
However, only about 2 percent of total active labour market budgets are spent on self-
employment.  In the United States, only seven states have active programs, and no state has had 
more than 1,000 participants in any year.  Several countries conducted evaluations of SEA 
operated as an alternative to continued receipt of UI benefits.  Some evaluations identified the 
program treatment by random assignment, while others were observational studies that used 
either or both, matching on characteristics and regression adjustment for observables. Nearly all 
evaluations found positive impacts of SEA.  These included a higher rate of engagement in self-
employment activity and higher earnings from self-employment.  Many studies also found 
evidence that SEA was associated with higher total income after participation; this was often due 
to wage and salary income.  This finding suggests that SEA had benefits for regular employment 
in the job market. The SEA intervention was not always associated with lower UI benefit 
payment costs, but targeting to those expected to be long-term unemployed improves this 
outcome. SEA tended to be most successful for its typical target population: older, experienced, 
more educated, and having higher levels of personal assets.  Indeed, programs requiring personal 
contributions for partial costs of business start-up tended to be successful.   
 
 A main shortcoming of existing evaluations is the short duration after intervention when 
outcomes were measured.  Just as for measuring small business start-up success, business 
survival, income, and hiring should be checked annually for at least five years.  Proprietorships 
lasting at least five years have a high probability of achieving long-term success.   
 
3.4.4 Job Creation Partnerships (JCPs) 
 
 Other countries have tried direct job creation efforts in various forms.  Generally, the 
programs operated as public works or public service employment have income transfer as the 
main objective.  Corollary aims may be to develop workplace behavior skills, arrest the 
deterioration of such skills, and contribute to social capital or public welfare.  Program 
participants are commonly either long-term unemployed or at high risk of long-term 
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unemployment, these include youths and minorities potentially facing discrimination.  A key 
question for measuring outcomes of direct job creation is whether the work experience can 
qualify one for unemployment compensation.   
 
Public service employment (PSE) programs provide a fixed amount of funding to a 
government agency or not-for-profit organization to employ unemployed individuals, typically 
disadvantaged persons who have difficulty finding unsubsidized employment.  These programs 
are also referred to as direct job creation programs.  There are two primary differences between 
PSE programs and wage subsidy or supplement programs.  The first is that PSE programs are 
typically for government or not-for-profit jobs, although there are exceptions, whereas wage 
subsidy programs target primarily private-sector jobs.  The second is that PSE programs provide 
funding to support the entire employment cost of an individual, whereas wage subsidy programs 
provide funding for only a portion of it.  It should also be mentioned that in many cases PSE-
supported workers are paid minimum wage and usually do not receive benefits.   
 
Some countries place a greater emphasis on PSE programs than others.  For example, of 
the 27 OECD countries for which data are available for 2007, four countries—the Netherlands, 
Ireland, Belgium, and France—spent the highest percentage of GDP on direct job creation 
(OECD, 2009).  Belgium emphasizes direct job creation much more than the others, spending 
0.34 percent of GDP on PSE programs.  In contrast, in 2007 the United States and Canada spent 
only 0.02 percent of GDP on these programs.   
 
There are typically three types of PSE programs.  The first is designed to provide 
employment during severe economic downturns or in severely economically distressed areas.  
The purpose in both cases is to reduce unemployment and provide workers with the means to 
support their families.  Improving long-term earnings or employment prospects is not the 
primary goal.  In its purest form, this category of PSE program is generally open to anyone 
having difficulty finding employment.  However, rarely does this type of  program have such an 
open-door eligibility policy; more typically, it is restricted to hard-to-employ populations.  One 
example of a program that falls into this category is the Summer Youth Employment Program in 
the United States, which provides minimum-wage, subsidized jobs to economically 
disadvantaged youth throughout the country.  The program began in 1964 as part of the War on 
Poverty initiative and continues today under the Workforce Investment Act.  Another example is 
the German public employment program (PEP), which was instituted to help reduce the high 
unemployment rate in the former East Germany after reunification occurred in 1990.  PEP 
participants were employed by government agencies as well as private-sector establishments in 
various industries.    
 
A second type of PSE program is targeted to specific population subgroups who have 
great difficulty finding unsubsidized employment.  Here the goals are to provide work 
experience and perhaps skills training, along with short-term aid and income, through subsidized 
employment.  An example that combines this category with the previous one is the New Hope 
Project in Milwaukee, which guarantees work to anyone living in a very poor section of the city.   
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The third category includes mandatory work programs.  These programs are usually 
associated with welfare programs, which offer cash benefits to employable recipients over a long 
period of time.  In response to public concern that some able-bodied persons are living off the 
taxpayer’s dollar, some states have required beneficiaries to participate in mandatory work 
programs while they receive benefits.  The goal is to ensure that aid recipients meet their social 
obligation to earn their income, while still providing aid to those who need it.  An example of 
such a program is New York City’s Work Experience Program, which assigns welfare recipients 
to subsidized positions in sponsoring New York City agencies (Ellwood and Welty, 1999).   
 
The advantage of PSE programs is that they are simple and direct.  The limitation is that 
by their very nature, they do not necessarily increase the attractiveness of employing 
disadvantaged persons.  Consequently, the likelihood of PSE participants transitioning into 
unsubsidized jobs after they leave PSE programs is minimal, unless the work experience and 
perhaps training (if offered) enhances their employability.  Another disadvantage is the potential 
worker substitution, or displacement effect.  Government agencies or not-for-profit organizations 
have an incentive to use the PSE funds to hire disadvantaged workers they may have hired 
anyway.  PSE workers also have the potential to crowd out (displace) private-sector workers.  
While having no direct effect on private-sector employers, PSE programs may have an indirect 
effect by reducing the availability of disadvantaged workers for private-sector jobs and by 
increasing their wages as the pool of unemployed persons shrinks.  In addition, if PSE programs 
are financed through taxes, higher tax rates may indirectly affect firm behavior.  Another indirect 
effect of PSE is the low output and productivity of the workers filling these positions, since the 
primary purpose of PSE jobs is to employ those who are not likely to be employed in an 
unsubsidized job.  In some cases, the PSE job positions are designed to do work that government 
agencies or not-for-profit organizations need done, and thus place value on that work.  Ideally, 
the person filling the position can meet the qualifications of the job—maybe not immediately, 
but quickly enough to be of value to the organization.  At the other extreme, the job is a make-
work job, which has little value to the company but which gives the position holder some 
experience in a workplace setting and occupies his or her idle time.    
 
3.4.4.1 Program design 
 
PSE program design differs considerably across programs.  Some PSE programs are 
confined to creating jobs in the government and not-for-profit sectors, while others include the 
private, for-profit sector (e.g., Germany’s PEP and Belgium’s Progression to Work program).  
Some programs include training and labour market support along with the subsidized 
employment (e.g., France’s New Start program and the Netherlands’ “Offer for All” strategy).  
PSE programs also differ in the population groups they target.  Some programs, particularly 
those that are implemented in recessions or in economically distressed areas, include a broad 
range of participants.  Others target narrow subpopulation groups, such as disadvantaged youth 
in the case of the United States’ Youth Summer Employment Program.  Another dimension of 
program design is the time in a worker’s unemployment spell in which he or she enrolls in a PSE 
program.  Typically programs target the longer-term unemployed.  Evaluation results offer 
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insight into the design of PSE programs that improves the effectiveness of the programs and 
minimizes displacement effects.    
 
3.4.4.2 Employment effects of PSE 
 
Since the primary purpose of most PSE programs is to find employment for the 
unemployed, the outcome of interest for PSE programs is the employment of participants.  Most 
evaluations consider two types of employment effects on participants: in-program and after-
program.  There is no doubt that a participant of a PSE program is employed during his or her 
period of participation.  The issue is whether PSE programs contribute to employment of 
participants after they exit the program.  There is also a macro or general equilibrium dimension 
to the employment effects of PSE programs, and that is the possibility of positive or negative 
interactions between program participants and other employed or unemployed workers.  These 
were described earlier as displacement or substitution effects.  However, the focus of most 
evaluations has been on estimating the short-term employment effects of PSE programs for the 
treated populations, disregarding the possibility of general equilibrium effects.   
 
Employment effects on the treated.  Results from more than two dozen evaluations of 
the PSE programs, mostly within European countries, suggest that participation in PSE programs 
reduces the likelihood of unsubsidized employment after exiting the program. 18  Of the 25 
evaluations of PSE programs in 12 European countries, nearly four-fifths find negative or 
statistically insignificant results.  Roughly half of these 25 studies used matching techniques to 
construct comparison groups.  The other half used either duration models or OLS regression 
adjustment.  None of the European studies used experimental design.  However, the evaluation 
methodology did not appear to influence the results.  For each method, about three-quarters of 
the evaluations yielded negative or statistically insignificant results.  Kluve (2010), in conducting 
a meta-analysis of 139 evaluations of European active labour market programs, concludes that 
“evaluations of direct employment programs are significantly less likely to estimate significant 
positive impacts, and more likely to estimate significant negative results,” relative to training 
programs (p. 913).  A World Bank study came to a similar conclusion, particularly with respect 
to after-program effects, when considering PSE programs in developed countries: “The majority 
of evaluations show that participants are no better off, and may be worse off, in terms of finding 
employment after the program” (Betcherman, Olivas, and Dar 2004, p. 48).  Their critique of 20 
studies of programs in developed countries found that only 7 of the studies showed positive 
impacts on employment and none showed positive impacts on earnings.     
 
German Reunification Work Support.  Probably one of the more studied PSE 
programs is the attempt by the German government to reduce high unemployment in eastern 
Germany after reunification.19  Disparities between the labour markets in the western and eastern 
                                                 
18 One explanation for the negative postprogram effect is the stigma placed on workers for participating in a 
direct employment program.  This is likely similar to the stigma effect associated with participating in wage subsidy 
programs. 
19 At least eight evaluations have been conducted to date, including Steiner and Kraus (1995), Hubler 
(1997), Bergemann et al. (2000), Kraus, Puhani, and Steiner (2000), Eichler and Lechner (2002), Cliendo, Hujer, 
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regions of Germany prompted the government to provide public service employment in eastern 
Germany through the reform of the Work Support Act.  Potential participants in the public 
employment program (PEP) have to be long-term unemployed (more than one year) or 
unemployed for at least six months within the last twelve months and have to be eligible for 
unemployment compensation.  Participants in PEP are not directly employed as a regular 
employee nor paid by the labour office.  Rather they have an employment contract with a 
program-supporting employer, which can be a public institution, a private non-profit 
organization, or a firm.  Normally, between 50 and 75 percent of the wages are covered, with 
100 percent covered in special cases.  Such special cases are common in eastern Germany, and 
because of the high or complete subsidies, the PEPs in this case look more like PSEs than wage 
subsidies.   
 
Participation in a PEP is typically limited to 12 months, although both shorter and longer 
(up to 24 months and, under special conditions, up to 36 months) durations are observed.  During 
their time in the program, participants are paid the going wage for that particular position, which 
in nearly all cases is higher than unemployment benefits.  PEP also pays social security 
contributions, which could create new rights for unemployment benefits.  An individual leaves a 
PEP when it ends, and it is possible, and desired, that the firm subsequently employs that person 
without a subsidy.  Furthermore, an individual must leave a PEP immediately to take up a job 
offer in an unsubsidized job if one is proposed by the labour office.     
 
The evaluations use a variety of methods, including discrete hazard rate models, 
matching, and hybrid approaches.  Most studies look at the employment status of participants 
after they have left the program. The length of time the evaluations follow their employment 
status varies but can be as long as 36 months after the treatment. 
 
Results vary across evaluations.  Steiner and Kraus (1995) find that relative to 
nonparticipants, male PEP participants have a higher employment probability 12 months after 
PEP participation.  Eichler and Lechner (2002) also find positive results:  their findings suggest 
that individuals participating in PEP substantially reduce their risk of unemployment in both the 
short run and long run and for both men and women.  For men, the majority of the reduced 
unemployment risk results from an increased employment probability; for women, it is because 
women drop out of the labour market.  The other studies find negative or insignificant results.  
For example, Kraus, Puhani, and Steiner (2000), in a later paper than Steiner and Kraus’s above, 
and using a different methodology, find a significant negative effect to PEP participation.  
Hubler (1997) concludes that PEP participation does not create the expected positive effects, 
although results differ according to the methodologies and specifications used.  Hujer, in several 
papers coauthored with Caliendo and Thomsen, generally finds negative or statistically 
insignificant effects for PEPs.   
 
U.S. National Supported Work Demonstration.  Random assignment experiments 
involving PSE programs are very limited and are basically confined to programs in the United 
States.  The three programs that were evaluated using this methodology—1) the Supported Work 
                                                                                                                                                             
and Thomsen (2004), Hujer, Caliendo, and Thomsen (2004), and Hujer and Thomsen (2006).   
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Program, 2) the AFDC Homemaker Home Health Aide Program, and 3) the Community Work 
Experience Programs—were conducted in the 1970s and 1980s and are no longer in operation.  
The results of the evaluations suggest that PSE programs are generally more effective for adult 
women than for adult men and for youth.    
 
To highlight the nature of supported work programs and their impacts, let us consider the 
National Supported Work Demonstration in more detail.  The supported work program provided 
individuals who had severe employment problems with work experience of a year or so under 
close supervision in work groups.  Four hard-to-employ groups were included in the national 
demonstration: 1) women on Aid to Families with Dependent Children (the U.S. welfare 
program, now called Temporary Assistance for Needy Families), 2) ex-addicts, 3) ex-offenders, 
and 4) young school dropouts, often with criminal records or histories of delinquency.  The goal 
of the program was to provide work experience to these groups so that they would be better 
prepared to join the labour force and do productive, meaningful work, cease engaging in socially 
destructive or dependent behavior, and become self-supporting members of society.  The 
program was a five-year demonstration operated by nonprofit organizations at 15 sites beginning 
in 1975.  During the period of operation, 10,000 participants went through the program.   
 
To evaluate whether this program accomplished these goals, a random assignment 
experiment was performed.   A total of 6,616 individuals were included in the random 
assignment experiment: 3,214 were participants and 3,402 were controls.  Each person in the 
sample received a baseline interview and up to four successive interviews at nine-month 
intervals.  The results are reported by the four subgroups listed in the preceding paragraph: 
 
AFDC Group.  To be eligible for this program, a person had to be female, on AFDC for 
30 of the last 36 months, and have no children under 6 years old.  The average age of AFDC 
participants was 34, all but 5 percent were black or Hispanic, and fewer than one-third were high 
school graduates.  The evaluation showed that in months 25–27 the experimental group’s 
employment rate was 20 percent above that of the control group, hours worked by participants in 
the experimental group were 35 percent higher, and their earnings exceeded those of the controls 
by almost 50 percent.  This differential persisted for wage rates even during the time the 
experimentals were employed in supported work programs.  After month 12, when increasing 
numbers left the program, the difference between the wage rates of the experimentals and the 
controls began to rise.  
 
Ex-Addict Group.  Both the participants and the control group were selected from those 
participating in drug treatment programs.  Almost all had used heroin, and the majority were 
young black or Hispanic males who had dropped out of high school.  The evaluation found that 
during and after their time in the supported work program, the experimentals were substantially 
less involved in criminal activity than were members of the control group.  Employment and 
earnings of the experimental group improved perceptibly over those of the control group after the 
27th month.  The reason that this improvement did not occur earlier may be related to the 
difficulty and, hence, delay that many ex-addicts experienced in finding employment after 
leaving the supported work program. 
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Ex-Offender Group.  Eligibility for the ex-offender group required an individual to have 
been incarcerated as a result of a conviction within the past six months.  Participants were 
predominantly young black or Hispanic males, nearly half of whom had not worked in a full-
time job in the previous 24 months.  The evaluation showed that the program had little effect on 
the participant group over the control group.  Participants had a somewhat better employment 
and earnings record after 27 months, but the difference was not statistically significant.  Unlike 
the ex-addicts, the ex-offenders who had participated in the program did not show any reduction 
in criminal behavior.  Furthermore, ex-offenders dropped out of the program at a relatively high 
rate; their average length of stay was 5.2 months.   
 
Youth Group.  Eligibility was limited to young people between the ages of 17 and 20 
years who had dropped out of school.  Half of the enrollees had a record of delinquency or crime.  
For the youth group, supported work had no long-term impact on the earnings, employment, 
criminal activity, or drug abuse of the participant group over the control group.  The evaluation 
results did suggest that the program was more beneficial for younger youth than for older youth.  
One reason for the lack of success was the difficulty in engaging youth in the program.  Many 
youths found it difficult to decide what kind of work to do, and they seemed to quickly tire of 
their jobs and left the program.    
 
Effects by subgroups from other studies.  Several studies of PSEs have examined their 
effect on subgroups, mostly on youth and on men and women.  Five of the 25 European studies 
looked at the effects of PSE programs that focus on youth.  Only one, a program in France in the 
1980s, showed positive effects.  The other four programs yielded negative or statistically 
insignificant results.  Several U.S. PSE programs focused on youth, but also with mixed results.  
Participants of the Summer Youth Employment Program were slightly more likely to work the 
following year, but no long-term gains were observed (Crane and Ellwood, 1984).  Evaluations 
of the Youth Corps found no statistically significant postprogram earnings or employment 
impact.  However, there was some evidence of positive effects for African American, Hispanic, 
and white female participants (Jastrzab, Masker, Blomquist and Orr, 1997). 
   
Effects of PSE by gender are generally more favorable for women than for men.  For all 
four evaluations of European programs, listed in Table 10, the estimated effects for men never 
exceed those for women.  However, only one study, by Eichler and Lechner (2002), actually 
showed positive results for women, in that their unemployment rates declined after leaving the 
program.  Yet in the long run this was due more to their leaving the workforce than to their 
increasing employment, and this result is hardly the program’s intent.  The other three studies 
found that the negative effects were not as strong for women as for men.  Evaluations of U.S. 
programs in general show stronger results for women than for men, in terms of both youth and 
adults.  For example, adult and young women in the CETA PSE program had higher earnings 
after leaving the program, but adult and young men had lower earnings.  For the Support Work 
Program, AFDC recipients, who were nearly all women, experienced much higher postprogram 
earnings impacts than did ex-offenders and ex-addicts, who are mostly men, although obviously 
the latter two groups have additional employment barriers to overcome. 
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Table 10  Summary of Evaluation Results of European PSE Programs
Country Evaluation study 
Target 
group 
Observation 
period 
Evaluation 
method 
Program effect 
Overall Subgroup 
Denmark Graversen (2004)  1994–1998 Duration Negative  
Denmark Rosholm (1999)  1983–1990 Duration Insignificant  
Denmark Rosholm & Svarer (2004)  1998–2002 Duration Negative  
Finland Natti et al. (2000)  1990–1995 OLS/selection Negative  
France Bonnal et al. (1997) Youth 1986–1988 Duration Insignificant  
France Brodaty et al. (2002) Youth 1995–1998 Matching Negative  
France Brodaty et al. (2002) Youth 1986–1988 Matching Positive  
Germany Bergemann et al. (2000)  1990–1998 Matching Negative F > M 
Germany Bergemann (2005)  1990–1999 Matching Positive  
Germany Caliendo et al. (2004)  2000–2002 Matching Negative  
Germany Eichler & Lechner (2002)  1992–1997 Matching Positive F > M 
Germany Hujer, Caliendo, & Radi (2004)  1995–1999 Matching Insignificant F > M 
Germany Hujer, Caliendo & Thomsen (2004)  2000–2002 Matching Negative F > M 
Germany Steiner and Kraus (1995)  1990–1994 Matching Positive  
Germany Kraus, Puhani, & Steiner (2000)  1990–1994 Duration Negative  
Germany Hubler (1997)  1990–1994 Matching Negative  
Ireland O’Connell & McGinnity (1997) Youth Early ’90s OLS/selection Insignificant  
Netherlands Ridder (1986)  Early ’80s Duration Positive  
Norway Hardoy (2001) Youth 1989–1993 OLS/selection Insignificant  
Norway Lorentzen & Dahl (2005)  1992–1999 Matching Insignificant  
Norway Zhang (2003)  1990–2000 Duration Insignificant  
Poland Kluve et al. (1999)  1992–1996 Matching Negative  
Slovak Rep. Van Ours (2001)  1993–1998 Duration Insignificant  
Sweden Frederiksson & Johansson (2003)  1993–1997 Matching Negative  
Sweden Sacklén (2002)  1991–1997 OLS/selection Positive  
Switzerland Gerfin & Lechner (2000)  1997–1999 Matching Negative  
UK Payne et al. (1996)  Early ’90s Matching, early Insignificant  
NOTE:  Most studies cited in Kluve (2010).  The notation “F>M” denotes that treatment is more effective (or less detrimental) 
for females than for males. 
 
 
3.4.4.3 Substitution and displacement effects 
 
As previously mentioned, PSE participants may displace workers who are not in the 
program.  The extent of displacement depends upon the design of the program, particularly the 
degree to which the program targets specific subgroups.  The importance of the size of the 
displacement effect depends upon the intent of the program.  If the program is intended to effect 
a countercyclical employment policy or one that targets workers in distressed areas for the 
purpose of reducing unemployment, such as the German PEP program, then the size of the 
displacement effect matters.  A one-for-one displacement would negate any impact of the 
program of putting more people to work.  If the program is viewed as enacting an antipoverty 
policy or one that targets hard-to-serve individuals, such as the National Supported Work 
program, then as long as the targeted group is employed through the program, the displacement 
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effect is of small consequence.  However, after the individual leaves the latter type of program, 
the displacement effect becomes a larger concern.  If the program helps a hard-to-serve person 
find employment after leaving the program, and the firm hiring the program leaver hires that 
person instead of another hard-to-serve person who never went through the program, the 
displacement reduces the long-run benefits of the program.  On the other hand, if the firm hires a 
hard-to-serve “graduate” of the program instead of hiring a higher-skilled person who did not go 
through the program, then the intent of the program is served even though a more highly skilled 
person is displaced.   
 
 Two methods have been used to estimate substitution.  One involves asking questions of 
program operators and supervisors and the other involves using econometric analysis.  The more 
rigorous and accepted approach is the latter.  Unfortunately, only a relatively few studies have 
examined substitution rates, far fewer than those that have evaluated participant outcomes.  
Johnson and Tomola (1977) was one of the first studies to examine substitution rates using an 
econometric approach.  They examined possible displacement caused by the CETA PSE 
program from 1966 through 1975.  They found that for every 100 PSE slots, 31 existing workers 
were displaced by the third quarter and 97 by the sixth quarter, which results in full displacement 
after 18 months.  Borus and Hamermesh (1978) disputed these results, showing that they were 
unstable and sensitive to functional form.  Yet the basic finding of high displacement remained.  
After CETA was revised in 1976 to narrow the eligibility rules to include only low income and 
longer-term unemployed, subsequent studies found somewhat lower substitution rates (Adams, 
Cook, and Maurice 1983).  A field study, chaired by Richard Nathan, concluded that substitution 
rates were between 10 and 20 percent (Nathan et al. 1981).  These estimates were based on 
conversations with providers and examinations of fiscal patterns, not on econometric analysis.  
 
The other program that has received considerable scrutiny with respect to substitution 
effects is the Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects (YIEPP), which offered high school 
students a guaranteed part-time job during the school year and a full-time job during the summer.  
The demonstration project was administered in the late 1970s.  Two approaches were used to 
estimate substitution rates:  field research and econometric methods (Unicon 1982).  Both 
yielded consistent results.  The field research found substitution rates of 57 percent in the private 
sector, 28 percent in the nonprofit sector, and 21 percent in the public sector.  The econometric 
analysis found substitution rates of 47 percent in the private sector, 45 percent in the nonprofit 
sector, and negligible displacement in the public sector.   
 
A few studies outside the United States also estimate the displacement effects of PSE 
programs.  The two highlighted here examine Swedish PSE programs from the 1960s through 
the 1980s, and both find displacement effects.  Gramlich and Ysander (1981) focus on the two 
largest categories of public relief expenditures and employment: 1) health and welfare workers 
and 2) road construction workers.  They find evidence of considerable displacement in road 
construction, but not in health and welfare.  Forslund and Krueger (1994) investigate the 
displacement effects of public relief workers from 1976 to 1991 for construction workers, and 
from 1982 to 1990 for health and welfare workers.  Results for construction workers show a 
negative and statistically significant effect:  for every additional 100 public relief workers hired, 
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69 fewer private construction workers are employed.  However, the results for health and welfare 
workers are much less clear.   
 
3.4.4.4 Total displacement and private crowd-out effects 
 
Most studies do not consider the other form of displacement, which is private crowd-out, 
particularly for programs that provide subsidized jobs in only government or not-for-profit 
sectors.  One reason may be that PSE programs focus primarily on unemployed workers, who are 
predominantly economically disadvantaged and are unlikely to be in demand in the private 
sector.  The private crowd-out effect is difficult to estimate.  It requires estimates of the 
economic parameters of supply and demand, which in turn depend on the target group and the 
economic conditions.  MDRC attempted to estimate the total displacement effect of the YIEPP 
program for youth.  They compared the employment and unemployment rates of youth in the 
program with those for similar youth in comparison sites where the program was not instituted.  
Before the program began, youth employment rates were comparable in the treatment and 
control sites.  MDRC found the total displacement rate averaged about 40 percent over the 
course of the program.  The rates differed by site.  MDRC decomposed the total displacement 
effect by sector and estimated a 55 percent displacement rate for the private sector and a 29 
percent one for the public sector.    
 
3.4.4.5 Value of output 
 
For PSE programs that focus on creating jobs for individuals that firms are reluctant to 
hire, either because of poor economic conditions or the participant’s lack of qualifications, the 
issue is whether the program is simply paying for make-work jobs, or does it add value in the 
products or services produced by the program participant?  This issue is more important from a 
benefit-cost standpoint, but it has been a consideration in gaining support for implementing a 
PSE program and perhaps in providing relevant work, and thus work experience, for program 
participants.  Estimating the value of work is difficult when an outside entity, a government 
program, is paying the wage bill.  For public works programs, such as the Works Progress 
Administration (WPA) of the 1930s which used the funds to build roads and bridges, as well as 
the New York City Work Experience of the 1990s which used the funds to maintain city parks, 
the answer is fairly simple.  Many miles of roads were built under the WPA, and tangible 
measures of cleaner and better-maintained parks were recorded as a result of the New York 
program (Ellwood and Welty 1999).  Other attempts at estimating the value of output involved 
asking employers, assigning quantitative value to output produced, and using the retail value of 
the good or service produced, if it is actually sold.  Estimates have also been based on comparing 
wages of regular employers with those of the program participants,. when it can be determined 
that they perform similar tasks.  Studies that have used this last method, such as the evaluation of 
Youth Corps, came up with rather implausible results, as they found that the wages paid to youth 
through the program were almost double the wages paid by the private sector.   
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3.4.4.6 Summary 
 
Public Service Employment programs provide subsidized employment to individuals who 
have difficulty finding work in unsubsidized jobs.  Europe emphasizes this form of active labour 
market intervention more than the United States or Canada.  Evaluations generally find that PSE 
programs are not effective in helping program participants find unsubsidized jobs after they 
leave the program.  In addition, there are sizable displacement effects with many of the 
programs.  However, the program appears to be more effective for adult women than for adult 
men and for youth.  There are some features of the program that work better than others.  In 
some studies, participants with less work experience tend to have greater postprogram benefits.  
Shortening the length of time participants are enrolled in the program appears to increase their 
likelihood of finding unsubsidized employment.  PSE programs tend to get better results when 
they place participants with regular employers in jobs similar to unsubsidized ones.  Evaluation 
results also indicate that displacement effects can be mitigated by narrowing the eligible group to 
those who are less likely to find regular employment, which may decrease the chances of those 
persons to find unsubsidized employment after completing the program.      
 
3.4.5 Employment Assistance Services (EAS) 
 
 In Canada, Employment Assistance Services (EAS) are normally used by job-ready 
clients who need information about labour markets, help with job search, and access to tools 
such as resume writing software and the Internet.  These and other services are commonly 
offered through public employment services in most developed countries.  Access to such 
services is normally unrestricted for any citizen legally entitled to work in a country.  In 
particular, access is not limited to eligible unemployment insurance (UI) beneficiaries.  
Nonetheless, some evaluations of employment services (ES) do measure effectiveness in 
conserving UI funds.  This section provides a survey of results from studies evaluating the 
effectiveness of widely accessible public employment services.  The magnitudes of the net 
impact are typically small, however—but then so too are the costs, making many of these 
interventions socially beneficial.  
 
 Our survey of public employment services divides evaluation studies into the following 
ten topic groups: 1) Job Interview Referrals and Job Placements, 2) Counseling, 3) Job Search 
Assistance, 4) UI Work Test, 5) Mandatory Services, 6) Sanctions, 7) Targeted Job Search 
Assistance, 8) Reemployment Incentives–Bonuses, 9) Reemployment Services to UI  
Beneficiaries, and 10) Youth Employment Services.  A summary of selected research evidence 
on these topics is presented in Table 11. 
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Table 11.  Summary of Evidence on the Effectiveness of Employment Services
Service Evaluation method Impact estimates Study location Authors (year) 
Employment Service 
(ES) job interview 
referrals 
NE: Controlled for observable 
characteristics in regression 
models. 
Increased earnings Sites in 27 U.S. states Johnson et al. 
(1983, 1985) 
ES job search assistance 
(JSA) 
NE: Controlled for observable 
characteristics in regression 
models. 
Acts as a backstop 
against long term U 
Pennsylvania Katz (1991) 
ES referrals NE: Controlled for observable 
characteristics in regression 
models. 
−2.1 weeks UI Washington Jacobson & Petta 
(2000) 
ES referrals NE: Controlled for observable 
characteristics in regression 
models. 
−1.1 weeks UI Oregon Jacobson & Petta 
(2000) 
Job search counseling RA: Among ES customers judged 
in need of counseling, some 
were randomly assigned to it 
No impacts  Florida, Minnesota, 
Utah 
Benus et al. (1977)
Job search counseling NE: Controlled for observable 
characteristics in regression 
models. 
No impacts Sites in 27 U.S. states Johnson et al. 
(1981) 
Job search counseling NE: Controlled for observable 
characteristics in regression 
models of unemployment 
duration.  
7-percentage-point 
reduction in 1-year 
return to 
unemployment 
France Crepon et al. (2005)
Job search counseling RA: ES registrants referred or not, 
with tests for homogeneity.  
Impacts in duration models 
with control variables.  
Increased search 
intensity  and rate of 
job finding 
Netherlands Gorter and Kalb 
(1996) 
Job search assistance RA: ES registrants referred or not, 
with tests for homogeneity.  
Impacts in duration models 
with control variables.  
No impacts on exit to 
employment, no 
differences between 
subgroups 
Netherlands (only 
Amsterdam and 
Rotterdam)  
Van den Berg and 
van der Klaauw 
(2006) 
Stronger work test RA: Regressions with controls. −0.55 weeks UI Charleston, SC Corson et al.(1985)
Stronger work test plus 
placement 
RA: Regressions with control 
variables for observables. 
−0.61 weeks UI Charleston, SC Corson et al.(1985)
Stronger work test plus 
placement and JSW 
RA: Regressions with control 
variables for observables. 
−0.76 weeks UI Charleston, SC Corson et al.(1985)
Report 4 employer 
contacts 
RA: Regressions with control 
variables for observables. 
−0.70 weeks UI Maryland Klepinger et al. 
(1998, 2002) 
Make 2 employer 
contacts but no 
reporting 
RA: Regressions with control 
variables for observables. 
0.40 weeks UI Maryland Klepinger et al. 
(1998, 2002) 
Make 2 employer 
contacts plus JSW 
RA: Regressions with control 
variables for observables. 
−0.60 weeks UI Maryland Klepinger et al. 
(1998, 2002) 
Make 2 employer 
contacts, both 
verified 
RA: Regressions with control 
variables for observables. 
−0.90 weeks UI Maryland Klepinger et al. 
(1998, 2002) 
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Table 11.  Summary of Evidence on the Effectiveness of Employment Services
Service Evaluation method Impact estimates Study location Authors (year) 
Remove the work test RA: Regressions with control 
variables for observables. 
3.30 weeks UI Tacoma, WA Johnson & 
Klepinger (1991, 
1994) 
Remove the work test Natural experiment, temporary 
closure of employment offices, 
suspended reporting 
requirement. 
5.28-week increase in 
duration of JSA 
Northern Ireland—Job 
seekers allowance 
(JSA) replaced “the 
dole” 
McVicar (2010) 
Delay job search 
assistance call-in 
RA: Regressions with control 
variables for observables. 
Earlier call-in had 
slightly shorter 
unemployment 
spells, and higher 
earnings after five 
years. 
U.K. national sample 
in the new “restart 
program” 
Dolton & O’Neill 
(1996, 2002) 
Mandatory services NE: Matching on observable 
characteristics in similar labour 
market areas. 
5.0-percentage-point 
increase in job 
finding 
U.K. new deal for 
young people 
Blundell et al. 
(2004) 
Sanctions NE: Selection bias correction for 
endogenous sanction on exit 
rate from employment 
58% male,  
67% female increase in 
job finding 
Netherlands response 
to 5–30% reduction 
in UI benefits 
Abbring et al. 
(2005) 
Job search assistance 
(JSA) 
RA: Regressions controlling for 
individual characteristics local 
offices, timing of enrollment. 
−0.47 weeks UI New Jersey Corson et al. (1989)
JSA plus training RA: Regressions controlling for 
observables, offices, timing. 
−0.48 weeks UI New Jersey Corson et al. (1989)
JSA plus reemployment 
bonus 
RA: Regressions controlling for 
observables, offices, timing. 
−0.97 weeks UI New Jersey Corson et al. (1989)
Structured job search RA: Regressions controlling for 
observables, offices, timing. 
−1.13 weeks UI D.C. Decker et al. (2000)
Individual job search RA: Regressions controlling for 
observables, offices, timing. 
−0.47 weeks UI D.C. Decker et al. (2000)
Individual job search 
plus training 
RA: Regressions controlling for 
observables, offices, timing. 
−0.61 weeks UI D.C. Decker et al. (2000)
Structured job search RA: Regressions controlling for 
observables, offices, timing. 
−0.41 weeks UI Florida Decker et al. (2000)
Individual job search RA: Regressions controlling for 
observables, offices, timing. 
−0.59 weeks UI Florida Decker et al. (2000)
Individual job search 
plus training 
RA: Regressions controlling for 
observables, offices, timing. 
−0.52 weeks UI Florida Decker et al. (2000)
Connecticut WPRS NE: Regressions controlling for 
observable characteristics. 
−0.25 weeks UI Connecticut Dickinson et al. 
(1999) 
Illinois WPRS NE: Regressions controlling for 
observable characteristics. 
−0.41 weeks UI Illinois Dickinson et al. 
(1999) 
Kentucky  WPRS NE: Regressions controlling for 
observable characteristics. 
−0.21 weeks UI Kentucky Dickinson et al. 
(1999) 
Kentucky WPRS RA: With matching on 
observables. 
−2.20 weeks UI Kentucky Black et al. (2003) 
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Table 11.  Summary of Evidence on the Effectiveness of Employment Services
Service Evaluation method Impact estimates Study location Authors (year) 
New Jersey WPRS NE: Regressions controlling for 
observable characteristics. 
−0.29 weeks UI New Jersey Dickinson et al. 
(1999) 
Maine WPRS NE: Regressions controlling for 
observable characteristics. 
−0.98 weeks UI Maine Dickinson et al. 
(1999) 
Illinois UI bonus RA: Regressions controlling for 
observable characteristics. 
−1.15 weeks UI Illinois Woodbury & 
Spiegelman 
(1987) 
New Jersey UI bonus RA: Regressions controlling for 
observable characteristics. 
−0.50 weeks UI New Jersey Corson et al. (1989)
Pennsylvania UI bonus RA: Regressions controlling for 
observable characteristics. 
−0.69 weeks UI Pennsylvania Corson et al. (1992)
Washington UI bonus RA: Regressions controlling for 
observable characteristics. 
−0.47 weeks UI Washington Spiegelman et al. 
(1992) 
Targeted UI bonus RA: Regressions controlling for 
observables, office, timing. 
−0.75 weeks UI Pennsylvania and 
Washington 
O’Leary et al. 
(2005) 
Reemployment and 
eligibility 
assessments (REA) 
RA: Matching and regressions 
controlling for observable 
characteristics. 
−1.2 weeks UI Minnesota Benus et al. (2008)
UI and ES in one-stop 
centers 
NE: Matching on observables and 
regression adjustment using 
other relevant variables. 
−1.8 weeks UI Wisconsin Almandsmith et al. 
(2006) 
Active labour market 
programs for younger 
and older 
unemployed 
NE: A natural experiment plus 
regression adjustment on 
observables (after difference 
over time of dependent 
variable). 
Smaller effects for 
youth, older, low 
education 
Portugal Centeno et al. 
(2009) 
NOTE: RA= random assignment experiment, NE= nonexperimental , JSW means job search workshop.  WPRS means 
Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services.   
 
 Job Interview Referrals and Job Placements.  In the early 1980s, the U.S. Department 
of Labor sponsored a nationwide evaluation of the effectiveness of the Employment Service:  
Johnson et al. (1983, 1985) evaluatedES referrals to job interviews.   The authors conducted 
interviews with 8,000 new applicants in 30 ES offices in 27 states between July 1980 and May 
1981, and did in-home follow-up interviews six to nine months later.  Their strategy was to 
compare those referred to an ES job interview with other ES registrants.  They focused on the 
following five outcomes: 1) time from ES application to first job, 2) earnings during the six 
months after ES contact, 3) employment at the time of follow-up interview, 4) usual work hours 
per week on the new job, and 5) wage rates.  
 
Johnson and his colleagues recognized that receipt of an ES job interview referral is 
likely a consequence of both individual and ES agency actions.  They suggested that individual 
motivation may distinguish who seeks out a service, and efforts by agency staff to achieve high 
reemployment rates may amount to cream-skimming.  Both these actions may cause the 
participant samples to differ from nonparticipant samples.  They asked baseline survey questions 
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to permit construction of three indices: work ethic, lack of confidence, and efficacy in carrying 
out plans.  They used local office factors to create controls for staff referral practices.   
 
 Preliminary analysis comparing recipients of an ES job interview referral with 
nonrecipients suggested differences among men as to prior earnings patterns, but no significant 
differences in prior earnings among women. Those referred by the ES to job interviews also 
scored higher on the baseline test of individual motivation, while those not referred were slightly 
more advantaged in terms of having higher pre-ES earnings.  Impact estimates were computed in 
regression models controlling for the influence of demographics, financial resources, work 
history, motivation, local office characteristics, and local labour market conditions.20 
 
 Large positive earnings gains were estimated for unemployed women, including all 
subgroups of women.  Among women an ES job referral was estimated to speed return to work 
by 2.8 weeks, with an 11.1-percentage-point increase in the probability of employment on the 
survey date six months after ES referral.  Women with a referral were 7.4 percentage points less 
likely to have dropped out of the labour force, and their earnings in six months were $325 more 
than the $1,400 mean for the nonreferred.  Among men, an ES job interview referral was 
estimated to speed return to employment by three days, but the estimate was not statistically 
significant.  Men over age 45 and men in urban areas also had positive but statistically 
insignificant effects.  There were no estimated impacts for either sex on reemployment wage 
rates.  About the effects for women, the authors speculate that “part of the reason may be that 
women have less labor market experience and less access to the traditional network of job 
finding methods and that an ES referral constitutes more of a service for women” (Johnson et al. 
1985, p. 136). 
 
 The National Commission for Employment Policy sponsored research that exploited an 
uncommon feature of UI to estimate the effectiveness of ES for dislocated workers in 
Pennsylvania (Katz 1991).  The study used data on UI recipients in Pennsylvania during the 
period from 1979 to 1987.  Unlike in most states, in those years Pennsylvania claimants were not 
required to register for job search with the ES.  Program effects were estimated by comparing 
labour market outcomes of ES users against those of nonusers of ES, so that program effects 
were subject to selection biases.  This study examined job search assistance (resume assistance, 
job search workshops, job finding clubs, labour market information, and job search planning) 
and job placements.  Net impact estimates were computed in regression models controlling for 
differences in observed characteristics.21  Job search assistance was most effective right after the 
start of a spell of joblessness.  Both job placements and referrals were found to be most effective 
two or three calendar quarters after commencement of joblessness.  The key insight gained from 
this study has to do with the response to interventions at differing times in the jobless spell.   The 
                                                 
20 They also tried Heckman selection bias correction procedures, but lacked instruments to predict receipt 
of an ES service that were not also correlated with outcomes. 
21 Error! Main Document Only.In addition to the indicator for ES service receipt, regression models 
included control variables for age, sex, quarters of prior work experience, prior work in manufacturing, SMSA 
unemployment rate, weekly UI benefit amount, exhausted UI benefits, number of weeks of UI benefits, and used ES 
before joblessness. 
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pattern that emerged led the study’s author to describe the ES as a “backstop,” or a job finding 
path followed when others have yielded no appealing prospects:  “The effectiveness of the ES 
appeared to be much less a function of the characteristics of individual workers than the overall 
length of their joblessness.”  (Katz 1991, p. 21.) 
 
 Jacobson and Petta (2000) did an evaluation in Washington and Oregon that found 
employment service job placements most effective for those with a strong record of job 
attachment, affording evidence that job search assistance would be an appropriate intervention 
for dislocated workers.  The data for Washington consisted of survey data on 587 job seekers 
who used the public labour exchange in the first half of 1998, plus administrative data on 
328,815 jobless spells that occurred between 1987 and the middle of 1995.  The Oregon data 
were based on administrative records for 138,280 jobless spells in 1995.  An analysis of job 
placements using the Washington survey data suggested differences in impacts across ES 
customers depending on their recent pattern of job attachment.  For job seekers characterized as 
having a spotty work record, the impact of a job placement was estimated to be large, while the 
impact estimate was even larger for those with a strong work record.  The analysis of 
administrative data was done in regression models controlling for observable variables including 
demographic characteristics, work history, history of recent UI claims duration and exhaustion, 
and local labour market conditions.  The impact of job referrals based on the Washington 
administrative data was estimated to be −2.1 weeks, and the estimate based on the Oregon data 
was −1.1 weeks.  Concern about the degree to which the Washington and Oregon ES evaluations 
were externally valid regarding displacement led to a related study.  Davidson and Woodbury 
(1993, 2000) used a computerized simulation model of the labour market called a general 
equilibrium search and matching model. They calibrated the model with labour market data from 
Washington state and with impact estimates of Washington public labour exchange (PLX) 
services (Jacobson and Petta 2000).  “The crowding-out effects of PLX referral and placement 
activities are small both absolutely and relative to the increases in employment that result from 
PLX activities . . . the benefits generated by PLX referral and placement activities outweigh the 
costs.  The benefits, again, are twofold: shorter unemployment spells for PLX users and general 
improvements in the labour market that result from PLX activities” (Davidson and Woodbury 
2000, pp. 19–20).  
 
Counseling.  Benus et al. (1977) conducted the first scientific evaluation of employment 
counseling in the United States as a small field experiment in which individuals judged to be in 
need of counseling were randomly assigned to receive it or not; both groups received normal 
placement services, and the treatment group received additional counseling.  Study sites (and 
sample sizes) were Minneapolis (215), Salt Lake City (278), and West Palm Beach (204).  The 
study authors concluded that counseling had no significant impact on duration of unemployment, 
employment earnings, job search effectiveness, job satisfaction, or occupational prestige.    
 
 The results from Benus et al. (1977) are consistent with evidence from a national survey 
of the counseling program conducted by Johnson et al. (1981).  Terry Johnson and colleagues 
surveyed ES staff in 30 offices around the country in 27 different states.  Counseling supervisors 
reported that counselors were primarily evaluated on the quality of the counseling records kept, 
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the size of their caseloads, and their communication and relationship skills. Many fewer 
supervisors indicated that counselors were evaluated on ES services provided to job seekers or 
the results of those services.  Johnson et al. (1983) reported impact estimates from their national 
evaluation of several employment services in the United States. Impact estimates were computed 
in regression models controlling for the influence of demographic, financial, work history, 
motivation, local office characteristics, and local labour market conditions.22  They concluded 
that employment counseling produced no significant impact on duration of unemployment, 
earnings, or job satisfaction.  
 
Crépon, Dejemeppe, and Gurgand (2005) evaluated the effects of intensive counseling 
schemes provided to about 20 percent of the unemployed in France since the 2001 
unemployment policy reform (PARE).  Several of the counseling schemes amount to a kind of 
qualitative profiling, intended to improve the quality of assignment of workers to jobs. The 
authors use a nationally representative one-in-twelve sample of newly unemployed persons for 
all new spells of UI receipt between July 2001 and September 2003.  They only analyze the first 
observed spell so as to avoid correlation of unobservable variables over consecutive spells.  Data 
end in June 2004, and unemployment spells are arbitrarily truncated at 900 days.  In estimating 
duration models they control for a large number of individual characteristics and unemployment 
history traced back to 1993.  In particular they control for gender, nationality, children, marital 
status, educational level, age, region of residence, reason of entry into unemployment, 
unemployment history (cumulative unemployment duration since July 1993 and since July 
1999), unemployment recurrence (number of spells since July 1999), welfare transfer (RMI), and 
type of unemployment benefit eligibility. They find significant favorable effects of counseling on 
both unemployment duration and cycling back to unemployment.  In particular, the program 
reduces the likelihood of new unemployment from 33 to 26 percent. This suggests that screening 
customers by subjective factors, using professional employment counselors, can reduce cycling 
back to unemployment.  
 
 Counseling-and-monitoring is a service offered in the Netherlands that consists of 
monthly meetings with an employee of the local UI agency for a period of six months, starting 
immediately after inflow into UI.  During these meetings, recent job search activities are 
evaluated and a plan for the next period's job search activities is made.  A distinguishing feature 
of this program is the random assignment nature of its operational design.  Unemployed job 
seekers (who are entitled to receive unemployment benefits) are randomly divided into two 
groups (treatment and control). Moreover, the program is implemented as part of the regular 
contact that unemployed people receiving benefits are obliged to maintain with the Joint 
Administration Office (JAO). At these meetings, the control group is dealt with in the 
“traditional” way: progress in finding a job is discussed (for example, the number of applications 
made and whether invitations are obtained for job interviews), and occasionally the information 
an unemployed person provides is checked. The basic approach of having regular meetings and 
the exchange of information is exactly the same for the treatment group. The difference is, 
however, in spending more time with each unemployed person in the treatment group than is 
                                                 
22 They also tried Heckman selection bias correction procedures, but lacked instruments to predict receipt 
of an ES service that were not also correlated with outcomes. 
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common in the “traditional” approach.  The following two paragraphs summarize two separate 
evaluations that found differing results for the Dutch program’s counseling and monitoring.   
 
 Gorter and Kalb (1996) estimated the effects of counseling and monitoring in the 
Netherlands on unemployment using random assignment, in a sample drawn from the registered 
inflow to unemployment from November 1989 through January 1990 at seven regional 
administrative offices (located in Haarlem, Maastricht, Arnhem, Vlaardingen, Apeldoorn, Venlo, 
and Rijswijk).  After necessary restrictions, the usable analytic sample included 722 
observations.  The evaluation focused on outcomes for the job finding rate, application intensity, 
and the matching probability.  In the authors’ job search model, the job finding rate is equal to 
the product of the application intensity (frequency of applications in a period) and the matching 
probability. The assumption is that ES counseling and monitoring boost the application intensity, 
thereby increasing the likelihood of finding a job. A sample of the inflow into unemployment 
was randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. The search activities and labour market 
events of the sample were recorded through interviews every four weeks for a total period of 
about one year.  For analysis Gorter and Kalb retained only those observations that provided full 
information on the "search history" of the individual—that is, 743 of 1,631.  Furthermore, they 
restricted the period between becoming unemployed and being assigned to CM to less than 60 
days. This reduced the sample to 722 cases. The homogeneity of participant and comparison 
groups was confirmed by simple tests which show that the sample means and standard errors of 
the "labour market history" variables for those receiving and those not receiving CM are not 
significantly different.  Impacts were estimated in duration models controlling for observable 
variables such as age, educational attainment, sex, prior job—permanent or temporary, years of 
work experience, years unemployed, days unemployed before registration as unemployed, 
occupation, and indicator variables for local area of residence. The empirical results suggest that 
both counseling and monitoring reduce the time required to find a job because of increased job 
search intensity—i.e., people given these services make more job applications than the 
comparison group. 
 
Van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006) also examined the Netherlands program for 
counseling and monitoring of unemployed workers.  They theoretically analyze these policies in 
a job search model with two search channels and endogenous search effort.  Their empirical 
analysis uses administrative data generated by random assignment plus follow-up survey data on 
new UI registrations in Amsterdam and Rotterdam between August 24 and December 2, 1998, at 
two local branches of the public employment service.  The experiment ended on February 8, 
1999.  The randomization process in the experiment prevented crossover between treatment and 
control groups in assignment or afterwards. The participants in the experiment were not informed 
in advance about the fact that the experiment was going on. None of the individuals in either 
group complained about their status. Since treatment assignment was compulsory, there was no 
noncompliance, and therefore no self-selection into or out of the assigned treatment or control 
group.  The authors estimated average treatment effects across the population of UI entrants in 
duration models of exit from unemployment to work.  In estimation they controlled for 
observable characteristics including age, sex, prior UI receipt, UI benefit amount, marital status, 
and city of residence. They find no evidence that counseling and monitoring affect the exit rate 
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from unemployment to work.  They find instead that monitoring causes a shift from informal to 
formal job search.  They assert that low-intensity job search assistance programs, such as the 
counseling component of the Dutch counseling and monitoring program, have small effects at 
best. They suggest that high-intensity job search assistance programs may have a more positive 
effect on the exit rate to work, and that monitoring of relatively well-qualified individuals in 
favorable macroeconomic conditions leads to inefficient substitution of search methods or 
channels. Individuals with worse prospects may have less scope for substitution, and monitoring 
of their search activity may lead to an increase in the exit rate to work. The null hypothesis of a 
zero treatment effect is never rejected, not even for specific subgroups or specific time intervals.  
However, the results suggest that transition rates to employment were somewhat higher for 
younger individuals and those who collected UI benefits before, those who did not vary at all by 
gender or marital status, and those who differed slightly across the two cities; and that transition 
rates were lower for those who had lost part-time jobs.   
 
Comparing the random assignment evaluations and results from the similar studies in the 
Netherlands, the differences can be partly explained by the fact that the intervention examined by 
Gorter and Kalb (1996) was more intensive, and labour market conditions were generally more 
favorable, than was the case for the Van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006) study.  In 
particular, the Gorter and Kalb treatment may be considered an add-on to the Van den Berg and 
van der Klaauw treatment, hence the stronger positive impacts found by Gorter and Kalb.   
 
UI Work Test.  The U.S. program for UI has a strong focus on reemployment.  The UI 
work test is a critical program feature for promoting reemployment. The work test normally 
requires both registering with the public employment service and contacting potential employers 
on a weekly basis. Once initially eligible, claimants must be able to work, available for work, 
and actively seeking work in order to continue collecting weekly UI benefits. Nearly all states 
waive the work search requirement for workers on temporary layoff with a definite recall date in 
the near future. Workers who find their jobs through union hiring halls also are commonly 
excluded from the work search requirement. These workers are not expected to search for work 
independently, as long as they are registered with the placement service of their union hiring 
hall.  Finally, workers are excluded from the work search requirement for those weeks during 
which they are enrolled in training approved by the state UI agency. 
 
 A work test field experiment in Charleston, South Carolina, involved random assignment 
of 5,675 new initial UI claimants to three treatment groups and a control group between February 
and December 1983 (Corson, Long, and Nicholson 1985).  The experiment evaluated three 
treatments representing successively larger bundles of services.  Claimants assigned to the 
control group were given the customary work test, which involved informing claimants that ES 
registration was required.  However, there was no systematic monitoring of this requirement.  
The three treatments were 1) a work test requiring that an ES registration notice be sent after the 
first UI benefit check was paid, with payment of the second check suspended for failure to 
register with the ES; 2) a work test plus enhanced placement services, a personal placement 
interview within one week of the first UI check, a job referral or an outreach attempt to contact a 
prospective employer (job development), training in using the job vacancy listings, and special 
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additional services again once the claimant drew nine weeks of benefits; and 3) enhanced 
placement services, plus job search workshops: a three-hour JSW, and after four weeks of UI 
benefits a JSW on labour market information. Treatment impacts on earnings and weeks of UI 
benefits were computed in regression models controlling for observable characteristics: age, 
race, sex, educational attainment, potential duration of UI benefits, UI wage replacement ratio, 
and base period earnings.  The first treatment had the largest impact.  It alone shortened the 
duration of compensated joblessness by more than half a week.  The additional services did not 
lead to significantly larger impacts. Impacts of the treatments were concentrated among men who 
averaged impacts of greater than 1.0 weeks for all treatments, and among workers in the 
construction industry, who had impacts of more than 4.0 weeks.  
 
 A field experiment on the work test conducted enrollment between July 1986 and August 
1987 in Tacoma, Washington, job service centers.  It involved a total of 6,763 UI claimants 
assigned to one of three treatments; 2,871 claimants were assigned to the control group (Johnson 
and Klepinger 1994).  The control group faced the standard work search rule requiring three 
employer contacts per week, plus an eligibility review interview (ERI) 13 to 15 weeks after the 
initial claim was filed.  The three treatments were as follows: 1) exception reporting—a complete 
relaxation of the work test, whereby claimants were not required to file the standard biweekly 
continued UI claim form and were told that UI payments would continue until the claimant 
reported a change in circumstances such as return to work or an increased level of earnings; (2) 
new work search policy—individualized work search requirements including a group ERI 
followed by an intensive one-on-one follow-up interview; and 3) intensive services—
individualized work search requirements (Treatment 2), plus a two-day JSW after four weeks 
(two days of classroom instruction plus 10 hours of phone canvassing), plus a group ERI after 12 
weeks with a focus on employability development, plus individual follow-up. Treatment impacts 
on UI receipt and reemployment were estimated using regression and probit models including 
the following variables for individual and regional characteristics: a set of age dummies, male 
dummy, race/ethnicity dummies, a set of education dummies, veteran status dummy, earnings 
and hours worked in each of the three years before filing for benefits, a set of occupation and 
industry dummies for the person's most recent job, WBA, maximum number of weeks of UI 
benefits payable, a set of dummies for type of UI claim, union member dummy, a temporary 
layoff dummy, and the unemployment rate in the county three months after the person filed the 
claim.  That last variable aimed to approximate labour market conditions at about the mean 
duration of the UI spell.  Impacts on reemployment earnings were estimated in regression models 
controlling for the above listed variables, plus each model included an additional Heckman 
variable to correct for selection bias due to estimation on samples of only those gaining 
reemployment.  Suspension of enrollment into the first treatment was done earlier than planned 
because the larger-than-expected response could easily be detected with a sample much smaller 
than designed.  Claimants relieved of the work test and the continued claim filing increased their 
period of UI benefits drawn by a statistically significant 3.3 weeks.  This impact was bigger for 
women with children and men without children, and for married women and unmarried men. 
Treatment 2 had an effect on UI benefit receipt of +0.17 weeks and was statistically 
indistinguishable from the existing standard work search rule applied uniformly to all claimants.  
Treatment number 3, which was customized and featured a JSW after four weeks and an ERI 
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after 12 weeks, had a statistically significant impact of 0.47 weeks.  Impacts were bigger for 
women without children and unmarried women.  An analysis of the timing of the components of 
this treatment and claimant response (at 4 and 12 weeks), combined with an analysis of the 
timing of the standard treatment given the control group (at 13 to 15 weeks) and the response to 
that, provided new insight into claimant behavior.  In both cases exit from UI benefit receipt 
appeared to be more likely right before a scheduled intervention, rather than after the service was 
provided.  Such a response might be termed an “invitation effect.”  This led to the conclusion 
that the timed elements of the work test—JSW and ERI—acted more like a stick, prodding return 
to work, than a carrot, providing nourishment for achieving that end.  
 
 Enrollment into the Maryland UI work search experiment was conducted in six public 
labour exchange offices around the state throughout the entire calendar year of 1994 (Klepinger 
et al. 1998, 2002).  A combined sample of 23,758 new monetarily eligible UI claimants were 
enrolled in the experiment.  The standard work search policy was given to the control group.  
This required two job search contacts per week, which had to be reported on the biweekly UI 
continued claim form but were not verified.  The four alternative treatments tested were 1) report 
four weekly employer contacts, which are not verified; 2) contact two employers per week, with 
no need to report the two contacted; 3) report two weekly employer contacts, which are not 
verified, plus attend a four-day JSW early in the unemployment spell; and 4) report two weekly 
employer contacts, which will be verified. Impact estimates were computed in regression and 
logit models controlling for age, sex, race/ethnicity, employment by a federal agency or the 
military, U.S. citizenship, earnings in each of the four quarters preceding the quarter a claimant 
applied for benefits, local employment office indicators, entry quarter, and maximum weekly 
benefit amount. Estimates were computed on the full sample of all monetarily eligible new 
claimants enrolled in the demonstration. The estimates can be interpreted as average effects over 
all eligible claimants, regardless of whether they actually adhered to the work search 
requirements in the experimental design. Requiring four job search employer contacts per week 
reduced the average duration of UI benefit receipt by 0.7 weeks. This reduction in duration 
resulted even when the employer contacts were not verified.  Telling beneficiaries to make two 
employer contacts per week, but removing the requirement to report the two contacts, resulted in 
a statistically significant increase in average UI benefit durations of 0.4 weeks.  Telling 
beneficiaries to make two employer contacts per week, plus requiring attendance at a four-day 
JSW early in the unemployment spell, reduced the average duration of UI receipt by 0.6 weeks.  
Requiring two employer contacts to be reported, plus telling claimants that their two contacts 
would be verified, shortened the average duration of UI benefit receipt by 0.9 weeks.  A 
verification rate of 10 percent appeared to be an adequate level of threat to generate a statistically 
significant response.  Notably, the bulk of the response to the fourth treatment occurred during 
the first spell of joblessness in the UI benefit year.  Similarly, the first treatment generated the 
bulk of its response during the first spell of joblessness in the benefit year. The effects of 
treatments 1, 3, and 4 were not associated with lower reemployment earnings.  However, 
eliminating the work search reporting requirement, as in Treatment 2, raised reemployment 
earnings by a statistically significant 4 percent.  The estimated effects of the treatments are not 
significantly different among specific demographic subgroups. In particular, there were no 
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differences across subgroups in the effects of the treatments on total UI benefits paid and the 
length of the first spell of UI by local office, race, age, sex, or prior earnings.  
 
 In the United Kingdom (UK), UI is administered by that country's public employment 
service and has a uniform initial duration of entitlement of 12 months. In 1987, a new program 
called Restart was introduced nationally. Under Restart, UI beneficiaries nearing six continuous 
months of receiving benefits were called in for an appointment at their local public employment 
service office and were provided with intensive job search assistance (Dolton and O’Neill 2002). 
An evaluation of the UK Restart program estimated short-term effects similar to those observed 
in the Tacoma alternative work search experiment (Dolton and O’Neill 1996).  Both evaluations 
suggested that there was a modest shortening in the duration of compensated unemployment and 
that the invitation for intensive job search assistance acted more as a prod than as a support for 
reemployment.  In a subsequent random-assignment field experiment, the treatment group 
received the standard UK Restart services when it was nearing six continuous months of 
claiming UI, while the randomly selected control group was given the same services when it was 
approaching 12 continuous months of receiving benefits.  The researchers found evidence that, 
over the short term, required job search assistance prodded both groups of UI beneficiaries to go 
back to work but that, over a longer, five-year term, the group that received such support earlier 
in its jobless spell had measurably higher earnings.23 This finding suggests that job search 
assistance can be a valuable service for job seekers. Long-term impacts by gender  were large 
and positive for males but were not measurable for females. 
 
Prior to 1996, unemployment benefits in the UK were often called “the dole” because of 
the lack of a work search requirement and the low wage replacement rate.  The benefit was 
renamed Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) because of the strong requirements for active work search.  
One requirement for continued benefits under the JSA is for the claimant to report in person 
every two weeks to a public benefits office to validate that he or she is making an active search 
for work.  A problem with this strategy was that public jobs offices were in a separate location 
from benefits offices.  Starting with a pilot program in 1999, Jobs and Benefits Offices (JBO) 
were created to strengthen the link between receipt of JSA and job search in Northern Ireland.  
These new institutions would strengthen the fortnightly monitoring interview, providing 
additional time and new elements of job search assistance, with advisers now able to suggest—
and submit electronic applications to—suitable registered vacancies during the interview.   
Northern Ireland is divided into 35 administrative areas.  Jobs and Benefits Offices (JBO) were 
established in 25 of these 35 areas by the end of 2008.  Refurbishment of each office took 
between 6 and 18 months, during which time the reporting requirement was suspended for 
continued JSA benefit receipt.  T-tests on the sample means suggest no significant difference 
between the treatment and control areas in terms of JSA stocks per capita, outflow and inflow 
rates, and redundancies and vacancies. In other words, treatments have not been differentially 
                                                 
23 Short-term estimates (Dolton and O’Neill 1996) were computed in competing risks models controlling 
for the observable characteristics age, sex, race, educational attainment, marital status, children, young children, 
driver’s license, home ownership, urban area, working spouse, and local unemployment rate.  The long term 
estimates (Dolton and O’Neill 2002) were estimated in linear probability models controlling for age, sex, urban area, 
past unemployment experience, and change in local unemployment rate.   
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imposed on high- or low-unemployment areas, on faster- or slower-falling unemployment areas, 
or on high- or low-vacancy or redundancy areas. During the sample inflow period, the aggregate 
JSA stock in Northern Ireland fell from over 60,000 in any given month to under 30,000. All 
areas of Northern Ireland experienced declining JSA stocks over this period, so labour markets 
were improving throughout the region.  Identification of the program change was done by the 
natural experiment of rolling remodeling efforts to create unified JOB offices in Northern 
Ireland.  McVicar (2010, p. 311) estimates that “withdrawal of job search monitoring on its own 
significantly increases the JSA stock, whether based on simple DID estimates, estimates from 
regressions of the JSA stock with various lag structures, or simulations of the JSA stock based on 
estimated flow effects.”  The magnitude of the effect estimated “—on the order of a 15% 
increase in registered unemployment—is similar to that found by Klepinger et al. (2002) when 
their zero monitoring and tough monitoring regimes are compared and contrasted” (McVicar 
2010, p. 311). 
 
 Mandatory Services.  Mandatory reemployment services are part of policies for many 
public employment services.  Frequently the penalty for not participating is a temporary 
suspension or reduction in UI benefit entitlement.  Blundell et al. (2004) examined the effect of 
mandatory reemployment services under the New Deal for Young People in the UK.  The 
program provides extensive job assistance and wage subsidies to employers.  Prior to this 
program, young people in the UK could, in principle, claim unemployment benefits indefinitely. 
Now, after six months of unemployment, young people enter the “Gateway,” which is the first 
period of intensive job search assistance. The program is mandatory, including the subsidized 
options part.  Blundell et al. (2004) focused on the job assistance and wage subsidy elements.  
They used data drawn from administrative records on a pilot test conducted in selected areas 
before nationwide program implementation.  The comparison group was selected from slightly 
older people of similar unemployment duration who lived in areas not involved in the pilot.  The 
authors applied a number of different econometric techniques, all exploiting the longitudinal 
nature of the data set being used but making different assumptions about the structure of the 
disturbances. All estimators amounted to difference-in-difference estimators with matching.  
They find that the outflow rate to jobs was increased by about 20 percent for young men as a 
result of the New Deal—that is, the number of men finding jobs in the first four months of the 
New Deal rises by 5 percentage points above a preprogram level of 26 percentage points. 
 
Sanctions.  Abbring, van den Berg, and van Ours (2005) used administrative data on new 
UI spells in the Netherlands in 1992 to assess the effect of sanctions for failure to comply with 
job search requirements.  In 1987 a new Dutch law on UI was introduced providing for a 
tightening of the eligibility rules and a system of benefit sanctions.  The law requires three things 
of claimants: 1) avoidance of unnecessary job loss, 2) positive actions to prevent staying 
unemployed, including active job search and participation in active employment and training 
programs, and 3) efforts to keep the administrative organization informed about everything that 
is relevant to the payment of the unemployment insurance benefits.  Failure to comply with these 
requirements can result in benefit sanctions.  The sanctions can be either a temporary or a 
permanent reduction—full or partial—of the benefit level. In practice, the temporary partial 
reduction of benefits ranges from 5 percent for four weeks to 25 or 30 percent for thirteen weeks.  
 78 
The UI administrative agencies are free to choose the sanctions they think are appropriate.  
Administrative data was provided on 182,239 unemployment spells starting in 1992.  A sanction 
was imposed in 2.9 percent of the cases, with the majority,  53 percent, being imposed between 8 
and 24 weeks of unemployment.  The effect of one random event on another, in the presence of 
selectivity, was estimated by a simple graphical procedure that extracts information on the effect 
of sanctions from the UI data, and that requires neither multiple spells nor regressors.  The 
estimator relies on the intuition that, “if a sanction increases the reemployment rate . . . then a 
relatively large fraction of those who make this transition [out of unemployment] have been 
given a sanction shortly before [they exit unemployment]” (Abbring et al. 2005, p. 618).  They 
estimate that reemployment rates are significantly increased by imposition of a sanction.  
Individual reemployment rates of males increase by 61 percent in the metal industry and by 36 
percent in the banking sector. For females, these effects are 98 percent for the metal industry and 
85 percent for banking.  Estimates on data in which the metal and banking industries are pooled 
with other industries suggest economy-wide sanction effects of 58 percent for males and 67 
percent for females.   
 
Targeted Job Search Assistance.  Targeting of JSA surfaced as a policy option during 
the 1990s, following the massive economic restructuring and worker dislocation of the previous 
decade.  Earlier research had identified JSA as a cost-effective tool for promoting return to work.  
The question of whether JSA would be effective for those at risk of long-term unemployment 
was evaluated in the context of a major field experiment in New Jersey (Corson et al. 1989).  
Together with earlier evidence on JSA cost-effectiveness, results from the New Jersey 
experiment supported establishment of the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services 
(WPRS) system, which required targeted JSA (Wandner 1994).   
 
Two subsequent experiments have evaluated the effectiveness of targeted JSA.  The first 
was undertaken around the time of WPRS start-up, with special accommodations made to ensure 
experimental integrity (Decker et al. 2000).  The second evaluation was done using data from 
after WPRS implementation (Black et al. 2003).  In this section, we briefly review the design and 
findings of these studies.  
 
New Jersey UI Reemployment Experiment.  Enrollment into the New Jersey UI 
Reemployment Experiment was done between July 1986 and June 1987 (Corson et al. 1989).  
The sampling frame for random assignment was set to target the evaluation to dislocated workers 
claiming UI benefits.  Characteristics screens were set to construct the sampling frame.   
These screens required that a claimant meet five conditions.  The claimant 1) must receive a first 
UI payment, and that payment must occur within five weeks of applying for benefits; 2) must be 
at least 25 years of age; 3) must have worked for the pre–UI claim employer for at least three 
years; 4) may not be on standby awaiting return to the claimant’s previous job with a specific 
recall date; and 5) may not be a union hiring hall member.   
 
The first three of these eligibility conditions permitted the offer of an intervention early in 
the jobless spell, and of these three, the second and third ensured that subjects of the experiment 
were well established labour force members separated from a long job attachment.  The fourth 
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and fifth conditions provided the potential for interventions to affect job search plans.  Claimants 
who are awaiting recall to their prior jobs and members of union hiring halls are not required by 
the UI system to engage in active job search.  
 
Random assignment sent 2,385 claimants to the control group and 8,675 to one of three 
treatment groups.  All three treatments included JSA, the first being JSA alone.  The second 
treatment added job training to JSA; the third treatment added a cash reemployment bonus to 
JSA.  The bonus was for reemployment within 11 weeks of the claim and was a cash payment of 
half the remaining UI entitlement, with the initial offer good for two weeks and then declining by 
10 percent per week.  The bonus was not paid if return to work was a recall, or if the job was 
temporary, seasonal, part-time, or with a relative.  For all three treatments, at five weeks into the 
claim, all claimants were given JSA orientation, skills and aptitude testing, a JSA workshop, and 
an assessment or counseling interview. 
 
During the benefit year, the impacts on weeks of UI benefit receipt were −0.47, −0.48, 
and −0.97 for the three treatments, respectively.  All of these impacts were estimated to have 
statistical significance.  The cumulative impacts on weeks of UI benefit receipt over the six years 
after the initial benefit claim were −0.76, −0.93, and −1.72 for the three treatments, respectively, 
with the impact from the third treatment estimated to have statistical significance (Corson and 
Haimson 1995).   
 
The New Jersey UI Reemployment Experiment demonstrated that JSA targeted to 
claimants likely to be long-term unemployed had the same cost-effective impact as that found for 
other groups of UI claimants—about half-a-week shorter UI receipt.  The encouraging results for 
the bonus treatment led the U.S. Department of Labour to further investigate the ideal design for 
a reemployment bonus offer (Decker and O’Leary 1995).   
 
Job Search Assistance Experiment.  The Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act 
of 1991 authorized the U.S. Department of Labour to conduct the Job Search Assistance 
Experiment.  The experiment was designed to evaluate whether providing early JSA to claimants 
identified by statistical models as being likely to exhaust their UI benefit entitlement would be 
cost-effective (Decker et al. 2000).  During the planning stages of the evaluation, which was 
scheduled to be run in the District of Columbia and the state of Florida, federal legislation 
leapfrogged public policy analysis. 
 
In 1993 President Clinton signed Public Law 103-152, which required state employment 
security agencies to establish and use a system of profiling all new claimants for regular UI 
benefits.  The Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) system was intended to 
identify UI claimants who were most likely to exhaust their regular benefits, so that they might 
be provided with early reemployment services to make a faster transition to new employment.   
 
 The WPRS established a two-stage process.  First, UI recipients who are expecting recall 
or who are members of a union hall are dropped.  These groups are excluded because they are 
not expected to undertake an active independent job search.  Second, remaining UI recipients are 
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ranked by their likelihood of exhausting regular unemployment insurance benefits.  Beneficiaries 
are then referred to early reemployment services in order of their ranking until the capacity of 
local agencies to serve them is exhausted.  The early assistance comprises at least eight hours of 
job search assistance, which usually includes an orientation to self-help facilities available at the 
public labour exchange and a JSW. 
 
In Florida, the JSA experiment proceeded with enrollment between March 1995 and 
March 1996 at 10 sites around the state where regular WPRS operations were temporarily 
delayed.  Random assignment in Florida involved 8,071 claimants.  In Washington, D.C., the 
experiment counted as the federal district’s WPRS implementation.  Random assignment 
enrollment for the JSA experiment was done in all public labour exchange offices throughout the 
District between June 1995 and June 1996 and involved 12,042 claimants.     
 
The JSA experiment established an eligible pool of claimants using a two-stage process: 
1) exclude job-attached and union hiring hall members, then 2) evaluate claimants’ probability of 
exhausting UI entitlement and target those with the highest probabilities for the evaluation.  
These claimants were randomly assigned to a control group or to one of three treatments.  The 
treatments were as follows: 1) structured job search assistance (SJSA): orientation, testing, JSW, 
and one-on-one assessment interview.  Failure to participate could result in denial of UI benefits.  
Two additional visits with staff to report job search progress; 2) individualized job search 
assistance (IJSA): orientation and one-on-one assessment interview.  Individual plan developed, 
which may include additional mandatory services; 3) individualized job search assistance with 
training (IJSA+): identical to IJSA, plus a coordinated effort with EDWAA staff to enroll the 
customer in training.  
 
The impacts of the three treatments on weeks of UI compensation in the benefit year in 
Washington, DC, were −1.13, −0.47, and −0.61, respectively, all estimated to have statistical 
significance.  Estimates of the same parameters in Florida were −0.41, −0.59, and −0.52, all of 
which, again, were statistically significant.  Both evaluations indicated that reemployment 
occurred at wage rates similar to prior levels.  The treatments had generally positive and 
significant effects on earnings in Washington, DC, but no impact on participant earnings in 
Florida. 
 
Structured JSA emerged as the most cost-effective intervention examined.  The authors 
of the evaluation report attributed the generally larger impacts observed in Washington, DC, to 
stricter enforcement of JSA participation requirements.  They recommend making particular JSA 
services mandatory and maintaining clear linkages between UI and ES in the new one-stop 
environment under the Workforce Investment Act (WIA). 
 
Dickinson, Decker, and Kreutzer (1999) conducted a six-state evaluation of the Worker 
Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) system implementation and effectiveness.  
Reliable data was available for only five of the six states (Connecticut, Illinois, Kentucky, New 
Jersey, and Maine).  Samples were drawn from the top of each state’s profiling score 
distribution, with UI beneficiaries near the top compared to those just below the WPRS referral 
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threshold.  Program impacts were estimated in regression models controlling for observable 
characteristics.  “The independent variables included in the regression models differed somewhat 
across states, but the models generally included variables for personal characteristics (including 
age, race, sex, and education), employment characteristics (including earnings, job tenure, 
industry, and occupation at previous job), UI entitlement (including weekly benefit amount and 
potential duration of UI benefits), and the probability of UI exhaustion calculated using the 
state’s statistical model. When possible we included all variables in the state’s statistical model 
as independent variables in our model. For some states, we were also able to control for local 
unemployment rates. Finally, all models included indicators for local office of initial claim and 
the quarter of the first payment” (Dickinson, Decker, Kreutzer, 1999, p. III-11).  Estimated 
average impacts on weeks of insured unemployment were –0.25, –0.41, –0.21, –0.29, and –0.98 
for Connecticut, Illinois, Kentucky, New Jersey, and Maine, respectively. 
 
Evaluation of Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services in Kentucky.  While 
Kentucky was included among the states studied in the national evaluation of WPRS, an 
independent assessment of WPRS in Kentucky based on an experimental design arrived at a 
much different conclusion.  The profiling model used in Kentucky was developed by economists 
at the Center for Business and Economic Research at the University of Kentucky (Berger et al. 
1997).  In working with the Kentucky Department for Employment Services on the WPRS 
system, these economists advocated a methodology for assignment to the WPRS that provided 
ready data for an experimental evaluation of WPRS effectiveness. 
 
Kentucky divides the predicted UI exhaustion distribution into 20 groups spanning 5 
percentile points each.  Every week the local WPRS capacity is hit within one of the 20 groups.  
That group is referred to as a profiling tie group (PTG).  In Kentucky, profiled WPRS customers 
within PTGs are randomly assigned to WPRS, or not.  This is viewed as an appropriate rule for 
referral to the WPRS from a group of UI claimants having scores that are not statistically 
significantly different.  It also provides the basis for evaluation of the WPRS based on 
randomized trials.   
 
From the PTGs, experimental and control groups were formed by the randomized trials to 
conduct an evaluation of the WPRS in Kentucky (Black et al. 2003).  Data was collected starting 
with the very beginning of WPRS implementation in Kentucky, in October 1994, and lasting 
through June 1996.  The PTGs yielded a total sample of 1,981 claimants, and 1,236 of these were 
assigned to mandatory WPRS JSA.  Compared to the total population of 48,002 profiled and 
referred Kentucky claimants during that period, means of observable characteristics (age, 
schooling, gender, race, prior earnings, and weekly benefit amount) for the experimental 
treatment group were not statistically significantly different from those in the control group.   
 
The impact estimates for WPRS in Kentucky were dramatic.  On three outcomes of 
interest, the estimated impacts were −2.2 weeks of UI, −$143 in UI benefits, and a $1,054 
increase in earnings during the UI benefit year.  The difference in these estimates from the 
national WPRS evaluation were most likely due to the fact that Black et al. (2003) essentially 
confined their contrasts within PTGs, thereby achieving a closer counterfactual.  Dickinson et al. 
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(1999, 2002) compared those assigned to WPRS who had the highest probability of benefit 
exhaustion against all those profiled but not referred, including many with very low exhaustion 
probabilities.  This meant the comparison group in the national evaluation was likely to have 
shorter mean benefit duration than program participants even in the absence of WPRS services.  
Essentially Black et al (2003) estimated local average treatment effects while Dickinson et al. 
(2002) estimated average treatment effects for the program.  When finely targeted, the WPRS 
program appears to be more effective. 
 
The willingness of the Kentucky Department of Employment Services to accept the 
recommendation of Professor Mark Berger and his colleagues regarding WPRS model design 
and system implementation was a key to producing reliable WPRS impact estimates (Berger et 
al. 1997).  Professor Berger and his colleagues at the Center for Business and Economic 
Research (CBER) at the University of Kentucky recommended randomization on the margin in 
assignment to WPRS.  This should be standard WPRS practice for all state and local 
employment service delivery agencies.  In setting up WPRS administrative rules, the Kentucky 
agency realized the value of evaluation research and used that orientation to help resolve the 
resource allocation problem.  When resources are limited, randomization in program assignment 
can always be viewed as an equitable mechanism.  It has the added benefit of providing for very 
strong evaluation evidence.   
 
Reemployment Incentives–Bonuses.  Between 1984 and 1989, four reemployment 
bonus experiments targeted at unemployment insurance (UI) recipients were conducted in the 
United States.  These experiments provided various levels of lump-sum payments to UI 
recipients who took new, full-time jobs within 6 to 12 weeks of their benefit application and held 
those jobs for at least three to four months.  Empirical UI research had produced evidence that UI 
payments might lengthen jobless durations beyond what they would be in the absence of UI.  
The purpose of these interventions was to learn more about the behavioral response of UI 
recipients to changes in the UI program.  Reemployment bonuses were intended to speed the 
return to work in a manner that would benefit employees, employers, and the government, and 
would be cost-effective.  UI claimants would be better off if they returned to work sooner and 
found jobs that were similar and paid similar wages to the jobs they would have taken in the 
absence of a bonus offer.  Employers would be better off if they experienced lower UI payroll 
taxes.  The government would be better off if the cost of the bonus was offset by a decrease in UI 
benefit payments to unemployed workers and an increase in income and other tax contributions 
by workers during their longer period of employment.  
 
Illinois UI Incentive Experiment.  The first bonus experiment was conducted in Illinois 
during 1984–1985 and was sponsored by the Illinois Department of Employment Security.  Its 
goal was to examine the theoretical and empirical economic implications of a reemployment 
bonus offer to UI claimants and the potential for developing a cost-effective bonus program.  The 
Illinois design provided a $500 bonus amount, equivalent to about four weeks of UI benefit 
payment—i.e., four times the UI weekly benefit amount (WBA).  To collect a bonus payment, 
treatment group members needed to become reemployed within 11 weeks of filing their UI 
claims. The estimated impact of the Illinois reemployment bonus offer to UI claimants was a 
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reduction in the duration of UI compensated unemployment by 1.15 weeks (Woodbury and 
Spiegelman 1987).  This reduction was so great that the reemployment bonus was cost-effective 
to the UI Trust Fund, generating a benefit cost ratio of 2.32.  At the same time, participants 
suffered no reduction in postunemployment wages, which indicated that the bonus offer did not 
reduce job quality. 
 
New Jersey UI Reemployment Demonstration.  Independent of the Illinois experiment, 
the U.S. Department of Labour (USDOL) sponsored a New Jersey UI experiment that included a 
reemployment bonus treatment group. This project was designed and became operational in 1985 
and 1986, before the results from the Illinois experiment became available.  As such, the New 
Jersey experiment was not designed to replicate or validate the Illinois experiment.  The New 
Jersey bonus offer was designed so that the amount of the offer was tied to a claimant’s 
remaining UI benefit entitlement and the amount paid was larger in cases of more rapid 
reemployment.  The initial bonus offer was one-half of the claimant’s remaining entitlement at 
the time of the offer.  This offer amount remained constant for the first two full weeks after the 
initial offer.  Thereafter the amount of the bonus offer declined by 10 percent of the original 
amount per week, falling to zero by the end of the eleventh full week of the bonus offer.  Initial 
bonus offers in New Jersey averaged $1,644, which was about nine times the UI weekly benefit 
amount.  The evaluation of the New Jersey experiment suggested that the reemployment bonus, 
as it was implemented in New Jersey, generated modest savings in UI.  Since the cost of offering 
and paying the bonuses exceeded the modest UI savings, the New Jersey bonus was not cost-
effective from the perspective of the UI system. 
 
Pennsylvania and Washington Reemployment Bonus Experiments.  In 1987, with the 
evaluation of the Illinois experiment completed and the New Jersey experiment operations over, 
the USDOL sponsored two additional reemployment bonus experiments, one in Pennsylvania 
and the other in Washington State.  In contrast to the Illinois experiment, these later trials 
generated much more modest results.  In the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments the 
bonus offers were set as multiples of the worker’s weekly benefit level.  This design was adopted 
because in the Illinois experiment claimants receiving less than the UI maximum weekly benefit 
responded more strongly to bonus offers than those constrained by the maximum (O’Leary, 
Spiegelman, and Kline 1995, p. 267).  The Pennsylvania and Washington experiments tested 
benefit levels that bracketed the Illinois bonus amount (4 × the weekly benefit allowance, or 
WBA) and tested qualifications both similar to the earlier offers and about half as great.  The 
resulting designs provided for four treatment groups in Pennsylvania and six in Washington.  
The dimensions of each design were the level of the bonus (high and low in Pennsylvania; high, 
medium, and low in Washington) and the qualification period or duration of the bonus offer 
(short and long in both states).  While half of the 10 treatments in Pennsylvania and Washington 
were cost-effective to claimants, society, and the government sector as a whole, only two of the 
treatments were cost-effective for the UI system (Decker and O’Leary 1992, 1995).   
 
The relatively weak response to the bonus offer in Pennsylvania and Washington led to a 
reexamination of the powerful Illinois results.  It was discovered that within the designed 
experiment, a second experiment had unintentionally taken place.  In 1984, as Illinois was 
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recovering from a major recession, the availability of Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC) 
was terminated.  This resulted in about half of the claimants studied having 38 weeks of UI 
benefit eligibility, with the remainder being eligible for only 26 weeks of regular UI benefits.  It 
turns out that the mean bonus response of −1.15 weeks in Illinois was made up of a response of 
−1.78 weeks for those eligible for FSC and −0.54 weeks for those not eligible.  The average 
response of −0.54 for the non-FSC sample in Illinois is close to the response observed in 
Pennsylvania and Washington, where the entitled duration of benefits was also similar.  
 
Among the individual treatments, the impact on weeks of UI benefits ranged from −0.05 
for the low bonus amount/short qualification period offer in Washington to −1.78 for the bonus 
offer to FSC-eligible claimants in Illinois.  Impacts for Pennsylvania tended to fall between those 
for Illinois and those for Washington.  Overall, a cash bonus can be expected to modestly shorten 
spells of insured unemployment—the mean effect of the offers made in the three states yielded 
about a one-half week reduction in weeks of UI benefits.   
 
The degree of response to the bonus offer was also examined for important subgroups 
within the sample.  Results from Pennsylvania and Washington suggest that UI claimants in low-
unemployment areas and claimants whose prior employment was in manufacturing tended to 
respond more strongly to the bonus.  However, close inspection of subgroup results reveals one 
main finding:  there is no difference between any pair of subgroups shown that is both 
statistically significant at conventional confidence levels and consistent across the three 
experiments.  The implication of this finding is quite striking—the reemployment bonus has a 
remarkably even impact on various subgroups of workers, whether delineated by gender, age, 
race, industrial sector of employment, level of local unemployment, or level of the weekly 
benefit amount. 
 
O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner (2005) investigate whether targeting reemployment 
bonus offers to UI claimants identified as most likely to exhaust benefits would reduce benefit 
payments.  They show that targeting bonus offers with profiling models similar to those in state 
WPRS systems can improve cost-effectiveness.  However, estimated average benefit payments 
do not steadily decline as the eligibility screen for targeting is gradually tightened.  The authors 
find that narrow targeting is not optimal.  The best candidate to emerge is a low bonus amount 
with a long qualification period, targeted to the half of profiled claimants most likely to exhaust 
their UI benefit entitlement.   
 
Two potential behavioral effects might reduce cost-effectiveness for an operational 
program (Meyer 1995):  First, an actual bonus program could have a displacement effect.  
Displacement occurs if UI claimants who are offered a bonus increase their rate of reemployment 
at the expense of other job seekers not offered a bonus.  Second, there is also the risk that an 
operational bonus offer program could induce an entry effect.  That is, the availability of a 
reemployment bonus might result in a larger proportion of unemployed job seekers entering the 
UI system.   
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If entry and displacement effects are sizable, actual program cost-effectiveness will be 
lowered.  However, targeting low bonus amount/long qualification period offers to only those 
most likely to exhaust UI should reduce both these risks.  Targeting would introduce uncertainty 
that a bonus offer would be forthcoming upon filing a UI claim, which should reduce the chance 
of a large entry effect.  Also, targeting should reduce any potential for displacement, since a 
smaller proportion of claimants would receive the bonus offer. 
  
Reemployment Services to UI Beneficiaries.  The high unemployment levels and long 
durations of UI receipt occurring in the 1975 recession led the U.S. Department of Labor 
(USDOL) to renew its emphasis on active job search by UI beneficiaries.  Guidelines for an 
eligibility review program (ERP) were issued by USDOL to all state employment security 
agencies in 1976, and beginning in 1977 states were allotted funds for operating ERPs (Walker 
1982).  The ERPs required states to do two things: 1) continuously review ability, availability, 
and the efforts of beneficiaries to gain reemployment and 2) promote reemployment by 
supporting an active job search by UI beneficiaries.  Over time the use of ERPs dwindled in 
many states, along with federal funding for staff to provide services.  Employment Service (ES) 
funding fell by half in real terms between 1984 and 2007 (O’Leary and Eberts 2008).  In 2005 
the USDOL renewed and expanded the ERP concept by dividing $30 million in funding among 
18 states to provide reemployment and eligibility assessment (REA) grants.  The REA requires 
two conditions.  First, UI beneficiaries must be required to report in person to a One-Stop Career 
Center for staff-assisted services as a part of the REA.  Second, assessments must include four 
steps: 1) a review of continued eligibility and referral to adjudication, as appropriate, when a 
potential issue is identified; 2) the provision of labour market information; 3) development or 
review of a work search plan; and 4) a referral to employment services (e.g., job search 
assistance workshops or job placement services) or to occupational or skills training, when 
appropriate.  Funding to states for REA rose to $50 million in 2009 (Small 2009). 
 
 Two recent evaluation studies provide additional evidence that work search requirements 
and JSA affect the duration of insured unemployment.  These studies looked at the 
Reemployment and Eligibility Assessment (REA) program and the Wisconsin reemployment 
demonstration in One-Stop Career Centers.  Both studies found beneficial effects of strengthened 
work search enforcement and linkages to reemployment services.  
 
 The REA initiative was a U.S. Department of Labor demonstration project with a budget 
of $20 million to provide assistance to states establishing new or significantly revamped REA 
programs.  REAs are an eligibility review program, run within the UI program without the 
participation of One-Stop center staff.  REA efforts were implemented in 21 states in 2005.  
Federal funds for REAs were appropriated with the proviso that research would be conducted in 
the pilot states to learn whether REAs could be a model for shortening jobless durations and 
reducing insured unemployment.  Evidence from a random assignment evaluation in Minnesota 
suggests that REAs reduced the duration of UI benefit receipt by 1.2 weeks (Benus et al. 2008).  
Estimation of the REA effects for Minnesota involved matching and regression adjustment on 
observable characteristics.  Recent federal initiatives have pumped millions of dollars into states 
to broaden the use of REA programs for UI beneficiaries. 
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 The Wisconsin demonstration project was also sponsored by the Employment and 
Training Administration (ETA) of the U.S. Department of Labor.  It brings UI and One-Stop 
center staff together to provide reemployment services and eligibility reviews in the One-Stop 
center.  In this cooperative operations model, UI staff are out-stationed in the One-Stop centers.  
The Wisconsin demonstration, with its nonexperimental evaluation design, provides further 
information about the cost-effectiveness of ES cooperation in the UI work test.  The project 
matched demonstration group claimants with up to three claimants from the comparison sites 
using an algorithm that linked individuals based on postal zip codes, their propensity to return to 
work (as predicted by their WPRS profiling scores), their prior employment history, and other 
individual background characteristics.  Impacts were estimated on outcomes of interest using 
regression adjustment including the following variables: had a disability; limited English 
proficiency; single parent; and number of previous UI claims. Those receiving additional 
attention for the work test in One-Stop centers shortened UI durations by 1.8 weeks and lowered 
benefit year compensation by $468 (Almandsmith 2006, p. 7). 
 
Youth Employment Services.  Centeno, Centeno, and Novo (2009) estimated average 
treatment effects on unemployment duration of active labour market programs in Portugal 
addressing long term unemployment of younger and older workers.  The Portuguese labour 
market is characterized by extremely high employment protection, long unemployment spells 
and generous unemployment insurance, and a low arrival rate of job offers—a rate that is low 
even in comparison to other European countries. The youth program (Inserjovem) targets all 
young people (less than 25 years old) before they have been registered for six months; the other 
program (Reage) attempts to serve all adults before they reach 12 months of unemployment.  
Both programs provide job search assistance, including vocational guidance, counseling, 
monitoring, and training or retraining options.  Potential sanctions—including loss of 
unemployment insurance and fee exemption to access the public health services—can result from 
failure to comply with the directions of the Employment Office (EO) placement team.  The 
programs were first introduced in a subset of EOs beginning in June 1998.  They were later 
rolled out sequentially to the other EOs, fully covering the country by January 2001. The pilot 
EOs were chosen for logistical reasons unrelated with the programs’ goals in terms of labour 
market outcomes.  Centeno, Centeno, and Novo (2009) apply a difference-in-difference 
methodology using a natural experiment, resulting in treatment and control groups originating 
from the sequential program implementation across the country.  They try to achieve 
identification by assuming that the average outcomes for treated subjects and controls would 
have followed parallel paths over time. They claim that results are robust to a wide variety of 
quasi-experimental designs and estimators.  They attempt to estimate the effects of the program 
compared to the outcome for the individual had he or she continued to search for a job in the 
absence of the support provided.  Impact estimates were computed while including a vector of 
covariates (predetermined with respect to the introduction of the program) that was included to 
correct for differences in observed characteristics between individuals in treatment and control 
groups.  The control variables include age, sex, nationality, schooling, place of residence, and 
some variables related to previous labour market experience (e.g., reason for job displacement).  
Results suggest the adult program leads to a modest reduction in the unemployment duration of 
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workers finding a job upon participation, whereas the impact for youth is generally negative 
(extended durations). These results are robust to a wide variety of constructions of 
nonexperimental settings and estimators. On the other hand, the results were mixed, and thus less 
satisfactory, for young workers, for those over 40, and for the less educated. Women also 
benefited less from the programs. The results seem to improve slightly for young workers in the 
second semester of implementation, but they deteriorate in the medium term. The lack of wage 
subsidies in the Portuguese programs may explain the minor impacts obtained when compared to 
similar programs.  Gender, age, and schooling seem to play an important role in determining the 
programs’ impact. In transitions into employment, the impact is larger for older men (a reduction 
of unemployment close to one month).  In terms of age, the largest impact is observed for 
individuals aged between 30 and 40. Workers with a higher degree of education seem to benefit 
more.   
Jensen, Rosholm, and Svarer (2003) study a Danish program associated with a dramatic 
decline youth unemployment. In 1996, Denmark established the Youth Unemployment 
Programme (YUP) for low-educated unemployed youth.  The dual aims of YUP are to increase 
the employability of low-educated unemployed youth, and to motivate them to undertake further 
education. The European Commission has labeled this program a “best practice.”  Young 
persons under the age of 25 without any formal education beyond secondary school, and who 
have been unemployed for 6 months during the last 9 months, are offered 18 months of specially 
designed vocational education.  Participants in a YUP education program, or other approved 
education program, receive UI at 50 percent the normal rate.  Refusal to participate in an 
approved education program results in loss of unemployment benefit entitlement.  Jensen, 
Rosholm, and Svarer investigated the impact of YUP on the duration of unemployment spells 
and the transition rates from unemployment to schooling and employment. They analyzed three 
effects at the very beginning of the YUP: an announcement effect, a direct programme effect, 
and a sanction effect; and found evidence that the YUP caused some of the observed reduction in 
youth unemployment.  Data was collected by interviewing approximately 3,500 individuals aged 
16–24 from April 1996 to December 1996. For each individual, they have information about 
labor market transitions occurring between the time of selection and the time of the interview, 
and about personal characteristics (age, gender, number of children, education, ethnic status).  
They also know whether and when the individuals have received an offer from the labor market 
office to participate in the YUP.  This information was used to construct treatment and a control 
groups. They provide homogeniety tests showing the control group was not meaningfully 
contaminated, and they argue this is because the sample was drawn early in the YUP 
implementation.  They estimate impacts on the risk of leaving unemployment for either skill 
improvement (education or training), or employment in a competing risks model controlling for 
observed and unobserved characteristics.24   
 
The main result is that the transition rate from unemployment to schooling is significantly 
raised by the YUP. This results mainly from a direct program effect and partially from the threat 
of sanction. These effects are estimated after correcting for the strong seasonality in the 
transition rate from unemployment to schooling.  In addition, they find somewhat weaker effects 
                                                 
24 They impose a restriction in estimation that unobserved errors in the training equation are perfectly 
correlated with errors in the employment equation.  
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on the transition rate from unemployment to employment. Their estimates of YUP effects 
suggest that aggregate youth unemployment may have been reduced by YUP through shifting 
young people away from ‘‘waiting on the dole’’ to ‘‘waiting in the classroom.’’ “Clearly, a 
significant increase in the transition to employment would have been more satisfactory.  
However, the possible ‘‘scarring’’ effect of unemployment suggests that it could be welfare-
improving to move the youth out of unemployment and into the classroom. Thereby, the long-
term consequences of unemployment may be mitigated.” (Jensen, Rosholm, and Svarer 2003, 
p. 314) 
 
3.4.5.1  Summary of EAS-related evaluations 
 
Our review of the effectiveness of support measures offered by public employment 
services around the world that are or could be available in Canada under the category of 
Employment Assistance Services (EAS) includes ten subcategories.  Evidence from evaluations 
in the U.S. suggest that job interviews and referrals can improve return-to-work rates and 
earnings, particularly for women and men in urban areas.  Evidence from France, the 
Netherlands, and the United States found small positive effects from job search counseling.  
Several studies in the United States and the United Kingdom testing active work search 
requirements for current UI beneficiaries found significantly shorter durations of UI receipt when 
the work test is stronger, and much longer durations when the work test is removed.  Mandatory 
services tested in the United Kingdom for unemployed youth had modest effects similar to the 
work test, while sanctions curtailing UI benefit entitlement in the Netherlands produced large 
and significant reductions in compensated durations.  Targeted job search assistance in the 
United States to those at risk of long term UI receipt is found to significantly shorten benefit 
durations.  Cash incentives for early return to work paid as bonuses after reemployment had 
modest effects in the United States, but the cost-effectiveness of such offers was improved when 
they were made to those most likely to have long durations of UI receipt.  Reemployment 
services provided on a regular schedule during a continuous spell of UI benefit receipt was found 
to shorten unemployment durations in the United States.  Similar favorable results were found 
when improving linkages between UI and ES services in One-Stop centers in the United States.  
Despite the threat of sanctions, employment services targeted to unemployed youths were not 
particularly effective in Portugal, but results were more encouraging in Denmark where 
outcomes include further education or training as well as employment. 
 
4 KNOWLEDGE GAPS IN THE EVALUATION LITERATURE  
 
 This chapter aims to lay a foundation for future evaluations of active labour market 
programs in Canada by identifying gaps in knowledge.  Filling these knowledge gaps would help 
to identify useful improvements in public employment policy.  The chapter is divided into three 
sections.  The first section summarizes gaps in the international evaluation literature reviewed in 
this paper.  The second chapter lists knowledge gaps in Canadian evaluations of public 
employment programs.  The third section lists items missing from the Canadian evaluations that 
are not reliably provided by the international literature.   
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4.1 Knowledge Gaps in the International Literature 
 
 This section provides an overview of informational items not found in the international 
literature concerning program impacts by participant subgroup, program features, bundling or 
sequencing of services, and labour market context.  The five categories of active labour market 
programs reviewed in Chapter 3 are discussed in sequence: skills development, targeted wage 
subsidies, self-employment assistance, job creation partnerships, and employment assistance 
services.  The remaining subsections of this chapter each follow the same sequence.   
 
 Skills Development.  Publicly funded job skill training has been a feature of active 
labour market policies in developed countries throughout the world for decades.  Nevertheless, 
the literature seems to suggest that policymakers and administrators of programs have not been 
able to improve outcomes over that time period.  While there has been considerable variation in 
evaluation findings, the majority of studies find modest positive labour market outcomes for 
adults and insignificant results for youth.  
 
 However, virtually no evaluation study has dissected the characteristics of the training 
that has been provided.  Training can be offered in formal educational institutions, on-line, at a 
work site, or in some combination of these.  Its content can be quite specific in nature or can 
integrate several domains of information.  It can be offered in a concentrated period of time or 
spread out over several months or years.  Furthermore, the effectiveness of these various 
modalities of training can interact with characteristics of the trainees and with characteristics of 
the trainers.  With quite limited exceptions, the international literature has not pried into the 
"black box" of training.   
 
 Given that the evidence to date suggests that the social payoff to skills development, if 
any, is derived only after several years, another gap in the literature is that it contains virtually no 
papers on the depreciation rates of skills that are acquired through training.  This, of course, 
would require long-term follow-up.  Fortunately, longitudinal databases have been constructed in 
a number of European countries.  Unfortunately, these data have not been fully exploited for this 
type of analysis. 
 
 Much of the international evidence stems from European countries that are, relative to the 
United States or Canada, densely populated.  Skills development traditionally has been offered in 
classroom settings, and so it may be hypothesized that rural populations have had access 
problems.  The literature provides little evidence on differences in training impacts across urban 
and rural subgroups.  
 
 Finally, the impact of the business cycle on training is not well-known.  Theoretical 
arguments can be made either way.  When unemployment is relatively high, the pool of 
unemployed includes relatively higher-skilled and more motivated individuals, which suggests 
that more positive outcomes may occur.  On the other hand, a soft labour market makes it more 
difficult to find employment after being trained. 
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 Targeted Wage Subsidies.  The most notable gap in the international evaluation 
literature on targeted wage subsidies has to do with understanding the effectiveness of the design 
of the program.  Most evaluations treat a targeted wage subsidy program as a "black box," in the 
sense that it is known that the program provides a wage subsidy, but little attempt is made to 
evaluate the effectiveness of different aspects of the program’s design.  An evaluation typically 
describes the program it is studying, but rarely does it assess the effectiveness of variations in the 
design of the program.  Since program design varies significantly across targeted wage subsidy 
programs, it is difficult to generalize about the effects of such program features.  It would be 
useful for policymakers if evaluation reports included more details about the treatment 
examined. Consequently, it is hard to piece together results from various studies to try to 
understand the marginal effects of program design changes, because of the confounding factors 
among them.  For instance, the United States’ Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) program 
provides a tax credit of up to 40 percent on the first $8,890 of earned income.  The subsidy 
decreases as earned income increases, until the subsidy is phased out.  The exact amount depends 
upon family circumstances.  The United Kingdom’s Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC) 
provides a flat amount of roughly £145 for up to £80 of earned income before tax and benefits.  
For earned income greater than £80, the person’s income after benefits and taxes jumps to £225, 
and then increases proportionally with increases in earned income thereafter.  The WFTC also 
includes a generous child tax credit for child care; the EITC does not.  Clearly, the EITC and the 
WFTC are different in design, but the literature does little to determine how much the difference 
in generosity affects the outcomes.  Furthermore, the frequency of the subsidy payment to 
recipients differs between the two programs, depending upon whether the EITC recipient elects 
to receive advance payment.  The impact of the WFTC on labour force participation is shown to 
be around 5.0 percentage points for lone mothers, and the impact of the EITC on the labour force 
participation of single mothers is shown to be roughly 2.4 percentage points.  Yet a study of the 
EITC finds that the program raises the labour force participation rate of least-educated mothers 
by 6.2 percentage points (Eissa and Liebman 1996).   
 
 It is difficult to know how to think about these results with respect to the design of the 
program.  Comparing two evaluations done by the black box approach, there are too many 
variables changing to attribute an effect estimate to one factor.  For example comparing WFTC 
and EITC, does a more generous tax credit raise the labour force participation rate from 2.4 
percentage points to 5.0 percentage points (to take the average results of the evaluations of the 
two programs)?  Or could it be that the participants of the WFTC are much less educated on 
average than the participants of the EITC, and a more apt comparison would be the average 
results of the WFTC of 5.0 percentage points with the results for the least-educated recipients of 
the EITC of 6.2 percentage points?  Perhaps reimbursement of child care under the WFTC 
accounts for the difference?  What is missing is the ability to assess how variations in particular 
program program features affect outcomes.  Such assessments should be done within specific 
program evaluations. 
 
Another gap in the literature is that very few programs have been evaluated using random 
assignment.  The majority of evaluations rely on comparison groups constructed using 
propensity score matching.  The gap is obviously not the fault of researchers but rather can be 
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blamed on the lack of attention or funds from policymakers to conduct demonstration projects or 
on their failure to set aside funds from a portion of an existing program to conduct random 
assignment evaluation.  Obviously, some programs, particularly ongoing programs, are difficult 
to evaluate using experimental methods, whether for ethical reasons or because the services are 
considered entitlements or essential to the well-being of the individual.  Therefore, 
nonexperimental methods will always be relied upon to evaluate most of the programs that are in 
place.  Nonetheless, questions do emerge as to the validity of nonexperimental approaches.  For 
example, consider that the only recent random assignment evaluation of a wage supplement 
program was conducted for the Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP), even though the United 
States’ EITC and the United Kingdom’s WTFC are extensive and costly programs.  The trial 
Canadian program is different from the U.S. and U.K. programs in that it has a three-year limit 
for receiving the subsidy, whereas the latter two are indefinite as long as applicants qualify 
according to their earnings.  For any given year, the Canadian and U.K programs are more 
generous in the subsidies provided than the U.S. program.  The United Kingdom covers child 
care, while the other two do not.  Despite these differences in program design, it is interesting to 
compare the evaluation results of the three programs:  one based on random assignment 
methodology and the other two based on matching techniques.  For lone mothers, the Canadian 
random assignment evaluation found an increase of between 6.1 and 12.6 percentage points in 
full-time employment (at least 30 hours per week) during the first four years.  Two evaluations 
of the U.K. program found an impact of between 2.9 percentage points (Leigh 2005) and 5.5 
percentage points (Francesconi and Van der Klaauw 2004).  The question is whether the 
Canadian SSP, since it is an experiment based on random assignment, should be used as the 
benchmark for evaluations of the other programs.  Obviously, it might be an interesting starting 
point for comparison, but the program design features differ so much as to render such a 
comparison problematic.   
 
 Another issue is the interaction of programs that exist concurrently with those under 
study.  Most evaluations have a narrow focus, but their participants may participate or have 
options to participate simultaneously or sequentially in other programs.  The evaluation results 
may be influenced by such interactions, even though the evaluation methodology tries to control 
for such factors.  On the other hand, it is important to understand how programs interact, and by 
not explicitly taking this interaction into account, the evaluations leave a gap in our 
understanding of those relationships.  
 
 Self-Employment Assistance.  International evidence on self-employment assistance is 
generally positive.  Controlling for other factors, evaluations suggest that SEA participants 
experience higher rates of self-employment, higher levels of income (from self-employment and 
other earnings), and draw less UI compensation.  Most evidence comes from programs providing 
a weekly or biweekly stipend at the level of UI benefits during the SEA start-up period.  The 
Canadian SEA program provides periodic payments, but it also requires personal contributions to 
the start-up costs. There is little or no international evidence on this last feature.  While only the 
United States targets SEA offers to those at high risk of long-term UI benefit receipt, compared 
to other unemployed job seekers most SEA participants worldwide are older and have more 
education, more labour market experience, and more personal assets.  This profile probably also 
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fits Canadian SEA participants, and these factors are probably positively correlated with SEA 
success.  Statistical evidence is lacking about SEA success in the dimensions of demographic 
characteristics, industrial and occupational settings, and self-funding requirements.  Encouraging 
evidence suggests that SEA can be a successful intervention in areas of high unemployment.  
Since most SEA evaluations have been relatively short term, and business survival is best judged 
over the longer term, future evaluations done five or more years after SEA assistance would be 
very valuable.    
 
 Job Creation Partnerships.  Gaps in the evaluation literature of direct job creation using 
government funds are similar to those identified for the targeted wage subsidies in Section 3.4.2.  
The lack of evaluations that estimate the marginal effects of different program designs leaves 
policymakers without a clear road map as to which features of a direct employment program they 
may prefer to adopt.  Since these programs may be used for different reasons, ranging from a 
countercyclical program to a program for employing the hard-to-employ, understanding these 
features is important.  
 
 In addition, very few programs are evaluated using random assignment methodology.  
The only program identified in this critique is the United States’ Supported Work Demonstration, 
which was conducted more than three decades ago.  The relevance of the findings of that 
program for reforming current programs or fashioning future ones could be questioned, since the 
labour environment and general attitudes of the groups covered in that demonstration may be 
different today, which could affect their response to the services and incentives integrated into 
that demonstration.  
 
 Employment Assistance Services.  Our review of the international literature on 
interventions that could fall under the heading of Employment Assistance Services (EAS) 
includes ten categories: 1) Job Interview Referrals and Job Placements, 2) Counseling, 3) Job 
Search Assistance, 4) UI Work Test, 5) Mandatory Services, 6) Sanctions, 7) Targeted Job 
Search Assistance, 8) Reemployment Incentives/Bonuses, 9) Reemployment Services to UI 
Beneficiaries, and 10) Youth Employment Services.  Evidence from several countries suggest 
that general public employment services, including job interview referrals and placements, 
counseling, and job search assistance, improve rates of reemployment and often modestly 
improve reemployment earnings.  These services are uniformly identified as being inexpensive 
to provide.  Employment service measures taken to assure an active job search by UI 
beneficiaries have been shown to be effective in several countries.  These studies include 
experimental removal of the work test in the United States and the United Kingdom, requiring 
mandatory services participation in the U.K., and the imposition of sanctions for failure to 
participate in the Netherlands.  Early targeting of reemployment services to those with the 
highest risk of long-term joblessness is also effective, as are targeted cash incentive payments for 
speedy return to work.  For unemployed youth who are ill-prepared for the job market, a Danish 
study  found that withholding or reducing cash unemployment assistance is an effective lever for 
motivating return to work or learning.  In Portugal, however, requiring participation in 
reemployment services combined, with the threat of losing UI for nonparticipation, worked as an 
incentive for older workers but not for younger workers.      
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4.2 Knowledge Gaps in the Canadian LMDA Evaluations 
 
 This section overviews estimates not provided in the Canadian LMDA evaluations of 
EBSMs by participant subgroup, program features, bundling or sequencing of services, and 
labour market context.  
 
 Skills Development.  The evaluation evidence from the Canadian LMDA evaluations of 
EBSMs mirrors the evidence from the extant literature from other countries.  That evidence 
shows relatively modest positive employment and earnings impacts, but it has very little to say 
about how those impacts vary by training or trainer characteristics.  Sample size constraints 
furthermore limit the Canadian findings about subgroup impacts, and the follow-up periods have 
been too short to estimate depreciation rates. 
 
 An advantage of the Canadian evidence vis-à-vis the international evidence is that it is 
able to exploit provincial variation in labour market conditions.  Thus there is tighter evidence 
about the effect of the business cycle on labour market outcomes.  Furthermore, the population 
densities across the provinces differ considerably, and so Canadian evidence of the effectiveness 
of skills development for rural populations should be available. 
 
Targeted Wage Subsidies.  Most of the LMDA evaluations estimated significant 
employment and earnings gains from targeted wage subsidies, with gains more pronounced for 
younger and harder-to-employ customers.  The evidence on EI savings was less encouraging, 
and most certainly resulted from the definition of insurable earnings under EI that permitted EI 
receipt after separation from employment supported by a targeted wage subsidy.  The Targeted 
Wage Subsidy program is the third largest active labour program in Canada.  There is adequate 
sample size among participants to do a deeper analysis of subgroup impacts.  The collection of 
LMDA evaluations has been constrained by budgets for follow-up surveys.  Better use of 
program administrative data could provide deeper insights into the workings of the program.  
Important evidence for Canada is also available from the self-sufficiency experiments.  As for 
targeted wage subsidies, results suggest that intervention effects are more positive for former 
claimants than for active claimants.  No evidence is available in the Canadian context for wage 
subsidies to employers through the income tax system; this could be a rich area for future policy 
and research.  The Canadian earnings supplement project (ESP) tested wage subsidies paid to 
workers.  Such supplements are appealing since they can avoid the stigma resulting from paying 
employers for hiring the unemployed.  Unfortunately, the very low take-up rate for the ESP did 
not yield reliable evidence of effects.  Such an intervention could be retried in Canada as an 
integral part of EI or the tax system.  Either avenue may yield higher take-up than the adjunct 
payments system tried in ESP. 
 
Self-Employment Assistance. The Canadian SEA provides weekly income support 
payments at the rate of EI benefits, and requires personal contribution of at least 25 percent of 
start-up costs.  Evidence from the LMDA evaluations suggest that SEA increases annual working 
hours by 20 to 30 percent, but that it also results in reduced annual income for SEA participants 
relative to proper comparison groups.  Evidence from the Wong, Henson, and Riddell (1998) 
 94 
evaluation of earlier versions of self-employment assistance was more favorable.  Perhaps a 
reconsideration of program design features could be undertaken.  In particular, the role of the 
personal contribution could be evaluated in a random assignment experiment.  Furthermore, it 
would be useful to have evidence on SEAs in different economic contexts, by demographic 
characteristics, by occupational and industrial categories of activity, and with long-term 
follow-up.   
 
Job Creation Partnerships. The LMDA evaluations yielded inconsistent and weak 
evidence on the effects of job creation partnerships.  There were insignificant main effects, and 
in most cases reliable impact estimates were not provided for subgroups delineated by participant 
characteristics, provider characteristics, labour market conditions, or ownership settings.  The 
former is not surprising; the latter is disappointing.  The main aims of direct job creation 
programs are normally to provide income transfer to a disadvantaged population while 
preventing further decline in employability skills through work experience.  Transition to regular 
nonsubsidized employment is not typically the main focus.  However, in any evaluation there are 
aspects of the intervention with positive outcomes, and detailed subgroup analyses should be 
done to reveal such results. 
 
Employment Assistance Services. Evidence about effects of EAS from the LMDA 
evaluations is mixed and mostly insignificant.  Nicholson (2010) writes that a main challenge to 
evaluators is the fact that EAS is usually combined in an action plan with other interventions.  
Therefore, evaluations focused on “EAS only" claimants have little statistical precision or power.  
These are the most widely used active labour market interventions in Canada, and the least is 
known about them.  Evaluation studies could estimate incremental effects of services by 
comparing bundles delivered in action plans.   
 
4.3 Questions to Be Answered: Overlap in Knowledge Gaps 
 
 This section summarizes categories of evidence not provided in either the international 
studies or the Canadian LMDA evaluations of EBSMs by participant subgroup, program 
features, bundling or sequencing of services, and labour market context.  
 
 Skills Development.  In the next round of EBSM evaluations, a major contribution could 
be made by carefully collecting data on training characteristics.  These would include total hours, 
hours per day, days per week, trainer(s) background and characteristics, trainee attendance, 
certification, technology and equipment used, characteristics of the location(s) of training, and so 
forth.  If feasible, randomized controlled experiments around some of these features would add 
value to the evaluation.   
 
 Furthermore, evaluations should plan for long-term follow-ups to track outcomes over 
time.  While this may be cost-prohibitive for entire cohorts, there may be subsamples of 
participants and controls for which longer-term follow-ups could be conducted.   
 
Targeted Wage Subsidies. Larger sample sizes achieved through the use of 
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administrative data could support deeper analysis of subgroup effects in the Canadian context on 
impacts by participant characteristics, location characteristics, provider characteristics, or source 
of support.  Detailed records on program features should be kept in administrative data, and these 
should be used in evaluation.  Important program features include the duration of subsidy and the 
amount of subsidy. Other mechanisms for wage subsidies could also be tried in controlled 
evaluations.  For example, subsidies paid to employers through the tax system for hiring from 
targeted groups, or wage supplements paid to job seekers through the EI or tax system.  
Additionally, limiting EI insurable earnings to non-subsidized work is an important question for 
policy debate; however, current entitlements make evaluation a challenging proposition. 
 
Self-Employment Assistance. Participation in SEA is quite small in Canada.  The full 
administrative file on all participants should be used for evaluation.  Comparison groups could 
be drawn from incomplete SEA applications, or from matching on characteristics among EI 
beneficiaries or reachbacks in EBSM records.  It would be useful to have evidence on SEAs in 
different economic contexts, by demographic characteristics, by occupational and industrial 
categories of activity, and with long-term follow-up.  Much of this analysis could be done with 
larger sample sizes available through use of administrative data. A random assignment 
experiment could evaluate the role of the 25 percent cost contribution to SEA participation and 
success.   
 
Job Creation Partnerships. There is very little reliable evidence about job creation 
partnerships (JCP) from the LMDA evaluations.  Worldwide there is little evidence that direct 
job creation programs like JCP lead to high rates of unsubsidized work. There is some 
international evidence that when direct job creation programs are operated by private sector 
enterprises, the transition to unsubsidized work is higher.  This program design feature could be 
tried and evaluated.  The main aims of direct job creation programs are normally to provide 
income transfer to a disadvantaged population while preventing further decline in employability 
skills through work experience.  Different metrics for JCP success could be devised—for 
example, preventing a rise in social assistance participation and program costs.  Such analysis 
would require linkage of administrative records across programs.  Evaluation of other EBSMs 
could benefit from linked program administrative data.   
 
Employment Assistance Services. Evaluations of a wide range of active labour market 
programs (ALMPs) across a variety of countries have produced three essential findings: 1) job 
search assistance programs are the most cost-effective, 2) large-scale public service employment 
programs are the least cost-effective and most costly, and 3) job training programs and 
employment subsidies fall somewhere in between, with the degree of cost-effectiveness 
dependent on proper targeting of assistance.  EAS is the most widely used active labour market 
intervention in Canada, and it might be the most cost-effective.  However, reliable knowledge on 
program effects is lacking.  The bundling of services in the action plan has confounded efforts to 
identify the effects of separate services.  International evaluations have found some services in 
the EAS menu more effective for certain categories of customers.  Compilation and analysis of 
EAS administrative data is invaluable for revealing the Canadian patterns of effectiveness for 
services by subgroup, location, and economic context.  
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5 IMPROVING THE NEXT ROUND OF LMDA EVALUATIONS 
 
5.1 Increasing Effective Sample Size 
 
Previous evaluations of EBSM under LMDA suffered from insufficient sample sizes.  
Larger sample sizes would support more extensive analysis of effects by participant subgroups, 
program features, services bundling and sequencing, and labour market context.  The main 
constraint on sample size was the cost of follow-up surveys conducted by third party survey 
agencies.  Sample sizes for all EBSM evaluations can be increased by more use of available 
administrative data on program participants.  When samples are chosen properly, these data can 
also be a source of information on very large comparison groups.  Supplementary follow-up 
surveys can be justified in certain cases.  This was requirement in recent years when 
administrative data could not be linked to Revenue Canada tax records for outcome measures of 
reemployment.  Linking to Revenue Canada data for outcome measurement greatly increases the 
research potential for program administrative data in Canada. 
 
5.2 Advantages and Drawbacks of Using Program Administrative Data 
 
 Use of program administrative data in evaluations has the potential to increase the 
effective sample sizes for evaluations at relatively low cost.  This section focuses on the 
drawbacks of using administrative data for evaluations.  There are a number of issues when 
working with administrative data records that make use of such data for policy analysis quite 
challenging.  These include but are not limited to: 1) the volume of data to be extracted, 2) 
unique identification of individuals, 3) documentation (or mainly lack thereof), and 4) missing 
and altered data. 
 
 A census of micro records for policy analysis requires intensive use of computing 
resources and should be accomplished on statistical server(s) and input/output (IO) sub-system(s) 
dedicated to that purpose.  Not only is considerable physical, data storage required but the IO 
sub-system attached to statistical server(s) must have the throughput capabilities to deliver the 
data and receive it again when modified by statistical processes.  Random access memory 
(RAM) must also be very large depending upon the statistical software used to process the data.  
As an example, the Upjohn Institute has completed many projects over the past 11 years for one 
state that involve use of all, state-wide quarterly wage records dating back to 1993.  The 
expected addition of data in 2011 will result in raw wage record data in excess of 330,000,000 
records.  Given that our statistical software (Stata) relies heavily on RAM for processing, the 
definition of new variables, data sorts and the balancing of the wage record data require over 128 
GB of RAM.  Furthermore, given a census of data from this state for unemployment insurance 
(UI) and the employment service (ES), the compilation all the wage and program data from the 
mid 1990s to the present currently requires 45 hours of continuous processing to produce all the 
analysis-ready data sets needed. 
 
 Another important consideration for data extraction is the question of who will extract the 
data and compile it for statistical analysis?  The experience of the Upjohn Institute is that data 
 97 
programmers for many government agencies are very capable at writing the code needed to 
extract data but often do not have the software and statistical knowledge needed to thoroughly 
examine the extract to make sure the results are in fact a “census” and that the results produced 
“make sense.”  Also, it is best practice to rely on experienced statistical programmers to merge 
data across data files and programs.  What this means is that unless the statistical analyst requests 
and receives complete data dumps of all agency data, extracts will often need to be repeated after 
the data are examined by experienced analysts and underlying errors are found. 
 
 One of the most sensitive and unfortunate issues with regard to administrative data 
concerns the unique identification of individuals.  Here in the United States that is best 
accomplished using social security numbers.  However, pervasive fear and multiple headlines 
over the past decade concerning “identity theft” have made this a very difficult issue.  Another 
state with which the Upjohn Institute has completed several projects over the past decade refuses 
to release the social security numbers with the micro data, and relies on a system that generates 
unique identifiers for each individual.  While that is typically not a problem for projects that are 
one-time events, data extracts that are repeated several times over a period of years for updates 
of the same project or new projects that often involve other agencies, introduce the problem of 
consistent identification over time.  Currently, the Upjohn Institute is facing this issue with the 
state just mentioned.  An update of certain data that involve “bogus” identifiers has a period of 
overlap from 2006-2008 with the same type of data received previously.  A merge of the 
“unique” identifiers from both data sources resulted in a successful match rate of just 0.1 percent 
upon initial receipt of the data.  An agency error was uncovered, the data re-written, and our 
successful match rate is currently 63 percent.  Obviously, more errors need to be resolved. 
 
 An obvious piece of information needed to understand administrative data sets and what 
might be possible from a research perspective is documentation.  In actual practice, that 
documentation is often just a COBOL program or a listing of variable names within a relational 
database.  Also, on more than one occasion as we have approached agencies to formulate a data 
request, we have asked for documentation only to receive the reply, “You tell us what you want 
and we’ll tell you if we have it.”  The important part of this aspect of acquiring agency data is 
developing relationships with the right people who have authority and fully support the project.  
Until that happens, be prepared to be greeted with suspicion. 
 
 Missing values for many observations of important research variables is common within 
administrative data sets.  For a recent project with yet another state involving unemployment 
insurance data, upon initial examination of the data, we found that 28 percent of all UI records 
were missing values for race/ethnicity, 29 percent missing for education and 35 percent missing 
data for the length of tenure on the most recent job from which they had separated.  Fortunately, 
the proper research pool from which we ultimately estimated statistical models was a sub-set of 
all UI applicants and this pool had much lower rates of missing data.  Nevertheless, we chose to 
include binary indicator variables for missing data within certain classes of variables because the 
systematic reasons those data were missing were resulting in certain groups failing to receive 
agency services.  By including the indicator variables in the models that were to be used by the 
agency, these persons were re-included in the pool for service receipt. 
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 Finally, an issue related to missing data is that because agencies use data primarily for 
program administration instead of planning for research, things are done that compromise the 
research value.  For example employment service transactions are commonly over written each 
time a customer visits an employment center so that individual transactions histories cannot be 
recovered.  The Upjohn Institute has also encountered administrative coding of data fields 
intended to have other meanings.  We worked with two state UI agencies that use the 
individual’s prior occupation code data field to instead record other administrative data. One 
agency modifies the occupation code to track whether the person is exempt from job search 
requirements and whether the client ultimately returns to past employment.  Another agency 
modifies the occupation code to indicate whether the client had previously registered with the 
employment service.  Obviously, these modifications transform an important variable for 
economic research into something useless, or worse–misleading. 
 
5.3 Filling Knowledge Gaps in Evaluations 
 
 The LMDA evaluations produced limited information on differences in program effects 
across participant subgroups, labour market conditions, program delivery methods, program 
features, program combinations, program sequences, and labour market context.  In Chapter 4, 
these subgroup impact estimates were the main gaps identified in the Canadian evaluations of 
EBSM.  Also in Chapter 5, the gaps review of the international literature suggests some 
important areas where future Canadian evaluations and policies could focus.  For example, 
requiring active job search while receiving cash EI benefits, closely monitoring and supporting 
active job search, and enforcing consequences when found deficient.  A common theme 
emerging from all the studies is to provide high quality services, while at the same time 
expecting a high level of effort from customers.    
 
5.4 Next Steps: Suggestions for Improving the Draft Cycle II Evaluation Plan 
 
 We endorse the plan to use administrative data as the main information source for round 
two of EBSM evaluations under LMDA.  We endorse the national strategy for pooling data 
across provinces to evaluate particularly small active measures, and for programs with larger 
participant counts, to facilitate extensive analysis of impacts by participant subgroups, labour 
market characteristics, and program features.    
 
 Participation of the federal partner should yield economies of scale in evaluation design 
and operations.  Program administrative data linked to Revenue Canada records should be the 
main sources of information for evaluations.  A national perspective in evaluation could also 
help adjust for economic conditions and generate labour market adjusted estimates to facilitate 
comparison of effectiveness across areas.  
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